Explaining AI Through Mechanistic Interpretability

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Recent work in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) attempts to render opaque AI systems understandable through a divide-and-conquer strategy. However, this fails to illuminate *how trained AI systems work as a whole*. Precisely this kind of functional understanding is needed, though, to satisfy important societal desiderata such as safety. To remedy this situation, we argue, AI researchers should seek *mechanistic interpretability*, viz. apply coordinated discovery strategies familiar from the life sciences to uncover the functional organisation of complex AI systems. Additionally, theorists should accommodate for the unique costs and benefits of such strategies in their portrayals of XAI research.

Keywords:

AI, ANN, deep learning, discovery, explanation, mechanistic interpretability, XAI

1. Introduction

Over the past decade, the term "AI" has increasingly become a synonym for deep artificial neural networks (ANNs) trained with machine learning (ML). These ANNs are often complex and opaque, approximating target functions through the mutual contribution of millions or even billions of parameters with values learned during an automated training process (Baraniuk et al., 2020; Chollet, 2021; Russell & Norvig, 2020). On the one hand, this setup allows ANNs to exhibit flexible and expressive behaviour, developing sophisticated ways of representing and processing information. On the other hand, these systems can be surprisingly brittle and prone to unpredictable and catastrophic failure (Fawzi et al., 2018; Raghu et al., 2017). Since the functional organisation of ANNs is both complex and machine-learned, *how* their internal structure implements the mapping from inputs to outputs often remains unknown. Despite this, AI systems based on ANNs are increasingly used to support or take over human tasks – from making music recommendations to medical decisions (Huang et al., 2020; Jugovac & Jannach, 2017). Especially in high-stakes[1] circumstances, regulators, philosophers and AI researchers increasingly call for making AI systems *explainable* (Burrell, 2016; Zednik, 2021).

To address this need, a research field has developed under the heading of explainable AI (XAI). But far from being unified, research under this umbrella tackles a range of distinct, though interrelated issues: Computer scientists take on the technical challenge of developing computational methods to produce explanations of AI systems (Guidotti et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2016; Wachter et al., 2017). Philosophers attempt to characterise relevant societal desiderata such as safety, trustworthiness, reliability, and fairness (Durán & Jongsma, 2021; Langer, Oster, et al., 2021; Páez, 2019). And psychologists grapple with the problem of quantifying epistemic outcomes like *understanding* (Langer, Baum, et al., 2021; Sloman & Rabb, 2016). In the face of this complexity, scholars have tried to coordinate these different strands of research, highlight how they might be mutually advantageous, and assess the extent to which (and at which costs) XAI can achieve its goals. To this end, scholars have developed taxonomies of explainability methods (Nunes & Jannach, 2017; Speith, 2022), offered conceptual models of the so-called explainability problem (Langer, Oster, et al., 2021; Zednik, 2021), and proposed simplifying unifications (Fleisher, 2022; Nyrup & Robinson, 2022). We applaud these contributions, and agree that AI explainability is a multifaceted issue which resists any one-size-fits-all solution (cf., Langer, Oster, et al., 2021; Zednik, 2021). However, the picture of XAI research that is typically presented is one in which computational methods deliver explanations for specific stakeholders in particular contexts. We think this is crucially incomplete: we must also consider the

[1] We refrain from committing to any particular definition of 'high-stakes'. See Title III, Chapter 1 of the Artificial Intelligence Act (Artificial Intelligence Act, 2021) for one proposal.

potential of coordinated research strategies aiming to uncover the functional organisation of trained AI systems.

So far, however, research to this end has been largely neglected. By focusing on how individual methods might deliver explainability in specific contexts, contemporary XAI effectively pursues a *divide-and-conquer strategy*. While this strategy can successfully highlight which features were influential for a given outcome, or how input features would need to be changed to obtain a different decision, this is only a small part of the story if we are seeking to explain and understand how AI systems work. In fact, what we *should* aim for to ensure that AI systems fulfil desiderata commonly demanded of AI systems by society – such as safety – goes far beyond specific contexts: We need generalizable insights about *how* the systems in question *work as a whole*; for only such insights about the functional organisation that elicits behavioural patterns and dispositions will allow us to anticipate how the system might respond to novel inputs and how it might behave when exposed to yet unexplored contexts.[2] Crucially, these insights cannot usually be extrapolated from applying individual XAI methods tailored to specific contexts – we would simply be missing the forest for the trees.

