

On the Recognition of Phenomena using Empirical Correlations

Abstract

We live in the midst of many recognitions every day. We know that there are various phenomena around us and we understand what they are. These actions are performed both unconsciously and consciously, and are essential to human beings.

In this paper, the main theme is the recognition of phenomena. Recognition is not merely to know it, but to understand it. Therefore, recognition of a phenomenon does not mean knowing that the phenomenon exists in and of itself, but also thinking about the factors that cause the phenomenon to exist.

In considering the recognition of phenomena, we use the concept of "empirical correlation," as mentioned in the title. This is an expression of experience in the form of "correlation between human beings and various phenomena" in order to clarify the concept of "experience" in general. The empirical correlation is a correlation that has two major domains: "transferable experience" and "intrinsic experience."

In addition, this empirical correlation is used to explain phenomena, which are divided into several stages. In order, they are the first, second, and third phenomena. In this division, I have based my own definition of the phenomena, but have additionally defined their components based on the idea of empirical correlations, and have built upon them.

Ultimately, I completed the process of constructing the phenomena by describing each of the phenomenal stages as a series of processes of constructing the phenomena, and then describing a new process called "skepticism" as a concomitant part of the process.

How do we perceive phenomena? By no means is the object we see now what it originally was, nor is it what is now fixed. It is within this correlative phenomenological composition that we relate to various phenomena and carry out various transformations. I hope you will take these ideas from this paper and understand them.

1 . Experience

The subject of "experience" has long been debated by many philosophers. It has been

approached from a standpoint that either insists on the importance of experience or does not. This paper does not deal with such a theme as "the conflict between empiricism and rationalism," which has been one of the triggers in Western philosophy, but simply analyzes the nature of experience itself.

Experience seems to have a great deal to do with our daily lives. Experience is involved not only when we limit our actions because we have had this experience before, but also when we look ahead to a point in time beyond the present and say, "I am going to have this experience.

To begin with, I would like to give a brief definition of experience. First of all, I would like to give a brief definition of experience: "Experience is the general term for the correlation between various phenomena and human beings, which can be broadly divided into two categories: intrinsic experience and transferable experience.

In life, people have to relate to many phenomena. And sometimes, there are interrelationships among those relationships. For example, suppose you are heading to a shopping center. But just as you are about to go there, you remember that you have an appointment with a friend. You therefore change your destination to the meeting place with your friend.

At this point, there is no correlation between the shopping center and the friend itself. However, for "you," the thinker, these two points in the category of destination should be considered reciprocal, with the values of "before" and "after.

In other words, what is being thought of here is not the shopping center and friends as "noema" for you, but the relationship between you and the shopping center/friends created by the thought (destination). In this way, when we deal with multiple events, we sometimes think not only of them as a unit but also of the relationship between them and us. We give this relationship a specific name, "correlation," and call it experience.

What is the situation when we compare events with each other? This means that there is some kind of correlation between the events. In the previous example, if both destinations are different shopping centers, we would not only compare the two types of relationship "person - shopping center" in the category of destination, but we would also note that each has the same property of being a "place (or homogeneity) of goods. We would also note that they have the same "place of sale (or homogeneity) of goods. Of course, in this case, too, it should be possible to argue that this is a type of experience, since we are only recognizing the correlation in an additive way.

Furthermore, here I would like to discuss the aforementioned "categories". Suppose, for example, that you walk and fall. At this time, "walking" and "falling" may be causally related, but they are not related in themselves. Therefore, this is also considered to be two correlations, "you - walk" and "you - fall," which are related to each other. It should also be obvious that they are related to each other by the category of "causality. Here, this category is given by "you" to the "inclusive correlation.

This "comprehensive correlation" is the correlation between correlations between things and the entities (experiencers) who are subjectively related to them. In other words, all complex experiences are composed of simple correlations between events and comprehensive correlations (contributing categories). The idea comes from Wittgenstein's *Treatise on Logic and Philosophy*, "Any statement about a composite thing can be decomposed into a statement about its constituent elements and a proposition that describes the composite thing completely." From.

And therefore this should be of a transcendently very acquired nature and inaccessible to the essence of things. Although the idea is from the pure enlightenment concept of "category" as proposed by Kant, the implication in this paper is a little different from that proposed by Kant. I do not consider this correlation of experience as having an "integrative" function in the sense of Kant's epistemology, because I consider it as something we use to approach things. Rather, I would like to define it as the opposite, that it should have an "analytic" function.

However, since synthesis also indicates that it can also analyze, the important difference should not be whether to summarize or divide, but rather, whether "I make it or I am allowed to use it. In this sense, we considered this way of looking at it to be in itself unproblematic.

Next, I would like to elaborate on essential experience and transferable experience in the next chapter.

