The Worldly Infrastructure of Causation

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This paper describes an alternative to currently dominant approaches to the metaphysics of causation. It is motivated by the gap between metaphysical accounts and recent epistemological research on causal reasoning and methods for discovering causal relationships. Our approach aims to characterize structural features of the actual world that support, and are exploited by, successful strategies for causal reasoning and discovery. We call these features the “worldly infrastructure” of causation. We identify elements of this worldly infrastructure, sketch accounts of their physical bases, and explain how they contribute to the possibility of successful causal reasoning.

1 Introduction

Recent work on causation has taken a variety of forms. Researchers in statistics, econometrics, and machine learning have been mainly interested in epistemological and methodological issues surrounding causal inference – issues concerning how one can reliably infer causal conclusions from various sorts
of data. Examples include the constraint-based causal discovery methods in (Spirtes et al., 2000), results about identifying causal effects (e.g., (Pearl, 2009)), machine learning techniques for inferring causal direction (Peters et al., 2017) and the potential outcome frameworks employed by many social scientists (Rubin, 1974; Hernán and Robins, 2020). Many philosophers – especially those focusing on causal explanation – have devoted significant attention to these methods. Many others have instead been concerned with the metaphysics of causation. This work also takes various forms. Some hold that the metaphysics of causation requires the introduction of special entities – powers, capacities, or the like. Others reduce causal claims to counterfactuals and elucidate the latter through possible worlds semantics. Still others propose that causal claims be understood via their relation to laws of nature. In addition, some philosophers claim that causation or causal relationships can be identified with processes or relationships in fundamental physical theories so that, metaphysically, causation is just, e.g., transfer of energy and momentum. Common to all these efforts is a search for “truthmakers” or “grounds” for causal claims and/or attempts to specify what causation “is” or what in the world “corresponds” to the causal nexus.

These metaphysical projects are conducted with little or no connection to the work on the epistemology of causation referenced above. Indeed, many contemporary metaphysicians insist that analyzing the metaphysics of causation can, and perhaps should, be sharply separated from the study of epistemological strategies for discovering causal relationships – the latter

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1Still other authors analyze “our concept” of causation, typically with the aim of reducing that concept to non-causal ingredients. We will not discuss these projects but they are also distinct from the infrastructure project we describe.
regarded as being of “merely” methodological or practical interest.

A recent prize-winning book (Paul and Hall, 2013) exemplifies this general practice. They aim to reduce garden-variety causal claims to counterfactuals, with their semantics determined by choosing a Cauchy surface on which the antecedent is true and evolving it forward in time using equations of motion of fundamental physical theories (following Maudlin (2007, chapter 1)). Ordinary subjects making causal judgments obviously don’t use anything like this procedure, but Paul and Hall provide no epistemological story about how, if this is what causal claims are, people are able to reason to correct causal judgments. We single out Paul and Hall not for special criticism, but because their book is a well-known and particularly thoughtful representative of the general practice of analyzing the metaphysics of causation independently of epistemological work on how causal claims are established.

Our goal is to describe and develop a project that is different from the metaphysical projects described above, but is also not properly described as epistemology. It represents a third possibility. This project aims to elucidate what we call the “worldly infrastructure” underlying the application of causal concepts and causal reasoning. The basic idea is this: there are generic

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2This separation is facilitated by Paul and Hall’s focus on “actual cause” claims, for which there is no consensus on an appropriate discovery methodology. The epistemological strategies and infrastructure features to which we draw attention are primarily exploited to identify type-level causal relations. We understand type-level causal relations as depending on token causal claims (Woodward, 2005, p. 44), but claims about “actual causes” further seek to make post-hoc responsibility attributions for the occurrence of a token effect. Type-level causal claims like “smoking causes cancer” do not entail claims about any individual smoker so there remain some linguistic questions about how to interpret such statements (Hausman, 1998, chapter 5), but the epistemic utility of the causal discovery methods we consider does not depend on those linguistic questions.
features of our world that license and support causal reasoning. These features include (but are not limited to): (i) some variables are statistically independent of others (not everything is correlated with everything else); (ii) interventions, in the sense of unconfounded exogenous manipulations that satisfy criteria like those described in (Woodward 2005) are often possible and furthermore, many systems exhibit naturally occurring exogenous sources of variation that count as interventions even though they do not involve human manipulation\(^3\); (iii) the macroscopic, coarse-grained behavior of many systems is largely independent of variations in their microscopic realizing details and this allows for “unambiguous” interventions on coarse-grained properties of such systems and the discovery of robust causal generalizations about their macroscopic behavior.