We propose that to remedy this situation XAI researchers should take a *mechanistic interpretability (MI) approach* for complex AI systems. The approach we suggest starts from the premise that once AI systems become sufficiently complex, they are best investigated and explained through the same lens as biological organisms (rather than being treated as technical artefacts). Thus, practitioners should seek to characterize AI systems in terms of their functional organisation (the organized activities of their functionally relevant components). This requires the application of coordinated discovery strategies familiar from life sciences, such as pattern recognition, functional decomposition, localization, and systematic experimental manipulations. As such, MI research may be significantly more resource-intensive (both in terms of time and in terms of labour) than developing specific XAI methods. In return for this investment, we gain a deeper and more holistic understanding of how trained AI systems work, thus enabling us to meet important societal desiderata. Given these distinctive costs and benefits, we think it is crucial for XAI theorists to accommodate for this research strategy in their analyses of the field. For only by having the full range of strategies for explaining AI systems in view can we make appropriate choices about which research to pursue, and thereby ensure that crucial desiderata will actually be satisfied when employing opaque AI systems in society.

[2] Importantly, what is of interest here is not the architecture that an AI system's programmers have specified prior to training. Rather, we are interested in the learned structure that has emerged through the automated training procedures the system underwent after its initial specification; hence it is also referred to as *emergent structure* (Manning et al., 2020).

We shall proceed as follows: In section 2, we briefly discuss achievements and limitations of contemporary XAI research. In section 3, we propose that rather than adopting a divide-and-conquer strategy, XAI researchers should seek explainability through mechanistic interpretability. We illustrate this approach by examining the case of Distill. In section 4, we discuss possible objections to our proposal. In section 5, we conclude.

2. Contemporary XAI: The Divide-and-Conquer Strategy

For current purposes we focus on ML-based AI systems (with ANNs being a paradigm case) that are opaque due to the scale and complexity of their learned structure (Burrell, 2016). Following Humphreys (2009), we characterise opacity as a lack of knowledge about a system's epistemically relevant elements (EREs) (see also Zednik, 2021).[3] The term ERE is deliberately non-specific. It captures any robust patterns which underlie or maintain a system's behaviour and are relevant to the epistemic goals of an agent. Thus, a system's opacity is relative both to an agent's (e.g., a company, AI user, or developer) interests and their knowledge about the system at a given time. Against this backdrop, we assume that any information eliminating opacity (by uncovering EREs) can function as an explanation (cf., Nyrup & Robinson, 2022; Zednik, 2021). We take making AI systems explainable by reducing their opacity to be the goal of XAI.[4]

Contemporary XAI research tries to achieve this goal through technical means. Specifically, it aims to develop algorithmic procedures – so-called XAI *methods* – that generate explanatory information about AI systems. Hence, XAI is very much "in the business of developing analytic techniques with which to render opaque computing systems transparent" (Zednik, 2021, p. 285; see Mittelstadt et al., 2019; Rudin, 2019 for similar claims). Since the kind of explanatory information needed to eliminate opacity depends on numerous factors (Kirsch, 2017; Langer et al., 2021), XAI researchers have developed a range of methods with different properties (e.g., scope, detail, format) (Guidotti et al., 2018; Molnar, 2022; Speith, 2022). Further work has addressed which methods are best suited for concrete scenarios in which stakeholders interacts with AI systems (Barredo Arrieta et al., 2020; Belle & Papantonis, 2021). This assumes that rendering AI systems explainable requires i) developing a range of XAI methods, ii) identifying specific explainability contexts, and iii) mapping XAI methods to these contexts. The result is a *divide-and-conquer strategy*: XAI research seeks, in any given case, to

[3] Notice that while we adopt Humphreys' framing in terms of *knowledge* of EREs, this can be adapted to an account centred on *understanding* by defining opacity as the lack of a *grasp* of EREs. Grasping an ERE involves making use of it to perform inferences, take decisions, or complete downstream tasks (Keil, 2019; Strevens, 2013).

[4] Achieving this outcome does not require comprehensive explanation of *all* AI systems. For systems that operate in low-stakes environments, fewer elements of the system may be deemed epistemically relevant.

provide "the most appropriate explanation for a specific ML solution in a given context on a given task" (Zhou et al., 2021, p. 2; see also Fleisher, 2022, p. 12).

The divide-and-conquer strategy has its merits. It naturally accommodates the insight that there cannot be a one-size-fits all XAI approach, and that different stakeholders, contexts and AI systems pose different constraints on feasible XAI methods. Further, the divide-and-conquer strategy has been and continues to be productive, both in terms of novel methods and conceptual analysis (e.g., Barredo Arrieta et al., 2020; Belle & Papantonis, 2021; Köhl et al., 2019; Langer et al., 2021; Ribeiro et al., 2016; Sokol & Flach, 2020; Zhou et al., 2021). Indeed, contemporary XAI research successfully produces tools enabling stakeholders to understand narrow aspects of AI systems (Belle & Papantonis, 2021; Guidotti et al., 2018; Lapuschkin et al., 2019; Molnar, 2022; Ribeiro et al., 2016; Ribeiro et al., 2018; Wachter et al., 2017). One prominent example is *Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations* (LIME) (Ribeiro et al., 2016). This technique, applicable to any AI classification system, produces linear surrogate models which highlight the importance of particular features for a given classification. LIME has been shown to improve stakeholders' ability to assess the quality of rival classifiers and, as such, may prove an adequate solution in specific contexts where such skills are required. Another success story for the divide-and-conquer strategy is research on *counterfactual explanations* and *algorithmic recourse* (Karimi et al., 2022; Wachter et al., 2017). This family of XAI methods can inform subjects of algorithmic decisions which alterations to the input data would have been resulted in a desired outcome. Such methods are crucial to enabling agency in an increasingly algorithmic world (Vredenburgh, 2022).