2 . Intrinsic and Transferable Experience

As mentioned in Chapter 1, experience can be divided into two main categories. They are "intrinsic experience" and "transferable experience. Note that "divide" here means to "break down," not to imply that the two types of experience exist separately from each other from an overarching perspective. If there is such a separation, then there must be two separate correlations of the same nature for the same event in the same category in comparison. But since each of us is only taking in one object through that category, there can never be more than one correlation.

Intrinsic experience, as the name implies, is experience that focuses on the intrinsic nature of things. In other words, it is a generic term for the only correlative field that remains constant even when all people become similarly experienced. In other words, it is a domain that is not subject to any correlation by other experiences. Specifically, there are three kinds of things: our human work of recognizing experience (reason), our work of giving categories (enlightenment), and the universal things that are given to us by things. Reason is a universal and innate quality in us, which we try to direct primarily toward external things.

Enlightenment is also a category-giving faculty, which allows us to define each domain in terms of the many correlates given to us by things. We are not looking at things, but at the correlations

with things in our internal domain.

Enlightenment can only do its work at the behest of reason. We can say that the category of kinds is also determined under the action of reason. This is because approaching correlations is not an attempt to grasp correlations like infinity.

The "universal thing" is a correlated domain that is not affected by categories. It is the most primordial of the experiences given to us by things. Specifically, "it, being, this, something, the need for description," etc. If this domain does not exist, then the possibility arises that the correlations given to us by things can be dogmatic and subjective, defined only by categories.

Second, transferable experience is a generic term for a correlational domain that is a counterpart to essential experience, such that it varies according to the correlations between each person-similar thing. In other words, acquired correlative domains, after being defined by categories, would be appropriate for this. Also, in general, much of what we can imagine as experience is in this domain.

As I said, experience refers to the correlative we have approached, which is something very external and not so much internal (the domain of categories, reason, etc.). This relational experience is heavily weighted toward that external part of it.

To define this kind of experience in concrete terms is like being asked to assign an infinite number of variables to one of them, and I had a very hard time doing it myself, but to put it simply, it is "a domain in which we experience ourselves as we might experience that correlation, in line with the experience we trust most. Correlating to experience does not mean that all events correlate to it. In addition, since this is something that we, as experiencers, approach ourselves, the thing must be within us. We are not in the world because we determine our world unknowingly, let alone include any external things.

I believe that there is a "domain" in every moment, in every situation that can be sought or contemplated. It is a very metaphysical concept that is determined by us, no one else, and is inviolable by nothing else. Our world" is "each person's set domain." We do not live in the world, but in the domain that makes the world exist outside or inside it.

Now that I have explained experience, in the next chapter, I would like to apply this to a discussion of what is called "absolutely possible experience."

3 -1. Absolutely Possible Experience

Absolvable experience is a generic term for experiences to which we humans have given universality (validity) beyond the correlative domain of the experience that can be valid in general. Similar examples are "hasty generalization" in logic (a kind of formal fallacy that attempts to derive a general theory from a small number of cases within a certain domain), or the term

"empirical universals" in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

In his book, Kant says, "An empirical universal is nothing more than a universality that is valid in the majority of cases, which has been raised to a universality that is valid in all cases, such as the proposition that 'all objects have weight.'" To analyze this example more closely, correlating the proposition (experience) that "objects have weight" to all other objects themselves is nothing more than our own self-indulgence, not the essence of the thing.

What is important here is that the concept of "correlation of correlations" has changed to another dimension, that of "correlation between correlations and things themselves," rather than the concept of "correlation of correlations" as we have been discussing. I should mention here in advance, just to be sure, that the way Kant's epistemology perceives experience and the way this paper perceives the concept of experience are two different things, so this grasping of the correlation of experience in a different dimension is my own idea, and I am not certain whether Kant intended it or not. I am not sure if Kant intended it to be so.

Now, then, how is the formation of an absolutely possible experience?

First of all, as a basic premise, some kind of correlation must exist. Then, a correlation similar to that

- Correlations similar to that correlation are formed between multiple events.
- The events that are given to us are all those that exist within our domain (explained in detail in the next chapter). And they are "independent of us."
- When we think, we have an action that makes us aware of what is outside our domain, and what we are aware of is brought into our domain by ourselves.

The above points must be satisfied.

First, let's talk about "similar correlations. This is a correlation formed between different things under similar categories, a relation of correlation whose form (proposition) is very similar. As you can read, this is because we need to be even slightly aware of the nature of "universality". There is no specific definition of the scope of the "plurality" here or the "majority" in Kant's earlier quote. If there is anything to be said about the scope, it would be up to the point where each individual forms an absolutely possible experience. Of course, after forming an absolutely possible experience, the nature of that universality is by no means elevated to what might truly be called universality.

