Muñoz Pérez, M. (2022) Wittgenstein on decisions and the mathematical practice. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Putnam and Finkelstein can be read as providing an answer to Kripke's skeptical argument by appealing to the way mathematics is commonly pursued. Nowadays, the debate surrounding pluralism has questioned the postulation of a unique way of developing mathematical activity. In this paper, we wish to reformulate Kripke's argument as a challenge for the conjunction of 'ifthenism' and a reasonable form of pluralism and, at the same time, propose a reading of some passages of the 'Philosophical Investigations' as a solution. Our conclusion is that, in order for pluralism to be preserved, we need to clarify both the fact that we make definite 'decisions' and the philosophical value that they, as we argue, bear. To investigate the nature of this value is one of the further tasks that we want to cover in this article.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Muñoz Pérez, M. mupemiguel99@gmail.com
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Foundations Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Practice Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Depositing User:	M. Muñoz Pérez
Date Deposited:	10 Feb 2024 20:26
Last Modified:	10 Feb 2024 20:26
Item ID:	23071
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Foundations Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Practice Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Date:	19 December 2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23071

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