Despite these successes, however, the *divide-and-conquer strategy* is also limited. Neither LIME nor counterfactual explanations can provide a comprehensive understanding of *how the systems* under investigation *work as a whole*. They do not tell us *how exactly* the internal structure of the model maps inputs to outputs, neither do they allow us to predict how a system will behave in *novel contexts*. Indeed, in an influential paper, Rudin criticizes the enterprise of XAI for this reason, asserting that XAI methods "do not provide enough detail to understand what the black box is doing" (2019, p. 208). Importantly, this information cannot be inferred even by examining many instances of various XAI method outputs. What is needed instead is systematic investigation that yields generalizable insights about systems' overall functional organization.

The need for such insights is expressed vividly in current debates about AI regulation in politics and society. Take the European Commission's proposed regulatory framework for AI systems (Artificial Intelligence Act, 2021). Article 14 states that adequate human oversight in high-risk scenarios demandsthat an overseer should "fully understand the capacities and limitations of the high-risk AI

system and be able to duly monitor its operation, so that signs of anomalies, dysfunctions and unexpected performance can be detected and addressed as soon as possible" and "be able to intervene on the operation of the high-risk AI system" (Artificial Intelligence Act, 2021, art. 14). With regards to both requirements, a detailed (and generalizable) understanding of a trained systems' overall functional organization is crucial. For illustration, consider the phenomenon of *typographic adversarial examples* in the image model *CLIP* (Goh et al., 2021). CLIP was trained to predict which text was paired with a given image on the internet. However, researchers found that CLIP was easily fooled by simply sticking a written label (e.g., "phone") on an object (e.g., an apple), causing the image to be classified according to the written label rather than the object (e.g., as phone rather than apple). This behavior was not foreseeable from ordinary reliability testing. Neither does highlighting the paper label as relevant to the classification output explain *why* CLIP relied on the labels rather than the objects in the images for classification. However, through systematic investigation into the model researchers revealed high-level neurons in CLIP which are sensitive to both images and text (Goh et al., 2021). Understanding this feature of the model's functional organisation made it easy to explain and predict CLIP's behavior when faced with written labels in images.

Luckily, CLIP is not in use in high-stakes domains . However, consider the dangers of deploying a system with similar vulnerabilities to, e.g., scan for weapons at an airport. Here, as in many other cases where AI is deployed in the real world, safety is among the chief desiderata. It is even listed as the first objective in the EU AI Act (Artificial Intelligence Act, 2021, sec. 1.1).[5] One way to ensure safety and prevent harm is to subject AI systems to rigorous testing before deploying them in high-stakes situations (Durán & Jongsma, 2021). However, doing this exhaustively will often be infeasible due to the dimensionality of the input space (Hacker et al., 2023; Keogh & Mueen, 2017). This makes it difficult to rule out the possibility of unpredictable failure when systems encounter novel inputs (Amodei et al., 2016; Hendrycks et al., 2018, 2023; Wei et al., 2023). A necessary complementary strategy, we think, is to characterise how the systems in question function in terms of how relevant components work together to elicit the behaviour we observe. Based on such characterisations, we can anticipate system behaviour even for novel situations, helping us to ensure system reliability and safety. The case of CLIP goes to show that insights into a system's functional organisation can help us understand a system's capabilities and limitations and avoid unforeseen failures.

Importantly, the issue we are getting at here is a principled one; it is not a criticism of any particular XAI method. We acknowledge that certain methods are sufficient for explaining particular instances

[5] While there is no domain-general definition of what it means for an AI system to be safe, safety is typically associated with the avoidance of both physical and psychological harm to human beings (Steimers & Schneider, 2022).

of system behaviour. But when deploying AI systems in the real world, fulfilling important societal desiderata requires a kind of *holistic explainability* that provides generalizable insights into how a system's functional organisation elicits its behaviours or outputs.[6] This project will *never* be adequately achieved through employing specific XAI methods in particular contexts. Instead, we propose, it can be achieved by *mechanistic interpretability* (MI). That is, by developing (human-interpretable) *mechanistic* explanations of systems' functional organisation. So far, this kind of project has been underappreciated by both philosophers and computer scientists.