Next, let me explain the phrase "independent with us". What I would like to state here is that the subject is ambivalent, based on the premise that the absolutely possible experience is correlated to the other. The domain that we cannot reach is the domain that our thoughts cannot reach, a temporal and spatial concept that is not all definable, in other words, it is equally my "ignorance".

Finally, we are aware of what is outside the domain in order to define it. Just as we recognize

our unknowing through our knowing (ignorance), we can define a certain knowledge, that is, a domain that we cannot reach, through a conflict. If we only pass through knowing, and there is no such concept as "not knowing," then it is never about knowing, but only about being "innately set up. Therefore, we cannot define our own domain without turning toward the external. And it is only when everything we become aware of in doing so is drawn to us that the formation of an absolutely possible experience becomes possible.

This will be explained in more detail in the next chapter, "Correlative Domain of Absolutely Possible Experience," but the correlative domain of absolutely possible experience must be external, not internal. This is because the internal is already thought by us. When I correlate with something that has already been thought about and its nature changes, it is only because "my consciousness has changed," not because the thing itself has been transformed. Then, it is only that we have literally changed our own domain to suit the universality that is valid in many cases. This is different from the theme of "improving the universality of things. Such a thing is nothing more than a change.

Therefore, after the above process, an absolutely possible experience is formed. In the next chapter, I would like to discuss the correlation domain.

3 -2. Correlative Domain of Absolutely Possible Experience

Absolutely possible experiences correlate with external things (which draw them into the internal domain). In the first place, I explained that the internal domain is the domain constituted by the things we think about, but that is not a very precise definition. More precisely, it is a conceptual (abstract) space in which my thoughts about things are complete in time and have no mass.

Here thinking about things is different from "thinking about correlations with things. All events in this domain should be seen as acquired. We are in constant contact with the external world, and each time we are in contact with the external world, we receive external things from the outside. Of course, we also work to encompass them inwardly as they are, and we may also see movements that do not do so, but rather bring an invariant function to our own domain. The former can be defined as something that encompasses things themselves, and the latter as something that encompasses correlations with things, and the workings that correspond to this are deeply related to the "correlative domain of absolutely possible experience.

As I explained in Chapter 3, the workings of the possible-absolute experience are external to the external (increasing universality). When I said that it is only a "change in my consciousness" when it is internal, I meant it literally: it is only a change of form within the domain. Note that it is only a change of form, not a (spatial) change of this abstract space. What is caused by the change

of form is certainly an increase in universality within my domain, but it is not an "objective universality" as I intend it to be. In other words, no matter how much I change my mind about a given correlation within my domain, it is only a universality within this domain. In other words, all such actions within my domain are acts called "the formation of absolutely possible experience. Thus, the correlative domain of the possible experience is the domain that is directly correlated with the essence of a thing, or at least with its essence as transcendently given to us.

What does it mean, then, to "bring an invariant action to one's own domain"? By "invariant" here, we mean "the (formal) changelessness of abstract space. Basically, we internalize external things into our domain, where they eventually become defined. As a result, we do not internalize things. If we cannot internalize things, transcendentalistically speaking, then we are still in contact with things in a certain internal domain, and as a result, the form does not change. If we could internalize things, we would add the unknown of the external element.

Therefore, we can define the correlative domain of the absolutely possible experience as the domain that is oriented toward all external things, and that is set up to continue our unchanging domain rules.

The next chapter will focus on the theme of phenomena.

4 -1. What is the Phenomenon? (Introduction)

We have relationships with many objects in our lives. These range from family members and friends to animals and objects. Some of them are not directly related to us. Direct" in this context refers to cases in which we have direct contact with the subject in reality or when communication is possible without a third party. The development of language skills and technological capabilities has made it possible for us to interact with objects that we have not actually experienced. A friend of a friend whom we have only heard about through stories, or an ancestor who has already passed away, could be examples of such cases. And if we were to recognize the subject only indirectly, there would be a difference between the direct recognition of the subject and the indirect recognition of the subject. The word "unexpectedness," which is commonly used in the world, is considered to be equivalent to this.

Whether indirectly or directly, we have a habit of composing rather than recognizing objects. It is, so to speak, unilateral recognition. This behavior unconsciously creates an unexpectedness between the object and our object or "representation" in this paper. The object we perceive is only an object for us. Are not representation and object two different entities? Then, what is the range of the difference, that is, to what extent is the representation occupied by the representation and to what extent is the object occupied by the object?

The content of this chapter and the following chapters is the domain in which "representation"

is formed. In accordance with the idea of the "Copernican turn" advocated by the German philosopher Kant, the purpose of this chapter is to clarify to what extent the domain of the object is subject to our perception.