Our concepts and strategies for causal reasoning developed to exploit the fact that we live in a world in which these generic features obtain. For example, the truth of (ii) is one factor that contributed to our developing a notion of causation that is closely linked to what happens under interventions – (ii) helps to ensure that this intervention-based notion will be useful. If interventions were rarely or never possible, we would not have developed a notion of causation tied to interventions. This is the sort of thing we have

\(^3\)We emphasize several things about this notion of an intervention. The first is that it is not limited to manipulations available to human agents, even in principle; it is perfectly sensible to talk about intervening on the mass of the up or down quark to determine the effect on the mass of the proton, for example. The second is that many human manipulations will not satisfy the conditions of an intervention and establishing that any particular human manipulation qualifies as an intervention can be non-trivial. However, it does not follow from this that most, or even many, human manipulations of a candidate cause will not count as interventions; see (Woodward 2021) for extensive discussion of the role of interventionist reasoning in everyday causal cognition. We thank a referee for encouraging these clarifications.

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in mind when talking about the worldly infrastructure that supports causal thinking.

Our project is also motivated by the empirical success of the causal discovery methods mentioned above. These methods reliably deliver knowledge about causal relations and it is natural to ask why they are successful. Maintaining that these methods are of no “metaphysical” significance denies any tight connection between the success of these methods and the structure of the world and leaves us with an account of causation that is unable to explain why these methods are successful, a position we consider untenable. We consider it a virtue that our project is responsive to the epistemology and methodology of causal inference, identifying features of the world that explain the success of those methods. As we will argue, the claim that the success of causal discovery methods supports the structural presuppositions underlying those methods has much in common with inferences commonly made elsewhere in science.

Furthermore, cataloguing the infrastructure features that underlie our successful causal reasoning invites the further question of why, in any particular system, those features are present. Accordingly, it may be useful to think of the “worldly infrastructure” project as having a natural second stage which builds on the catalogue of worldly infrastructure on which the success of our causal reasoning depends. This second stage aims to identify worldly bases for the infrastructure features themselves: to offer explanations of why the infrastructure features obtain in any given system. While the explanatory targets in the first stage are the successes of various strate-
gies used in causal inference, the explanatory targets for the second stage are
the infrastructure features themselves. We do not expect this second stage
to output one-size-fits-all-systems explanations for any particular infrastruc-
ture feature; for example, we note below that explanations of modularity
in biological systems frequently advert to evolutionary considerations, but
those considerations are obviously inapplicable when explaining the presence
of modularity in a particular model of (say) a classical fluid.

Our primary aim in this paper is to describe this approach to thinking
about causation and illustrate it, first and foremost by identifying some core
worldly infrastructure features on which our causal reasoning depends but
also by providing illustrative sketches of how explanations characteristic of
the second stage of the project might proceed. In that sense, the paper has
a somewhat programmatic character. It is also true that with respect to
the second stage of the worldly infrastructure project, seeking to identify
physical or biological bases for properties of the world that facilitate causal
reasoning certainly does not originate with us; to take just two examples, it is
common for biologists to explain the modularity present in biological systems
by appealing to evolutionary considerations and there have been a number
of attempts to identify a physical basis for the principle of the common
cause.\footnote{A useful discussion of such attempts to explain modularity is given by Steel (2007, chapter 3.4). Hofer-Szabó et al. (2013, chapter 8) provide a recent example of the second project, attempting to locate a basis for the principle of the common cause in the structure of quantum field theory (though see Forster (2014) on Hofer-Szabó et al.’s characterization of the principle of the common cause).} However, such projects have been pursued somewhat piecemeal in
the literature, and in the absence of anything like the first stage of our project
serving to identify a full suite of explanatory targets for such physical or biological explanations. One hope we have is that distinguishing the worldly infrastructure project as a novel approach to thinking about causation will lead to such projects being pursued more systematically and in closer contact with work in causal discovery.

2 The General Framework

The framework we adopt has several parts. First, there are the infrastructure features themselves, such as (i)-(iii) above. Second, there are connecting principles that license inferences from the presence of some particular infrastructure, typically in conjunction with other information, to causal conclusions. In this sense the connecting principles reflect the use of the infrastructure in causal inference. The general form $P$ of the connecting principles is:

(a) Particular instances of infrastructure features obtain (e.g., variables exhibiting some pattern of statistical (in)dependence, some manipulation of $X$ with respect to $Y$ has the characteristics of an intervention, etc.)

(b) Additional information (possibly causal in character)

\[ \therefore \text{Causal conclusion (from (a) and (b))}. \]

For example, the claim (1) that interventions are often possible is a general claim about an infrastructure feature. The claim (2) that some particular
manipulation of $X$ with respect to $Y$ satisfies the conditions for an intervention is a claim of form (a). The characteristic interventionist claim ($M$) – if an intervention $I$ on $X$ is possible and $Y$ systematically changes under $I$, then $X$ causes $Y$ – is a connecting principle of form $P$. If the antecedent of $M$ is satisfied, this licenses a causal conclusion. For ($M$), the additional information (b) referred to in $P$ is built into the characterization of an intervention, which includes causal information about the effect of an intervention $I$ on $X$.