3. Augmenting Contemporary XAI Through Mechanistic Interpretability

We suggest taking a *mechanistic interpretability (MI) approach* to complex AI systems that starts from the following premise: once AI systems become sufficiently complex, they are best investigated and explained through the same lens as biological organisms rather than being treated merely as technical artefacts (cf., Eden, 2007). Taking inspiration from successful scientific inquiry in the life sciences, we propose that XAI practitioners should apply coordinated discovery strategies (such as pattern recognition, functional decomposition, localization, and systematic experimental manipulations) to characterize AI systems in terms of their functional organisation, i.e., the organized activities of their functionally relevant components. At the same time, theorists should accommodate the unique costs and benefits of this research strategy in their portrayals of XAI research. With the full range of strategies for explaining AI systems in view, we can make appropriate choices about how to ensure that crucial desiderata will be satisfied when deploying trained AI systems in society.

3.1. Mechanistic Interpretability

If we want to explain how AI systems work as a whole, we are essentially interested in their *functional organisation* or structure. That is, we seek to understand what system properties support their behaviour and how system functions are implemented by the orchestrated interactions of relevant component parts. This kind of project is neither new nor unique to XAI research.[7] And it is highly familiar from recent discussions on how to explain biological systems mechanistically (see Bechtel, 2009; Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Craver, 2001; Craver & Darden, 2013). Therefore, we suggest

[6] We use the term 'holistic' to signal a focus on how AI systems' organisation implements their behaviour. As we will show, this need not be opposed to reductionist methodologies (see also Burnston, 2021). Note also that this reasoning does not only apply to *local* XAI methods (i.e., those that apply to single predictions), but also to *global* XAI methods (i.e., those that produce explanatory information pertaining to whole models).

[7] The idea that certain aspects of computer science should be treated as empirical inquiry goes back at least as far as Newell and Simon (1976).

adopting strategies familiar from mechanistic inquiry in the life sciences to develop mechanistic explanations of the capabilities and behaviours of opaque AI systems.

Recall that ANN's acquire their functional organisation through automated training procedures. After training, components within the system (the EREs of mechanistic explanations) will adopt specialised roles that programmers do not usually anticipate. These components will be organized in ways allowing them to work together to elicit the behaviours we observe (Manning et al., 2020; Richards et al., 2019). The task for researchers seeking MI will be to uncover the relevant components along with their organization. This task may not be simple, for it will often go beyond investigating the functional roles of pre-individuated ANN structures like neurons and layers (Bau et al., 2017). Frequently, it may involve characterising more exotic and distributed structures like circuits (see section 3.2) and representational subspaces (see Elhage et al., 2021).

To achieve such characterizations of functional components (EREs) in AI systems, researchers must detect and describe the robust patterns that underlie or maintain the system's behaviour (Wimsatt, 1994). In other words, they must engage in a *pattern recognition practice* (Haugeland, 1998; Kästner & Haueis, 2021), where patterns are any non-random arrangements within systems (Dennett, 1991) which (in virtue of their orderly character) serve as candidates for recognition. As such, patterns constitute potential EREs when seeking MI for AI systems.

Pattern recognition practices in science are collective endeavours involving the coordinated application of shared skills, tools, and concepts (Brigandt, 2011; Kästner & Haueis, 2021). They consist in a set of *epistemic activities* which conform to epistemic norms shared and continuously refined by the research community throughout scientific inquiry. Epistemic activities include such things as *decomposition* and *localization* (cf. Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Brigandt, 2011; Kästner & Haueis, 2021) or *recomposition* (cf. Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). *Decomposition* involves breaking a phenomenon down into a set of constitutive sub-functions and is often applied recursively to produce multi-level functional characterisations (Craver, 2007). *Localization* is the assignment of a sub-function to a particular part of the system which is hypothesised to implement it. *Recomposition* involves building a system back up in a functionally informed manner. To carry out an epistemic activity, researchers will typically engage in a variety of *epistemic operations*. These are the atomic units of scientific inquiry; they consist of concrete actions that track, measure, or manipulate the components of the target system, or generate, transform, and visualise data. In practice, epistemic activities are typically applied in an iterative manner to create a growing store of collective knowledge and fine-tune hypotheses about which system components are functionally relevant, how they are organized, and how they interact to produce characteristic phenomena.

As such, we argue, pattern recognition practices are ideally suited to produce interpretable, functional characterisations of *how AI systems work as a whole*. They deliver *mechanistic explanations* (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2001; Kästner & Haueis, 2021) of how the functionally relevant components of a system interact to produce a phenomenon of interest. In the best case, these explanations are comprehensive, providing a detailed, multi-level account how a system works (see Figure 1). This holds for artificial systems just as for biological ones.



Figure 1: The application of coordinated discovery strategies uncovers the functional organisation of trained AI systems. The system's overall behaviour (black circle at the top) is elicited by the relevant components (smaller circles) working together. Components can be further analysed into sub-components to reveal a nested hierarchy (see also Craver 2007).