In this chapter, I will first explain the definition of phenomena by introducing the concepts of Frege's dichotomization of meaning and empirical correlation. Then, the phenomena are divided into first, second, and third phenomena. In the next chapter, we will define them based on the ideas of empirical correlation and judgment.

In all processes, we will define the concepts of "phenomenon" and "judgment" in detail and discuss them using the linkage with empirical correlations. By looking at our approach to the subject in parts, we will clarify the differences between the various domains and consider the domain of representation formation, which is also very relevant to the subject of this paper.

4 -2. What is the Phenomenon?

To begin, let us define "phenomenon" in this paper. Generally speaking, a phenomenon often refers to a situation in which something is in a certain situation or in some causal relationship. Examples include "a phenomenon in which a friend disappears" or "a phenomenon in which an object suddenly ignites. In addition, there are no conditions such as indirect or direct conditions regarding the object of this instruction. It is possible to imagine a scene of a fire or the possibility of a fire in any place, regardless of whether or not you have visited that place before. The indicated place is only an abstract category, and it is possible to assign the acquired property of the place where the fire occurred.

Now, I define the phenomenon as a correlative model between the act of indicating and a number of objects and elements. Directing" is similar to the oriented property of noesis in Husserl's phenomenology. It refers only to the departure from that act of directing. And, of course, the act of indicating requires an object to be indicated, so there is always a completed structure of oneself (the thinker), the indication, and the object.

Here, I would like to introduce the concept of "meaning and significance" to these structures. This concept is discussed by Flöge in his article "On Significance and Meaning ("Über Sinn und Bedeutung")" and others. The concept of "meaning" is divided into the two aspects of "significance" and "meaning," with the former being the way in which the indicated object is defined (Sinn) and the latter being the object of the indication (Bedeutung). As an example, take the proposition "Olin is an apple. In this case, both Olin and apple refer to the same object, "the apple as a fruit. However, Olin is one variety of apple, while apple is an inclusive concept that includes all varieties. Therefore, although they are the same indicative object (apple), the way they are specified is different. In this case, we can say that they have the same meaning but

different significance. And in phenomena within the same dimension, this significance or meaning does not change. In particular, the meaning must be the same in all phenomena.

In addition, in discussing "elements," I would like to introduce the empirical correlation. Element is the collective term for the partial perception of an object, and experience here refers to the elements of the object that we have acquired. An example of a "frightening experience" is the experience of having acquired the "frightening" element of some object or phenomenon. Thus, experience has abstract and conceptual characteristics. As mentioned above, experience correlates represent a passive correlation between oneself and an object. Note that it is passive, as opposed to a phenomenon consisting of an act of instruction.

There are two types of empirical correlations: intrinsic experience and transferable experience. The former can be called universal experience and refers to the homogeneous experience that all people tend to have of the same object. The latter, on the contrary, is a generic term for experiences that vary from person to person. Also, when combined with Hegel's idea mentioned earlier, essential experience is an experience that occurs in a domain where the significance and meaning of the object does not change. However, transferable experiences, by their nature, occur in an expanded domain in a way that does not indirectly alter the significance and meaning of the object.

For example, suppose an apple is perceived as sour by everyone. One person might say, "The sourness of this apple is comparable to that of a dried plum. In this case, the perception that the apple is sour is an intrinsic experience, while the perception that the sourness of the apple is similar to that of the pickled plum is a transferable experience. In the transitive experience, the meaning includes not only apples but also dried plums. However, the core meaning is the apple, since the dried plum is used only as an analogy for the sourness of the apple. Thus, even though the meanings may seem to differ, there is only one core meaning, and other meanings may indirectly indicate it, which is a transferable experience. The same can be said about the transformation of significance.

Therefore, in phenomena within the same dimension (the domain in which significance and meaning do not change), essential experience is the element. In addition, transferable experience exists across multiple phenomena with different meanings and significance. As for the domain of transferable experience, it is difficult to define it clearly because it varies greatly from one individual to another. Certainly, however, meaning and significance are directly or indirectly related to the core object.

So far, we have discussed the structure of phenomena and the formation of elements. In order to explain the formation of phenomena, we will now divide the process into "first phenomenon," "second phenomenon," and "third phenomenon. In the next chapter, I will explain them step by step.

5 -1. On the stage of Establishment of the Phenomenon

At the end of the previous chapter, we divided phenomena into several stages. Phenomena are only subjectively constituted, and the process can be divided into several stages based on their characteristics. These are the first, second, and third phenomena. I will explain them in this order.