If (1) were false and interventions were rarely possible, ($M$) would be largely useless as a principle in causal inference since its antecedent would rarely be satisfied. Assuming that our ways of thinking about causation have developed because they are functional or useful in some way (Woodward, 2014), it is hard to see why we would have developed a notion of causation in which ($M$) plays a central role if (1) were false. In reality (1) is true, so it has been useful for us to develop a notion of causation that is intimately connected with what happens under interventions. This is one illustration of what we have in mind when we say that our thinking about causation is formed in response to, and exploits, the presence of the infrastructure features.

It may be helpful to clarify the functional approach to causal reasoning with an analogy. When disambiguating visual scenes, the human visual system relies on the built-in assumption that illumination is generally from above (i.e., from the sun) and that objects tend to be convex. That this assumption is generally correct partially explains why the visual system is
generally reliable when inferring shape from shading; it also partially explains why the human visual system developed to exploit it. We see the existence of the causal infrastructure analogously: the worldly infrastructure is analogous to the physical facts about illumination from above and the convexity of objects, while the inferential principles that exploit that infrastructure to deliver causal conclusions are analogous to the visual system that exploits those physical facts to deliver reliable inferences of shape from shading.

The infrastructure features are related to each other in a way that supports consistent causal reasoning and inference. That is, we can exploit the presence of distinct infrastructure features in ways that converge on consistent causal conclusions—conclusions that thus can be transferred across different inferential contexts. As an illustration, consider the principle of the common cause (CC): if \( X \) and \( Y \) are statistically dependent, then either \( X \) causes \( Y \), \( Y \) causes \( X \), or \( X \) and \( Y \) have a (set of) common cause(s). Perhaps one could imagine a world in which CC regularly fails when “cause” is understood along interventionist lines: a world in which frequently \( X \) and \( Y \) are statistically dependent but interventions on \( X \) are not associated with changes in \( Y \), interventions on \( Y \) are not associated with changes in \( X \), and there is no third variable \( Z \) such that interventions on \( Z \) are associated with changes in \( X \) and \( Y \). Our world is not like this. In our world, there are systematic connections between patterns of statistical association and what will happen under interventions that are captured by the principle of the common cause. This means that in our world, there is a connection between what may be inferred from statistical dependencies and what will happen under interventions. Given CC and that \( X \) and \( Y \) are statistically depen-
dent, if we determine that $X$ and $Y$ do not have a common cause and $Y$ does not cause $X$, we may infer that some intervention on $X$ is associated with changes in $Y$. (Here we employ a connecting principle of form $P$ which uses $CC$, information about statistical dependence, and information about the absence of other causal relations to infer a causal conclusion.) Again, our ways of thinking about causation have developed to take advantage of such connections.

As another illustration, consider the Causal Markov Condition (CMC). CMC is satisfied if, for every variable $X_i$ in a causal graph $G$, conditioning on the parents (direct causes) of $X_i$ renders $X_i$ statistically independent of every other variable in $G$, except possibly its descendants (effects). It is crucial for usefully applying CMC that statistical dependencies – unconditional and conditional – not be ubiquitous. Suppose instead that for any set of variables $X = \{X_1, \ldots, X_n\}$ we could measure, each $X_i$ and $X_j$ were statistically dependent and remained statistically dependent as we conditioned on all subsets of other variables in $X$. Applying CMC alone to $X$ generates a set of fully connected graphs (every variable directly causally connected to every other), the size of which grows quickly with $n$, so CMC alone would be of little use. Normally we invoke additional conditions, like the widely used faithfulness condition, that select sparser graphs over fully connected ones. However, if for every set of variables $X$, no (unconditional and conditional) statistical independence relationships obtain, conditions like

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5 Faithfulness is often useful for causal inference, but not indispensable: it could be replaced by one of several weaker alternatives (Zhang and Spirtes, 2016; Forster et al., 2018). CMC is at least a candidate general truth about the world; faithfulness and its weakenings should be understood as defeasible model selection strategies.
faithfulness would add nothing to our ability to infer anything definite about causal structure. Fortunately, in our world there is a considerable amount of unconditional and conditional statistical independence and we regularly exploit that, in conjunction with other conditions (like CMC and faithfulness), to learn about causal relations.

The existence of variables that are statistically independent is also required for other familiar causal inference procedures like the use of randomized experiments – we cannot randomize if there are no natural statistical independencies among the variables of interest and we cannot produce any. In this case, there would be no possibility of causal learning on the basis of randomized experiments. Again, we should distinguish between (i) the connecting principle that licenses causal conclusions from the results of randomized experiments – roughly, if in an experiment in which assignment of \( C \) is randomized, the incidence of \( E \) is higher in the treatment group than in the control group (and we rule out that this a statistical fluke), then infer that \( C \) causes \( E \) – and (ii) the infrastructure feature: generically available statistical independencies that enable randomization. That the infrastructure (ii) is required for the strategy (i) illustrates the general fact that our causal reasoning strategies can only profitably be applied to worlds in which the infrastructure supporting those strategies is present.
3 Some examples of worldly infrastructure