3.2. The Case of Distill

We shall now illustrate the MI approach with a concrete example. In their work on the image classification ANN *InceptionV1* (Cammarata et al., 2020; Olah et al., 2018), Chris Olah and colleagues explicitly endorse applying life science research strategies to ANNs, suggesting that "neural networks are an object of empirical investigation, perhaps similar to an organism in biology" (Olah et al., 2020). Hence, they set out to characterise the functional structure of InceptionV1 using coordinated discovery strategies as described above.

For reasons of space, we cannot describe the InceptionV1 architecture in detail here; but a brief introduction to the structure of convolutional ANNs (cANNS) will aid understanding of what follows. As this family of models was designed to process image data, their architecture reflects an attempt to match the compositional and hierarchical properties of natural images (Chollet, 2021). The convolutional layers that give cANNs their name consist of filters which cover a small portion of the input image (represented as an array of raw pixel values). These filters slide over the image, computing activations (dot products of input and filter plus bias) at each spatial position. By analogy with biological neural networks (and mathematical equivalence with other ANN architectures), filters can be thought of as the receptive fields of neurons, with one neuron corresponding to each spatial position the filter covers.[8] As filters consist of trainable parameters, neurons can learn to respond to different features in the image, producing maps reflecting the presence or absence of features (e.g., edges) to feed to downstream layers. Through composition of simple features, neurons in these downstream layers can thus become sensitive to complex features like shapes, objects, and people. Thus, the very structure of cANNs (their depth, connectivity, and layer design) are adapted to the hierarchical compositionality that characterises images.

Olah and colleagues (Cammarata et al., 2021) discover and analyse a *curve detector circuit* within InceptionV1. Circuits are sub-graphs of neural networks which, crucially, are not specified as distinct parts of the ANN's architecture. Instead, circuits are part of the model's learned structure. They are functional units which neurons self-organise into during the training process. As such, the curve detector circuit, consisting of a group of neurons spanning five early layers and encompassing around 50 thousand parameters, is a compelling example of an ERE that can only be rendered accessible through a pattern recognition process seeking MI. To uncover this circuit, Olah and colleagues utilize various epistemic activities including decomposition and localization. They begin by using feature visualization, a technique in which an image is synthesized to maximise the activation of a given ANN component (Olah et al., 2017).[9] The Distill team use the term *features* to mean human interpretable concepts that components in ANNs become functionally specialised for.[10] They taxonomize the neurons in the first 5 convolutional layers of InceptionV1 into layer-wise "families" (i.e., functional groups) based on which features they are sensitive to (e.g., Gabor filters, colour contrasts, lines, curves). Using feature visualizations to represent neurons and families in diagrams of the ANN makes

[8] In biological brains, each neuron's weights have to be learned separately, even if they are learning to detect the same visual feature (e.g., edges). In ANNs, exploiting the assumption that features may appear anywhere in any image, weights can be shared among neurons for computational efficiency.

[9] For reasons of space, we will not go into specific formal details but paint the general picture in relatively broad strokes. For technical details see the referenced work.

[10] The authors conceive of features as corresponding to *directions in neuronal activation space*. In theory, these directions can be defined across the vector space determined by the activity of arbitrary groups of neurons.

reasoning about their functional relationship significantly more tractable. Notice that this epistemic activity is composed of iterating multiple epistemic operations: producing visualisations for each neuron, applying labels to them, and grouping the neurons into families.

Taxonomizing neurons serves as a useful starting point, but a mechanistic explanation of InceptionV1 also requires characterising the *interactions* between neurons. To achieve this, having documented the presence of curve detector neurons in InceptionV1's third layer, the investigators followed their connections to see how upstream neurons (those closer to the input layer) were contributing to their capabilities. This required the application of additional tools, such as methods to visualize the connection weights between neurons (Voss et al., 2021). Iterating this strategy all the way back to the input layer allowed the researchers to develop a holistic view of the circuit. Ultimately, the Distill team concisely describe the mechanistic structure of the curve circuit as follows: "Gabor filters turn into proto-lines which build lines and early curves. Finally, lines and early curves are composed into curves" (Cammarata et al., 2021). Through coordinated and systematic application of epistemic activities, the full curve circuit becomes recognisable as an ERE distinct from the rest of the network within which it is embedded.

To ensure that discovered patterns are robust, pattern recognition must adhere to epistemic norms such as integrating multiple sources of evidence.[11] Otherwise, overreliance on visualisation techniques which involve researcher degrees of freedom risks falling foul of common scientific blunders like confirmation bias (Gelman & Loken, 2019; Pu & Kay, 2018). In line with this, the Distill researchers used multiple techniques to verify their hypotheses. For example, they observed the responses of curve detector neurons to natural images to confirm they played their hypothesised roles with real stimuli. However, this raises the possibility of a rival hypothesis; could the curve detectors actually specialise in detecting a finite set of specific curved objects, rather than the more general sub-function of *curve detection*? To exclude this rival hypothesis, Olah and colleagues systematically tested the neurons with synthetic stimuli, determining that the curve detection neurons in layer 3b of InceptionV1 are invariant to both fill and colour (i.e., they really are curve detectors).