5-2. First Phenomenon

The first phenomenon is the most primordial phenomenon. It is the very first thing we construct as we compose a phenomenon. It is highly subjective and correlative to the object. The first phenomenon includes both intrinsic and transitive experience. At this point, I perceive myself as the only thinker, and the existence of others is excluded from the phenomenological composition. Therefore, any element, regardless of its intrinsic nature, is subjective.

Moreover, the correlation within this phenomenological domain is absolute, free from any external influence. External influences include objective interpretations based on "judgments," which will be discussed later. In other words, there is no change in the nature of the subjective element within the first phenomenon due to properties outside of the highly subjective domain.

For example, let us assume that one's own being first obtained the element X with respect to a certain object A. If we take this point as the primordial occasion, then X is established as an element in the first phenomenon. At this stage, the element Y obtained by another person for the same object A can never have any relation to A or X for oneself. This is not to say that such an action is impossible, but rather that in this domain, which is in line with the classification of the primordial domain, such an action is ignored. If this were to happen, the primary phenomenon of initiation would take on an external character, obscuring the subjective domain. The fact that it is obscured indicates that the correlative field it forms is unclear. Since the correlation must exist in any phenomenon, the blurring of the underlying domain hinders the logical development of any phenomenon.

5-3. Second Phenomenon

The second phenomenon is that obtained by judgment. Judgment is the action of trying to expand the hitherto subjective domain of phenomena based on the existence of others. In our natural attitude, we do not doubt the existence of others. It would be difficult to affirm the idea that people at a distance do not exist unless we are aware of them. This idea also affects phenomena. After we have constructed the first phenomenon, we try to confirm its universality.

There, we can incorporate others as fellow thinkers in the construction of a multifaceted phenomenon. This is judgment.

Through judgment, we obtain the second phenomenon, which is the correlative model between the other and the object. The second phenomenon is a correlative model of the object or element with the others that we assume. The other here can only have the nature of a thinker X who is different from oneself. This is because what is emphasized in the second phenomenon is the sign that not only oneself but also other thinkers have the same phenomenon. Thus, the basic element in the second phenomenon is essential experience. Of course, it is possible to say that transferable experiences are also included, since they are the same thinkers. However, since transferable experience varies from person to person, it is difficult to define the transferable experience of other thinkers. If one were to do so, a mere thinker X would not be sufficient, and a further definition of the nature would need to be made each time. But as I mentioned earlier, the important thing is not "who did what," but rather "who also did something." Thus, here, transferable experience is treated only as a signifier of "being," and is not even included in the basic elements.

In the second phenomenon, the essential experience is recognized for the first time as universal due to the presence of the other. This makes us feel as if the essential experience in the first phenomenon has been transformed into something with an objective nature. Intrinsic experience is universal in nature, but by definition within the first phenomenon, it was perceived as subjective. This misunderstanding has been cleared up here.

5-4. Third Phenomenon

The third phenomenon is the phenomenon constituted by transferable and intrinsic experience, which differs from other phenomena because of the characteristics of its perception. What we generally recognize as phenomena, "representations," are these. Through judgments in the second phenomenon, social properties are assigned to essential experience. Thus, it is no different from the first phenomenon in terms of its components and thinkers, but it has the universality of its nature and the subjective nature of transferable experience.

This is the model of the "phenomenon" as we usually perceive it.




Figure 1




Figure 2

As indicated above, the phenomenon undergoes several processes, culminating in its final form, the third phenomenon. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the first and second phenomena. Of the transferable and essential experiences contained in the first phenomenon, the latter acquires universality through an act called “judgment. In the second phenomenon, which is generated by judgment, transferable experience serves only as a mere symbol. What is important is that essential experience can be assumed by the thinker, the other. Figure 2 also shows the relationship between the second and third phenomena. Although the third phenomenon does not seem to differ from the first phenomenon in terms of components, the important point is that essential experience is considered to be a part of the second phenomenon. This allows us to acquire objectivity as well as

subjectivity. This allows us to recognize objects with legitimacy, even though they are “our own perceptions.

By discussing the formation process of phenomena in detail, we were able to define the formation domain of representations (the third phenomenon). Although we usually think of the object as subjectively recognized, the representations created there also have objective properties. This property may make us feel that our own perception is correct.

Representation and object are never the same thing. The former is something that we create subjectively, while the latter exists from its natural state. It is also a superphenomenal existence that transcends even the composition of our phenomena. It combines more than mere “signification as being,” as evidenced by the fact that we obtain the elements, even though there is no empirical correlation there at all.

Thus, the object has properties that cannot very well be called a “phenomenon” if we look at it from the perspective of my definition of correlative phenomena. It is precisely because we try to recognize something that is not a phenomenon as a phenomenon (representation) that a distortion is created there. And this is expressed in the form of “unexpectedness.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the process of constructing the phenomenon in more detail, based on the assumptions I have made so far. I would like to focus on the concept of “skepticism,” which I mentioned at the beginning.