We now turn to some candidates for the worldly infrastructure of causation (including some already introduced). Our aim at this point is only to describe some of the features that a world must possess to support causal reasoning strategies like our own. To streamline prose we will use “variable” to describe both elements of the world standing in causal relations and representations of those elements.⁶

3.1 Statistical Independence

The world contains many n-tuples of variables that are strictly statistically or probabilistically independent of each other, and many others that are “effectively independent,” i.e., sufficiently close to independence that they can be treated as independent for many inferential purposes. Some examples:
(A) The outcomes of successive coin tosses with the same generating set up are typically effectively independent. Those outcomes are also strictly independent of many other variables: ambient temperature, fluctuations in stock prices, etc. (B) Mendel’s law of independent assortment states that alleles for different traits are passed to offspring independently of each other. This “law” does not always hold (because of genetic linkage, among other considerations) but when it does, the independence relations it generates can be exploited in causal inference, as in the use of “Mendelian Randomization”

⁶The reader is free to use “quantity” (where quantities can be two-valued, real-valued, etc.) when the discussion concerns causal relata in the world and reserve “variable” for representations of quantities.
to make inferences about the role of environmental exposures in causing diseases (Lawlor et al., 2008; Sanderson et al., 2022). (C) Assumptions that the velocities of any two molecules in a dilute gas are statistically independent immediately prior to their collision – like the Stosszahlansatz or the assumption of “molecular chaos” – have played an important role in statistical physics since the time of Boltzmann (Brown et al., 2009).

We have already described several ways in which the presence of statistical independence is exploited in causal inference. The presence of such independence is often a foundational assumption of core principles of causal inference; for example, the standard proof of CMC assumes that each variable is a deterministic function of other measured variables (its parents) and an additive “error” term. The error term for each equation is assumed to be probabilistically independent of the parents and the error terms across equations are assumed to be independent of each other.

As another illustration, techniques for inferring causal direction often exploit information about statistical independence. As a simple example, consider a system of three variables, with $X$ independent of $Y$ but $X$ and $Z$ dependent and $Y$ and $Z$ dependent. Then a reliable heuristic delivers the judgment that $X$ and $Y$ cause $Z$: the causal direction goes from $X$ and from $Y$ to $Z$, with $X$ and $Y$ causally independent.$^{7}$ Obviously we could not develop or use this heuristic if all or most variables were pairwise statistically dependent.

$^{7}$See Woodward (2022a) for more on why this and other, more sophisticated procedures for inferring causal direction work.
Looking beyond explicit frameworks for causal discovery, the factorizability of joint probability distributions (reflecting statistical independence) is commonly understood as indicating causal independence in science. This has important methodological consequences, not least that knowing that a joint probability distribution factorizes often justifies analyzing the causally independent subsystems independently, greatly facilitating computation. For instance, the factorization of a joint distribution in physics is commonly understood to reflect facts about (effective) causal independence of the subsystems (i.e., the absence of nontrivial physical influence between the subsystems). Such inferences are ubiquitous in classical physics and, although quantum entanglement makes the connection subtle, remain extremely common in quantum physics as well. To take a particularly well-known example, this connection between the factorizability of a probability distribution and causal independence is the essence of the so-called “Bell locality” condition that is assumed in proofs of Bell-type theorems. The enormous difficulty that people have had in coming to grips with the fact that quantum systems in entangled states apparently can violate this condition speaks to the centrality and importance of this type of reasoning in physics.

3.2 The possibility of interventions

We noted that it is frequently possible to intervene on some variables with respect to others; that is, it is possible to manipulate some variables in a way that is independent (causally and statistically) of the values of other

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8For readers unfamiliar with this condition, see, e.g., [Norsen 2011].
variables, and in a way that influences certain other variables only indirectly, if at all, or to find naturally occurring variables satisfying this condition. Our world does not conspire to make such interventions impossible. For example, our world is not superdeterministic (Shimony et al., 1976): that would entail that whenever a researcher does an experiment in which she thinks she is performing an intervention $I$ that manipulates $X$, and records a change in $Y$, this is actually due to some unobserved common cause of $I$ and $Y$, or due to some common cause of $X$ and $Y$ that “just happens” to be correlated with $I$\footnote{Superdeterminism is different from – and much stronger than – the possibility that the world is governed by deterministic laws. The latter poses no particular problems for causal inference.}. This would imply that the supposed intervention $I$ is not really an intervention at all and the conclusions the researcher draws about the causal relation between $X$ and $Y$ are mistaken. The assumption that this sort of systematic confounding is not widespread is required to draw correct causal conclusions from experiments\footnote{It is also generally true that local interventions are possible. This means, roughly, that when it is possible to intervene with $I$ on $X$, $I$ itself does not consist of some delicately tuned manipulation of many other, perhaps spatially separated, variables.}