In addition to applying decomposition and localization to the trained network, Olah and colleagues carried out a (computational) recomposition of the curve detection circuits they had investigated (Cammarata et al., 2021). To do this, one of the authors, leveraging the insights gleaned from the discovery process, designed a curve detection algorithm with the same structure as InceptionV1's by hand. That is to say, they manually set the values of the weights between the neurons. Having done so, the behaviour of the hand-designed network could be compared to that of InceptionV1 by

[11] For more on robustness see, e.g., Wimsatt (1981).

exposing them to identical stimuli and observing their responses. A highly similar response profile was demonstrated, suggesting that Olah and colleagues really had recomposed the curve detection circuit.

The Distill investigation into InceptionV1 exemplifies all of the properties of a pattern recognition practice, viz., the coordinated application of epistemic operations consisting of a shared set of concepts, tools, and skills.[12] Olah and colleagues organised their investigation around core concepts: *features* and *circuits.*[13] When it comes to tools, various visualisation techniques, synthetic stimuli, and explainability interfaces were developed and employed throughout the discovery process. Finally, implementing a pattern recognition practice on ANNs demands multiple skills. Unlike in a wet lab, manipulation of physical instruments is not required. Rather, a firm grasp of the mathematics underlying ANNs is critical. What *is* shared with discovery processes in the life sciences are the reasoning skills required, i.e., choosing which system properties to track and visualise, abductive reasoning to generate hypotheses, and design of experimental procedures to test those hypotheses.

3.3. Benefits of the MI Approach

Unlike the divide-and-conquer strategy, the pattern recognition practice applied by Olah and his colleagues followed a coherent, systematic research agenda. The scientists' goal was to uncover functional components within the classifier and to illuminate how they work together in the system's overall functional architecture. To this end, they (i) *systematically* searched for functional units (i.e., EREs) that had not been explicitly coded, (ii) *coordinated* different epistemic activities to help reveal the relationships between different measurements, and (iii) *iteratively* refined hypotheses concerning various EREs, their activities and interactions. Eventually, they stitched together a mechanistic explanation rendering intelligible how the first five layers of InceptionV1 work. With respect to curve detection specifically, the authors note that "although curve detection involves more than 50,000 parameters, those parameters actually implement a simple algorithm that can be read off the weights and described in just a few English sentences" (Cammarata et al., 2021).

The case of Distill highlights that MI research has two distinct advantages. First, it can shed light on EREs (e.g., the curve detection circuit) of opaque AI systems that are inaccessible through individual

[12] Note that in some cases the computational methods described above have direct analogues in biology and neuroscience. However, the similarity we wish to evoke holds at the level of *research strategies* not at the level of *individual methods*. For detailed discussion of methodological similarities see Ivanova et al. (2021). On how probing methods in MI were derived from multivariate pattern analysis in neuroscience see, e.g, Bashivan et al. (2019) utilizing synthetic visualisations in a neuroscience context. On how interventionist theories of causality can be applied to test causal hypotheses in ANNs see Geiger et al., (2021).

[13] The investigation of *circuits* as a relevant unit of analysis has been adopted by further researchers (Wang et al., 2022), highlighting the cumulative nature of research from the scientific perspective.

XAI methods. There are two reasons for this. The first is that, like measurement tools in the life sciences, individual XAI methods are tuned to picking up specific kinds of information. While tools specialised for answering specific questions are clearly useful, they are also crucially limited. For instance, EEG measures electrical potentials, but it cannot tell us about brain structure. The second reason is that while a lot of information may be gathered from applying different XAI methods, that information will often stand unconnected. By contrast, successful pattern recognition (yielding ERE identification) crucially depends on the coordinated application of many relevant instruments and the *integration* of multiple sources of evidence in conjunction with careful *scientific reasoning* (cf., Kästner, 2018). By identifying previously unknown EREs, researchers pursing MI research will often be rewarded with deeper explanations revealing a wider set of EREs and uncovering the functional architecture of AI systems (see Figure 1). We think this is precisely what is needed to render AI systems holistically explainable.

