List, Christian (2023) A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness. [Preprint]
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Abstract
In this discussion paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims – namely, “first-person realism”, “non-solipsism”, “non-fragmentation”, and “one world” – but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. So, theories of consciousness face a “quadrilemma”. Since it will be hard to achieve a consensus on which of the four claims to retain and which to give up, we arrive at a landscape of competing theories, all of which have pros and cons. I will briefly indicate which kinds of theories correspond to the four horns of the quadrilemma.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Consciousness, Subjectivity, Objectivity, Quadrilemma, Facts, First-person realism, Non-solipsism, Non-fragmentation, One world versus many worlds, Meta-problem of consciousness | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness General Issues > Structure of Theories |
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| Depositing User: | Christian List | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 28 Sep 2023 14:37 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2023 14:37 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 22582 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness General Issues > Structure of Theories |
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| Date: | 28 September 2023 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22582 |
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