Going further, often variables occur “naturally” that have the characteristics of interventions (i.e., they are “exogenous” to a candidate causal relationship from $X$ to $Y$ and provide sources of variation in $X$ that are associated with variation in $Y$ only through the variation in $X$ they produce). Such variables greatly facilitate causal inference, making possible “natural experiments” in many areas of science and the identification of variables that can serve as “instruments” (i.e., instrumental variables) for investigating causal relationships (Angrist et al., 1996). These techniques illustrate, among other
things, that even if the relationship between $X$ and $Y$ is confounded (by a common cause $Z$, for example), as long as we can find an instrumental variable $W$ that is an additional source of variation in $X$, where this variation is independent of the variation in $X$ caused by $Z$, we can use this information to detect whether there is a causal relation between $X$ and $Y$. Variables having these intervention/instrument-like characteristics are not always available, but often they are (even if identifying them requires considerable ingenuity) and can be exploited in causal inference. As with other infrastructure features, the existence of such variables is a generic empirical fact about our world.

A related observation is that it is sometime possible to “fix” the values of variables exogenously by imposing values that remain unchanged, via processes that are causally uninfluenced by other variables in the system. Consider the ideal gas law (IG) $PV = kT$ that relates the pressure $P$, volume $V$, and temperature $T$ of a gas at thermodynamic equilibrium. (IG) is silent about the causal relationships among these variables. Now consider a gas confined to a box of fixed volume and immersed in a heat bath of fixed temperature. The heat bath fixes the value of $T$ exogenously (since the other variables $V$ and $P$ do not influence the heat bath), while $V$ is fixed exogenously by enclosing it in a rigid container. We can represent this with the equations (2) $V = v$ and (3) $T = t$ indicating that these variables have been set to fixed values. We can then use (2) and (3) to solve for the pressure using (IG). In a more general setting, Simon (1953) used such facts about the order in which the values of variables in a set of equations can be determined to infer causal direction (i.e., which variables cause others). In the specific
experimental setup we consider, this licenses the inference that volume and temperature are causes of pressure.

3.3 Modularity

A system at a chosen scale of analysis is modular if it has a representation that correctly predicts that if we modify selected causal relationships between variables of the system, certain other causal relationships will remain unchanged. (Modularity is not a binary property but comes in degrees.) For example, a system of two coupled springs is modular to the degree it is possible to modify the relationship $F = -k_1 x_1(t)$ governing one spring (e.g., by heating the spring) while leaving the relationship characterizing the other spring unchanged. It is implausible that it is somehow metaphysically necessary that there exist modular representations for all systems of interest and nothing guarantees that such representations will exist at any chosen level of description. Nevertheless, we are sometimes able to discover modular representations of systems and this greatly facilitates causal analysis. For example, if intervening to knock out one gene in a genetic regulatory network will not lead the entire system to reorganize so that causal relations throughout the network change (which would be a massive failure of modularity), this makes it much easier to learn about the causal structure of the network. (Many investigations of genetic regulatory networks assume this sort of modularity, often with good empirical support; the influential
work of Davidson (2010), for example. Again, it is a fact about our world that many systems of causal relations are modular at some accessible level of measurement and description.

3.4 Value-Relation Independence

Our discussion of principles such as CC and CMC has emphasized “constraint-based” methods for learning causal structure based on conditional independence relations, but there now exist machine learning methods for causal inference that exploit properties of probability distributions besides conditional (in)dependence. Central to these methods is the “principle of independent mechanisms” (PIM) (Peters et al., 2017, chapter 2.1). Consider a system of two random variables in which $X$ causes $Y$; PIM formalizes the sensible expectation that the “mechanism” that determines the probability distribution over the cause variable $X$ operates independently of the “mechanism” that determines the conditional probability distribution over the effect variable $Y$, given $X$. More concisely, PIM requires that $\Pr(Y|X)$ be “independent” of $\Pr(X)$. Here “independence” clearly cannot mean statistical independence. Rather, it means something like $\Pr(Y|X)$ and $\Pr(X)$

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11 Mitchell (2009) (following Greenspan (2001)) describes a hypothetical gene network in which interventions on one gene or node produces a change in causal relations throughout the network, so the system is non-modular at this level of description. We agree that there may be real gene networks that behave this way but if the failure of modularity is sufficiently massive we think it becomes an open question whether it is useful or appropriate to talk about “the” causal structure of the network.

