Bentzen, Bruno (2023) Propositions as intentions. Husserl Studies. pp. 1-18.
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Abstract
I argue against the interpretation of propositions as intentions and proof-objects as fulfillments proposed by Heyting and defended by Tieszen and van Atten. The idea is already a frequent target of criticisms regarding the incompatibility of Brouwer’s and Husserl’s positions, mainly by Rosado Haddock and Hill. I raise a stronger objection in this paper. My claim is that even if we grant that the incompatibility can be properly dealt with, as van Atten believes it can, two fundamental issues indicate that the interpretation is unsustainable regardless: (1) it is hard to determine, without appealing to propositional intentions on pain of circularity, what intention a proof-object should be understood as a fulfillment of; (2) due to a difficult fulfillment dilemma, it is unclear, at best, what the object of an intention corresponding to a proposition is.
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Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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Keywords: | intuitionism; Husserl; intentional fulfillment; intuition; Heyting | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Foundations Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof |
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Depositing User: | Dr. Bruno Bentzen | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 13 Jan 2023 14:04 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 13 Jan 2023 14:04 | ||||||
Item ID: | 21632 | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Husserl Studies | ||||||
Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10743-0... | ||||||
DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1007/s10743-022-09323-3 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Foundations Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof |
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Date: | 9 January 2023 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 1-18 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21632 |
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