6 . The idea of “skepticism” in phenomenon formation

There has been much debate about the validity of what we perceive. Is there really a world as we perceive it? As in the movie “The Matrix,” the world we perceive is merely an artificially constructed virtual world, and our real selves are merely asleep in another world. This opinion may have existed many times before, but it has never been proven to be valid. Since we can only perceive this world, there is no room to verify whether this is true or not. At least for those of us who are alive today, this world is recognized as something that does exist, and extending the story to its legitimacy should be beyond the reach of any human being. But this doubt still gives rise to many different ideas.

The question of whether the objects around us really exist is the same idea of skepticism that has been emphasized in philosophy. Through the idea of methodical skepticism, Descartes derived the axiom that makes one’s own existence absolute. He used doubt to derive what he ultimately does not doubt. Doubting everything may be a biased idea, but he came up with one absolute idea from it. To touch on his idea a little more, the very existence of the act of doubt exists in any situation. In other words, we are granted that legitimacy to perform the act of “doubt.

There are several possible outcomes to our act of doubt. We may “accept” or “deny” the existence of the object, or we may “withhold” the existence of the object in the sense of including

both possibilities. And we make these judgments about the phenomenon, or more precisely, about the entire process by which the phenomenon is formed. We use the idea of first, second, and third phenomena with respect to the process by which a phenomenon is formed. We make skepticism and judge the negation of the object (phenomenon) in these phenomenal stages.

What we will study in the next chapter is the formation process of the universal act of “affirmation/denial,” which is the end of skepticism about existence, and the definition of its domain. Focusing on the stages of the formation of phenomena, we will clarify how skepticism is performed and examine the factors that cause these actions to take place.

7 -1. Skepticism

At each stage of a phenomenon, we are skeptical and seek to confirm the validity of the phenomenon. As discussed earlier, the formation of phenomena can be divided into three stages. As we have already discussed, the formation of phenomena can be divided into three stages: the first, the second, and the third. In this order, we refer to extremely subjective phenomena, phenomena for others as far as we can infer them, and general phenomena that we usually recognize. These are tasks performed by us humans who perceive them, regardless of the nature of the phenomena. Therefore, the act of skepticism, as long as it targets a phenomenon, must also have some approach to this constitutive process.

Moreover, the skeptical phenomenon is sent to a state of “suspension,” which is a departure from its original target stage. Skepticism is only the failure to determine the existence of a phenomenon, and at this stage, no element, positive or negative, has been determined.

Skepticism, in the general sense, would be considered to be directed against the final formed phenomenon, or the third phenomenon. It is attached only to the objects that are now before us, to whether they really exist or not. But is this really accurate? Since phenomena can be divided into a number of constituent processes, it is not necessarily true that the object of our doubt can be limited only to the phenomenon as the final product. In this section, we will focus on each stage of the phenomenon, and assuming that skepticism is made at each of these stages, we will examine the nature of the skepticism, the basis of the skepticism, and the effect of the skepticism on the compositional process of the phenomenon. Let us now turn our attention to the various stages of the phenomenon.

7-2. Skepticism in the First Phenomenon

In this first phenomenon, it is done from a physical perspective. In other words, we have never “seen” the phenomenon in question. In this chapter, I will use the example of “unicorns,” which are

considered to be imaginary creatures. The unicorn is an imaginary horse-like creature with a horn in the center of its forehead and white skin, as described in the Bible. There are some variations from region to region, but none of the characteristics are so unscientific as to be unrealistic. Naturally, we have never actually seen a unicorn. Our object in the hypothetical third phenomenon (if we assume that this object exists as a third phenomenon) includes elements such as “horse, white, one horn”. However, we have never seen a “unicorn” that includes all of these elements.

Also, we must not assume the existence of any thinker other than ourselves here. Under the first phenomenon, we are “the only thinker,” and “the existence of others is excluded from the phenomenological composition. Therefore, there can be no case at this stage in which the subject is related to the existence of another, such as being told of the existence of a unicorn by another.

If there is a case in which it is possible to form the first phenomenon of the object without skepticism, it would be a case in which, based on one’s own experience, the object of the unicorn suddenly flashes into one’s mind, or in which one actually recognizes (or is under the illusion of recognizing) it.

7-3. Skepticism in the Second Phenomenon

Skepticism in the second phenomenon is a kind of “judgment. Judgment is the process by which one transforms the first phenomenon into the second, by recognizing a thinker (X) who is the same as oneself. In this way, the first phenomenon moves away from mere subjectivity and acquires the character of something that also encompasses universality. As can be seen from the nature of skepticism in the first phenomenon, here too the action of skepticism works not against the phenomenon, but against the formation of the phenomenon. In other words, we do not doubt what has been formed, but whether or not it will be formed.