12 The basic obstacle is that when considering the independence of $\Pr(C)$ and $\Pr(E|C)$, one does not have access to a statistical sample of probability distributions that could be used to check whether $\Pr(C)$ and $\Pr(E|C)$ covary. See Peters et al. (2017, section 4.1) for a pedagogical explanation of the challenge to understanding the independence asserted.
can vary independently of one another, in the sense that $\Pr(Y|X)$ will not change under suitable changes in $\Pr(X)$ (changes in $\Pr(X)$ produced by interventions, roughly speaking), and vice versa. This can be understood as a modularity condition (since it asserts that the mechanism generating $X$ can be modified independently of the mechanism connecting $X$ to $Y$) and reflects the assumption, common to many areas of science, that laws and initial conditions can be formulated such that the latter can change independently of the former.$^{13}$

One virtue of PIM is that by exploiting information about probability distributions that goes beyond that used by constraint-based causal discovery methods, it can solve problems that those methods cannot. For example, for a system of two variables $X$ and $Y$, principles like CMC and faithfulness that exploit only conditional and unconditional (in)dependence relations are unable to distinguish between $X \to Y$ and $X \leftarrow Y$. PIM helps because, given various additional assumptions, if it is satisfied by $X \to Y$ then it will not be satisfied by $X \leftarrow Y$, so it can be inferred that the direction in which PIM is satisfied is the correct causal direction (Shimizu et al., 2006).$^{14}$

Such methods have been tested on data in which the causal direction is inde-

\footnote{As Woodward (2022a) argues, one of the crucial features of the distinction between laws and initial conditions is that we expect the former to remain stable or invariant under changes in the latter. This invariance requirement is closely connected to the expectation that the mechanisms that generate initial conditions are independent of the laws that evolve those initial conditions.}

\footnote{These additional assumptions take a variety of forms but concern the functional relation between $X$ and $Y$; for example, that it can be represented by an “additive error model” of the form $Y = f(X) + U$ or $X = f(Y) + V$, or that the distribution of at least one of the variables in the model is non-Gaussian.}
pendently known (e.g., the relationship between altitude and temperature) and perform well above chance (Mooij et al., 2016). PIM thus identifies further worldly infrastructure that, when present, can be exploited to facilitate reliable causal inference.

3.5 Realization Independence

It is often true that upper-level systems of causal relationships display a substantial degree of “realization independence” with respect to their lower-level realizing details: the same upper-level causal relationships continue to correctly characterize the behavior of a system across some range of changes in its lower-level realizers. For example, the thermodynamic behavior of a sample of bulk matter is essentially independent of its exact microstate, as long as that state resides within the appropriate region of the state space. For many psychological and neurobiological phenomena, it appears that the specific behavior of any individual neuron (which is typically stochastic) hardly matters – the aggregate properties of populations of neurons is what matters. Many powerful theoretical tools – such as renormalization group methods and homogenization techniques – were developed to exploit the presence of realization independence, in its myriad forms, to simplify (or make possible at all) prediction and explanation (e.g., Batterman, 2001). Realization independence, when it obtains, also allows us to ignore or abstract away from lower-level details (the modeling of which is often intractable) and thus facilitates causal analysis (Woodward, 2018; Robertson, 2021).
If the behavior of some upper-level system exhibits widespread failure of realization independence, then to achieve causal understanding of the system’s behavior we must advert to some lower-level description that provides stable, realization-independent relations. If this lower level is not epistemically accessible, or we lack a good theory of its behavior, or informatively connecting it to upper-level behavior is computationally intractable, then our pursuit of causal understanding of the higher-level system will stall. To illustrate, [Goldenfeld and Kadanoff (1999)] consider the possibility that to adequately model the behavior of a bulldozer, one would have to appeal to quantum chromodynamics. They remark that one would have “model chaos”: the choice of a model for bulldozer behavior would be highly sensitive to assumptions about the correct model for the behavior of the strong force, the state of the quark and gluon fields that (partially) realize the bulldozer, etc. This is information that we have no serious possibility of connecting to bulldozer behavior; if it were necessary, bulldozer science would be impossible. If realization independence failed to anything like this degree for sufficiently many natural phenomena, scientific inquiry itself – let alone causal understanding – would be impossible.

### 3.6 Independence as a Common Thread

All of these infrastructure features concern independence relations: statistical independence among variables, the existence of variables that are causally independent of other variables (making possible interventions and natural exogenous sources of variation), the independence of upper-level relationships
from details of their lower-level realizers, the independence of causal relationships from the mechanism(s) determining the cause variable(s) in those relationships (PIM), and the independence of some causal relationships governing the behavior of a system from others (modularity). This varied store of independence relations provides the primary resources we use to learn about causal relationships: it is the existence of such independence relationships that supports causal learning and the applicability of causal notions. Somewhat counterintuitively, we learn about (causal) dependence, first and foremost, by exploiting information about independence.

4 Does the Infrastructure Call for Further Explanation?

Our concern so far has been to elucidate the infrastructure features that our causal thinking has developed to exploit and which support our ability to learn and reason about causal relations in our world. In the Introduction, we also flagged a natural second stage of the worldly infrastructure project: pursuing the further, albeit independent question of why those infrastructure features are present. What, for example, accounts for the ubiquity of statistical independencies? Why is it often possible to perform interventions whose effects are largely independent of the lower-level realizers of the manipulated variable? Any attempt to systematically answer such questions lies beyond the scope of the present paper, not least because we expect that accounting for the presence of any particular infrastructure feature in different systems
will often require different explanations, but we sketch some scientific details we take to be relevant. We hope this will illustrate how the infrastructure project opens the door to novel lines of inquiry that are easily overlooked when pursuing more familiar metaphysical projects.