This leads us to the second advantage of MI research. Characterizing a system's functional structure in terms how relevant components work together enables domain experts to control (e.g., through targeted interventions) and predict system behaviour even for novel situations. As such, it helps prevent unexpected failures and thus contributes to satisfying important societal desiderata. We already briefly outlined how MI contributes to system reliability and safety in high-stake domains (in section 2). While image recognition may not be such a domain *per se*, the case of Distill serves as proof of principle that a fine-grained characterisation of the functional architecture of complex ML-based systems is possible.[14] Besides, ML-based image recognition is likely to be utilized by AI systems employed in high-stakes domains such as traffic control, law, and surveillance. In addition to ensuring safety, the kind of understanding MI elicits is also crucial to support trust. While the relationship between interpretability, trust, and trustworthiness is complicated (Markus et al., 2021), it is widely agreed that if AI systems are going to be employed to make socially and morally consequential decisions, they need to be *trustworthy* (Kästner et al., 2021). The trust that laypeople have in technological systems is often founded upon their belief that *someone, somewhere* understands the system deeply (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). For sufficiently complex AI systems, we believe, such deep understanding depends upon uncovering EREs that are not attainable through the divide-and-conquer strategy. By contrast, MI has the potential to produce the kind of expert understanding that supports trust.

[14] See (Bricken et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2022; Wu et al., 2023) for recent work applying MI to language models.

Another desideratum for which MI is likely to be important is scientific understanding. ANNs have already had a large impact on many scientific fields (Boge, 2022; Bouatta et al., 2021; Cichy & Kaiser, 2019). They achieved unrivalled predictive success for complex phenomena as diverse as neural activity, protein folding, and particle physics. However, philosophers have expressed concern that ANN models, while undoubtedly impressive, do not confer scientific understanding (Chirimuuta, 2021). This limitation is usually traced to the inscrutable learned structure of these models. However, this structure is *precisely* what MI seeks to characterise – and once it is captured successfully, formerly opaque ML-based systems may be re-engineered as transparent or interpretable ones. Therefore, we expect MI to play an increasingly important role for scientific research in the coming years (see also Crook and Kästner, Manuscript).

Though our discussion in this section has focused on the potential of MI, we want to be clear that we are *not* calling to eliminate traditional XAI methods. Rather, we take both approaches to be *complementary*. MI research requires extensive technical knowledge, scientific skill, financial resources, and time. Just as in life science research, it may take several iterations before a relatively stable mechanism for a phenomenon is uncovered (cf. Craver & Darden, 2013, Kästner & Haueis, 2021). Thus, seeking MI for AI systems will usually incur much greater investment (both financial and labour) than developing XAI methods and applying them in well-defined contexts. These higher costs might only be worth paying in high-stakes scenarios. Likewise, understanding the overall functional organisation of a system might simply not be relevant in some cases (Durán & Jongsma, 2021). Besides, we think that both MI research and applying traditional XAI methods in a divide-and-conquer fashion will often be *mutually supportive*. Researchers seeking MI can employ specific XAI methods as tools to support some of their coordinated epistemic activities. Likewise, MI research may help refine specific XAI methods, e.g. by revealing new EREs, or improve the mapping between different XAI methods and contexts for the divide-and-conquer strategy. Thus, to what extent MI research and traditional XAI research will be required or useful will depend on the questions at hand, the stakeholders involved, and the specific desiderata at play. Still, it is important that MI research and its unique potential is not overlooked – neither by practitioners nor theorists of XAI.

4. Worries and Responses

Before closing, we shall briefly outline and respond to some possible objections to the MI approach. Though the list below is not exhaustive, we take it to capture the most common worries our proposal will face. Some critics might worry that the chances of successful MI research are too low. For instance, because (#1) the *complexity of large models* (due to their number of parameters and non-linearities)

makes explaining them mechanistically hopeless (e.g., Cearns et al., 2019). Consider GPT3, which contains 175 billion parameters (Brown et al., 2020). Clearly, manually investigating every parameter of such large models one-by-one is infeasible. However, this is not required for MI. Instead, researchers are seeking patterns within the complex system to characterise its function. These patterns may not only involve many parameters, they can also recur multiple times within the system, dramatically reducing effective complexity (recall the 'neuron families' discussed in section 3.2, (Olah et al., 2020)). Besides, models need not be explained exhaustively "all the way down" to parameter-level to accrue important benefits. In many cases, relatively abstract descriptions will be sufficient.

Others may worry that (#2) we might be *lacking the right concepts* to accurately characterise an AI system's functional organisation (Boge, 2022). We think that even if this is true for now, it is not an argument against seeking MI. It can make implementing a pattern recognition practice *harder*, but forming new concepts is part of the ordinary business of scientific discovery (cf. Craver & Darden, 2013, chapter 5). Besides, the entire history of the life sciences speaks to humans' ability to characterise unfamiliar and complex domains in various useful ways (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Mitchell, 2002). Thus, we see little reason (theoretical or empirical) to think that trained AI models contain structure so alien that human beings are fundamentally unable to grasp it. Where concepts are lacking, they can be invented (see Schubert et al., 2021 for an example of this in Distill's work). Science frequently operates by making domains interpretable through visualization, simplification, idealization, and abstraction (Fleisher, 2022; Levy & Bechtel, 2013).