The second phenomenon is based on the first and is formed by the action of “judgment. By its very nature of affecting the forming stage, skepticism is necessarily of the same kind as this “judgment. If skepticism is not formed, judgment is formed; if judgment is formed, skepticism is not formed. Thus, skepticism in the second phenomenon is not something that is done for the second phenomenon, but something that is done in place of judgment, sometimes in the interval between the first and second phenomena, during a certain period of time. The following figure shows the model. As you can see, the nature of the phenomenon is changed by the presence of others, and the nature of the phenomenon is determined by judgment or skepticism in the process.

This judgmental skepticism occurs when it is difficult to “judge,” that is, when the object is not recognized by other thinkers. For example, even if we have blind faith in a unicorn, we cannot immediately recognize it according to the skepticism of the first phenomenon, because others have never seen it. In a phenomenon that others do not recognize, it is impossible to elevate it to a second phenomenon, so skepticism is used as an alternative.




Figure 3

7-4. Skepticism in the Third Phenomenon

In the third phenomenon, skepticism arises primarily from the difference between one's own perception of the phenomenon and that of others. Essentially, through the synthesis of transferable and essential experience, we form the third phenomenon in a way that embraces the thinking other and completes the phenomenon. The transferable experience is always with us, and the essential experience is in me, the inclusive thinker. However, skepticism arises when the synthesis is not successful in this case. Skepticism in the third phenomenon differs from skepticism in other phenomenal processes in that it is directed against the nature of the phenomenon. Traditionally, it has been thought that by pointing out the non-absoluteness of the fundamental properties that form the phenomenon, the existence of the phenomenon itself should be questioned if the phenomenon itself is not possible. As long as the first and second phenomena have already been established, the foundations of transferable and essential experience have been completed, and their existence will not be shaken. What is it that we should question, then, is the nature of the phenomena, that is, the difference between transferable experience and essential experience.

Let us refer to it in more detail. In the difference between transferable experience and essential experience, it is clear that they are different in nature, but as transferable experience under the first phenomenon is not directly affected by "judgment," there is a discrepancy when it is used in the third phenomenon. In other words, the boundary between subjectivity and objectivity becomes blurred because they were forced to be synthesized with essential experiences that have universality.

Moreover, in the second phenomenon, some transferable experiences have succeeded in clearly transforming their nature as essential experiences through judgment, but transferable experiences have not yet succeeded in acquiring subjectivity in a substantial sense. Under the first phenomenon, we can of course say that we recognize objects based on subjectivity, but this is only from our current perspective. In other words, after recognizing the existence of the other, we realize that we have been using an extremely subjective perception, and under the first phenomenon, it is difficult to define either subjectivity or objectivity. This is because the Other does not exist. Therefore, at the time of the first phenomenon, we have only acquired "blind subjectivity."

Seen in this light, it is clear that in the third phenomenon, the transferable experience is more unstable. Therefore, in this difference, the main transformation takes place in the transferable experience. To put it concretely, it is based on the popular tendency that essential experience never decreases and transferable experience never increases. The two are in a one-way transformation relationship, and we are uncomfortable with the transformation and suspicious of the phenomenon.

8 . On the results of skepticism

As mentioned earlier, after skepticism, the phenomenon is sent to a "pending" state. The phenomenon is then defined as either "positive" or "negative."

This process after skepticism is always bidirectional, objective, and "non-fixed." In my phenomenological theory, phenomena are always non-fixed. As long as I am describing phenomena according to a model of correlation with humans, they must be influenced by humans. Of course, the reverse is also true.

The third phenomenon is only a temporary endpoint, and if we focus only on its nature, it is equal to the first phenomenon, the second phenomenon, or any state of suspension, positive or negative. It is merely the operation of the goal and the start in various spans of time. And that goal is not necessarily one and the same with the start.

Now, a phenomenon that has become the object of skepticism is subject to suspension for any reason. In the state of suspension, the phenomenon is not quite literally complete. This is not completion in the sense of temporary completion. There is a defect in the components of the phenomenon, or in its integration, and the phenomenon itself is not complete. Although not completed, it is possible to think of incomplete phenomena as long as we have been able to handle phenomena up to the third phenomenon.

Phenomena that are withheld then remain withheld or are defined as either positive or negative. This transformation occurs when the thinker is affected differently in the phenomenon correlation as a result of a new perception or thought.

For example, in the case of the skeptical object in the first phenomenon, as long as one recognizes

it, the object is defined as positive and proceeds to the second phenomenon.