Consider statistical independence (though these considerations also bear on the possibility of interventions). One important consideration concerns certain properties of physical forces in the actual world. Forces between bodies fall off with distance fairly rapidly: polynomially for the gravitational and electromagnetic forces and exponentially for the weak and strong forces.\(^{15}\) This means that (i) at length scales longer than an atomic radius, only the gravitational and electromagnetic forces are relevant and (ii) at any scale, the dominant contributions to the dynamical evolution of a physical system typically come from other systems in its immediate environment: the fall-off of forces ensures that interventions on physical systems even relatively short distances away often have negligible effect. It is also the case that (iii) essentially all macroscopic systems are electrically neutral under ordinary conditions, so electromagnetic interactions will not naturally produce correlations between properties of bulk matter and (iv) the gravitational force is sufficiently weak, and the gravitational effect of any object in our immediate vicinity so dramatically swamped by the gravitational force exerted by the earth, that in many circumstances gravity is also an ineffective means of naturally producing correlations between properties of bulk matter. The result is that many variables of many natural systems, particularly macro-

\(^{15}\)At least, at scales larger than about \(10^{-5}\) meters. Inside protons and neutrons the strong force between quarks and gluons increases with distance, resulting in the confinement of those quarks and gluons.
scopic systems, will be effectively independent under most ordinary physical conditions.

The fall-off of forces also underpins a central pillar in the structure of quantum theories, the cluster decomposition principle (Reed and Simon, 1979; Weinberg, 1995; Duncan, 2012). Remarkably, although the cluster decomposition principle plays a deep role in shaping the structure of quantum theories (Williams et al., 2024), on one way of looking at it, it essentially amounts a statement of (a spatiotemporally local version of) the CMC. Cluster decomposition constrains scattering processes in a quantum theory: it requires that the presence (or absence) of measured correlations between particle properties in the post-scattering state be fully explained by those particles having causally interacted (or not) during the scattering event. The basic idea is that as two “clusters” of particles are translated a large spacelike distance away from one another (i.e., out of local causal contact), the total probability distribution over the possible outcomes of the total scattering process should factorize into a product of independent probability distributions, one for each of the two causally unrelated “clusters”. Any correlations between post-scattering properties of particles within a cluster should, in turn, be fully accounted for by that scattering interaction. In other words, cluster decomposition requires that any measured post-scattering correlations between any two quantities $X$ and $Y$ must be screened off by the scattering

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16We said above that we would be considering statistical independence, but a referee asked about the relationship between the fall-off of forces with distance and the CMC. We consider the CMC a connecting principle, not an infrastructure feature, and so its explanation does not really fit into what we’ve called the second stage of the worldly infrastructure project, but we nevertheless thought it best to address the question here.
interaction \(Z\). One can prove that this principle is satisfied if and only if the forces between any two particles in the model fall-off sufficiently rapidly with distance.\(^{17}\)

More generally, there will be many physical situations in which the fall-off of forces with distance will ensure that error terms for variables of interest will be independent. As mentioned in section 3.1, this means that long as the effect variables are functions of their immediate causes (as is standardly the case in physical modeling) and an additive error term, it follows that the model will satisfy CMC. For example, consider two bodies of masses \(m_1\) and \(m_2\) orbiting a central body of mass \(M \gg m_1, m_2\). (Two celestial bodies orbiting a large star, for instance.) The gravitational influence of the central body is the dominant contribution to the dynamical evolution of each of the two lighter bodies; local influences on body 1 and body 2 make comparatively negligible contributions to that dynamical behavior and will accordingly be modeled as error terms. For sufficiently distant bodies and/or an appropriate coarse-graining of the variables of interest, the local influences on body 1 will be independent of those on body 2, securing the independence of error terms.

A second important physical consideration is that the interaction of a system with a larger environment (or even with other parts of the system itself) can produce decorrelation and effective independence among variables.

\(^{17}\)More precisely, cluster decomposition requires that while the S-matrix that determines the probability distribution over the properties of the scattered particles should be invariant under a simultaneous spatial translation of all the scattering particles, it cannot be invariant under any spatial translation of only a subset of the scattering particles. It can be shown that this is equivalent to a constraint on the Hamiltonian governing the dynamical evolution of the scattering particles, requiring that the forces between any two particles fall off of sufficiently rapidly with distance.
within the system, both classically and quantum mechanically. The environment can, and typically does, interact with the system in a way that “washes out” (often rapidly) statistical correlations within the system. For example, although two molecules in a gas will have correlated momenta immediately after they collide, their momenta rapidly become effectively independent as a result of subsequent independent collisions of each particle with other molecules in the gas. In quantum theories, environmental decoherence produces a similar result. Consider a “system” – two particles, with entangled spins – interacting with molecules constituting an ambient “environment”. This interaction rapidly entangles the system with the environmental molecules, and although the entanglement between the two initial spins entails that results of appropriate measurements of those spins should be correlated, the entanglement between system and environment renders these correlations inaccessible to us via measurements. The result is that environmental decoherence rapidly renders measurements of the spins of the “system” particles effectively statistically independent (see e.g., Schlosshauer (2019)).