Besides, a critic might protest that (#3) the *analogy to life sciences research is flawed* because we do not actually understand how living systems work either. Indeed, many neuroscientists admit that we do not yet have a comprehensive mechanistic understanding of how the brain works despite decades of effort (Buzsáki, 2020; Pessoa, 2023). Yet, we see reasons to be *more* optimistic about understanding AI systems through MI than explaining the brain: (i) since AI systems are designed and trained by us, we have exhaustive knowledge about their architectures, learning algorithms, objective functions, training data, and learned connection weights, (ii) we can perform any conceivable experiment with arbitrary precision and complete access to the causal consequences of our interventions, and (iii) we can choose to develop models which are tailored to be amenable to scientific investigation.

Even if MI research is successful, some might worry that the benefits we highlighted above (see section 3.3) will not be worth the trouble. For instance, those sympathetic to our approach in principle may argue that (#4) *it will be impossible for researchers to seek MI for large AI systems as quickly as they are developed*. It would just be too resource intensive. While we acknowledge MI research requires significant resources (see section 3.3), we think there are good reasons to pursue it anyway. First, it

might simply be worth the investment if otherwise we cannot safely deploy AI in high-stakes scenarios (see section 2). Second, because mechanistic insights may be transferable from one system to another, the investment might pay off more quickly than we think. For instance, insights about the functional organisation of one language model may well transfer to other language models (*mutatis mutandis* for other domains). Theoretical reasons for this optimism are provided by Cao and Yamins' (2021) *contravariance principle*, which implies that functional convergence should be expected in systems that can perform complex tasks efficiently (see also Bansal et al., 2021; Schrimpf et al., 2020). Besides, researchers are increasingly converging on architectural choices for AI systems (Bommasani et al., 2022). Since model architecture constrains both the kind of functional structure that can emerge and the kind of epistemic operations researchers can apply, this is positive news for MI. Moreover, the resource intensive nature of pattern recognition practices can be viewed as a feature, rather than a bug. There is still understandable resistance to large AI systems being deployed in high-stakes scenarios (Rudin, 2019). In light of these concerns, it may be reasonable to propose some degree of mechanistic explainability as a pre-requisite for adopting technological innovations that could prove consequential and difficult to reverse (Stirling, 2007). A time-consuming requirement could give slow political processes time to react and inject democratic influence into decisions that impact all of society (Bender et al., 2021; Floridi et al., 2018).

Other critics may worry that (#6) *MI will not yield accurate predictions of AI systems' behaviours in social contexts* – though this is what really matters when we think about deploying AI in modern society (Bender et al., 2021). We acknowledge MI will not be sufficient to precisely predict all effects of deploying models in specific real-world contexts (such prediction is generally intractable, see Shalizi, 2006). However, given MI research seeks to reveal how AI systems work as a whole, it yields deeper and more generalizable insights into how a system may behave in novel (social) contexts than applying the divide-and-conquer strategy. Thus, even if MI is costly and the benefits are not all-encompassing, it may still be superior to its alternatives.

In a nutshell, MI research can offer answers to research questions which are in principle unavailable to those pursuing a divide-and-conquer strategy (see section 2). As such, it is not only important for practitioners to pursue MI to gain explainability where other strategies are unproductive. It is also crucial for theorists to accommodate MI in their in their portrayals of the XAI research landscape (see section 3.3). For only by having the full range of strategies for explaining AI systems in view can we make appropriate choices about which research to pursue to ensure societal desiderata are satisfied.

5. Conclusion

Contemporary XAI research is seeking explainability for opaque AI systems in a divide-and-conquer fashion, viz. by employing specific XAI methods in various contexts. While this strategy has its merits, it fails to illuminate how trained AI systems work as a whole. Yet precisely this kind of holistic understanding is needed to satisfy important desiderata placed on AI systems by society. We argued that mechanistic interpretability research, though it is resource intensive, can serve as a remedy: by uncovering a wider range of EREs than any individual XAI method, MI contributes to a deeper and more holistic understanding of complex AI systems' functioning. These insights can be utilized to predict and control system behaviour beyond pre-defined contexts, which is crucial to satisfy societal desiderata. Appreciating these unique benefits of MI research will help scholars to make adequate choices about what research to pursue to ensure we can safely and reliably deploy ML-based systems in modern society.

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to the members of the project "Explainable Intelligent Systems (EIS)", the participants of the Philosophy Breakfast in Bayreuth, and the audience at GAP.11 for feedback on earlier versions of this paper. We are especially thankful to Johanna Thoma, Marius Backmann, Olivier Roy, Paolo Galeazzi, Sara Mann, Andreas Sesing-Wagenpfeil, Eva Schmidt, for detailed comments.

Funding

Work on this paper was funded by the Volkswagen Foundation grant AZ 9B830. The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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