Conversely, if one does not recognize it, it is defined as a negative. However, one might feel uncomfortable with this content.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this three-state transformation process is objective. In the first phenomenon, we recognize ourselves as the only thinker (although strictly speaking, there is not even the concept of only), and the skeptical criterion of the phenomenon is whether we "recognize" it or not. Thus, at least for oneself, everything that one perceives is affirmed to be a second phenomenon, and there is no such thing as not perceiving. If it exists, it is of course denied, and one's own reality is always filled only with affirmations. In short, there is no phenomenal state that corresponds to "withholding" for the self.

However, this idea is influenced by the very subjective first phenomenon, and is contrary to the objectivity of the three states. Therefore, the concept of "after skepticism" = "withholding" retains its objectivity independently of the first phenomenon, and the action "defined as negation after withholding" is established.

As described above, there is another process based on the credibility of a phenomenon apart from the process by which we compose the phenomenon. This process is more incidental than the process of composition.

It is also important to remember that some phenomena may not be recognized at the stage of composition because their objectivity requires the existence of others as a precondition.

9 . Generalize

So far, I have discussed the perception of phenomena through concepts such as empirical correlation and the constitutive stages of phenomena. As I myself have been influenced by Husserl's phenomenological theory, I believe that the idea of noema-noesis, in particular, is expressed in the form of the correlation between the human being and the object.

Since the theme of phenomena is a very common one, and since I have tried to define it mainly in terms of the correlation between each person, it is probably not a good thing that my phenomenological theory itself has been broadened in scale.

If the scale becomes wider, there will naturally be more things to deal with, and more terms to consider in relation to them. Inevitably, the number of detailed fallacies will increase. This phenomenological theory itself must have some points to be criticized, which I am not aware of.

I dealt with the theme of "recognition of phenomena" this time, and in the process, I noticed some points in my own way. One of them is that the idea of "ignorance" was operationalized as a relatively important idea.

The idea is that we "know that we do not know," that is, that relative phenomena have a mutually

defining relationship with each other. Apparently, there is a cry that this phrase was not coined by the famous philosopher Socrates, but that is not what is important now.

Although we have defined the absolutely possible experience as externally influenced, it can also be said that the part of the experience that is not influenced by the absolutely possible experience is internal (in the sense that the influence is in the present tense). The concept of "subjectivity" in the formation of phenomena was also defined precisely by the presence of the Other.

It seemed to me that the reason I frequently cited the Other as the thinker after entering into the content of the process of composition of phenomena may have been because of a latent awareness of this, in order to clarify the definition of subjectivity.

Philosophy has often discovered the unrecognized. It has not exactly discovered the unknown, but only defined the known as known. For humans, there is no such thing as the "unknown" subjectively. Similar to the way we perceive "negation" in the first phenomenon, there is no way for us to perceive what we do not see or know. There is nothing we can do except to be creative within the domain of what we have now, whether we are aware of it or not.

No matter how many new creations we seem to have made, or new theorems and laws we discover, new technologies we develop, new species we register, etc., in some field, they are nothing more than our understanding of what is known as "known."

This may sound a bit pessimistic, but what I am trying to say is that we can create new knowns by transforming all the elements we are given, regardless of whether they appear academic or not, to the extent that our wisdom allows. This is what I mean. Although I dealt with relatively popular concepts such as "experience" and "phenomenon," I eventually went into the process of constructing phenomena and connected my ideas to the categorical field of relationships with others, significance, and meaning.

Of course, as with my phenomenological theory, in the end I merely described the process of composition and transformation by adding an existing human being (the correlative object) to an existing phenomenon, and this is an act of making the known known known. However, consider the importance of thinking about a relatively familiar theme from a philosophical perspective, and especially of entering into a known fact that you have never thought about, or even unconsciously understood, as such.

Just as a phenomenon is never complete, perhaps no theory can be complete as long as it is human to create it. Even if it seems to be completed, it must be only a temporary period of time awaiting the next new critique.

As I mentioned earlier, my phenomenological theory will never be complete. Nor will it ever be refined. Therefore, I expect that it will receive further criticism and develop further in the future.

Reference

Wittgenstein, L(1933), *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, New York: Harcourt. (Wittgenstein, L, Shigeki Noya(2021), 論理哲学論考, Iwanami shoten)

Kant Immanuel(1781), *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* , in Kants Werke, Hrsg.v Ernst Cassierer(1922), Bd3, Berlin (Kant Immanuel, Hideo Shinoda『純粹理性批判 上』, Iwanami shoten, 2018)

Frege, G. (1892), ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung,’ in *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung*: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980, 40–65, (Frege, G, Syun Tsuchiya「意義と意味について」, 『フレーゲ著作集 4』, 71–102 pages, Keiso Shobo, 1999)