Another important consideration, relevant to the above, is that whether variables are independent can depend on their “grain” as well as the “cut” we make to distinguish the system of interest from some larger environment. By choosing an appropriate graining of variables and an appropriate system/environment cut, we can sometimes characterize systems in such a way that few variables are correlated and many are independent, thus maximizing the information that can be exploited for causal discovery. In particular, a description of a system using fine-grained variables which are dependent
can sometimes be replaced by a description using more coarse-grained variables that are independent. For example, the exact positions of atoms in my coffee cup may be, at some divinely accessible level of precision, correlated with my position at my desk because of gravitational interactions. But if we adopt more tractable, coarse-grained variables – variables that track atomic positions to something like the 10th digit would suffice, let alone variables that track only the position of the coffee cup itself on the desk – there will be no such correlation. (Incidentally, this is one reason why the claim that everything in the backward light cone of some event $E$ is causally related to $E$ shows much less than is often supposed. The claim might be correct, in some sense, for maximally fine-grained descriptions of all systems and events involved, but even mildly coarse-grained variables will exhibit effective independence. It is those variables that are of interest, even in the practice of fundamental physics (cf. Frisch, 2014, pp. 68-70).)

Causal inference does not require that variables (or relationships) be fully independent (or modular) at all spatiotemporal scales, only that they be effectively independent at a particular scale of interest. To claim that rainfall is exogenous with respect to crop growth (Simon and Rescher, 1966), it need not be that agriculture has no long-term influence on climate. It only need be that over the timescale of interest (say, five years) any influence of crop growth on rainfall is sufficiently small to be negligible on that scale. That independence is often only approximate is not in tension with recognizing independence as a genuine feature of the world. It is still the case that the possibility of differentiating between dependent and independent variable

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18It may be that only those variables are even physically meaningful (Miller, 2021).
sets at one scale requires it not to be the case that all variables influence all others equally at all scales (Weinberger 2020). It is fortunate for causal analysis that it is possible to successfully characterize the dominant behaviors of worldly systems at different scales in terms of a relatively small set of causal influences.

Space constraints leave us able only to sketch explanations for the presence of other infrastructure features, but we emphasize that these explanations will typically be domain or system-dependent. For example, in biological systems like brains or genomes there are reasons to believe that natural selection will often produce modular systems and systems whose behavior is somewhat insensitive to lower-level details (Wagner et al. 2007; Clune et al. 2013). The explanation of modularity and the autonomy of higher-level behavior in physical systems, when present, obviously proceeds along much different lines (e.g., for the latter, often by appeal to renormalization group methods).

5 Success, Realism, and Effective Theories

We have argued that the presence of the worldly infrastructure features explains the success of our procedures for making inferences about causal relationships. This argument is an instance of a general form of reasoning employed throughout science. Scientific modeling rests on empirical presup-

\[ More \text{ precisely, it is an indispensable part of the explanation. The success of those procedures also depends on obvious factors like the existence of users of the procedures, their cognitive abilities, etc.}\]
positions. The application of textbook techniques for calculating scattering cross sections in quantum field theory involves several: for example, that the scattered particles interact weakly and that the scattering occurs at effectively zero temperature. The use of polygenic risk scores to predict behavioral traits and diseases rests on the presupposition that the traits in question are the result of a large number of genetic factors, each individually contributing a very small and approximately additive effect on the trait in question; it also presumes that the ingredients (SNPs) that go into the scores, if not themselves causal, are correlated with genuinely causal factors (Kendler and Woodward [2023]). When these applications are successful, we can infer that the real-world physical situation satisfies the presuppositions of our modeling strategies. For example, the fact that polygene risk scores are replicable and predictively successful suggests to geneticists that these presuppositions concerning genetic architecture are correct. It also helps to explain why many previous attempts to identify common candidate genes with large effects on the traits in question were unsuccessful (i.e., fail to replicate): for many traits, such genes do not exist. Concluding that the presuppositions of a modeling strategy are satisfied in the real world on the basis of that strategy’s empirical success is a familiar inference in the sciences. We claim that a similar inference holds for the worldly infrastructure that underlies successful causal reasoning: the success of various causal discovery strategies reveals facts about what the world is like – i.e., about the presence of the worldly infrastructure that supports the success of those strategies. In this sense, we are simply treating causal discovery like other fields of successful scientific inquiry.
This “argument from success” may remind readers of similar arguments by scientific realists: (1) science (or a particular theory) is predictively accurate, (2) the success of science (or this particular theory) would be miraculous if its descriptions of the world were not at least approximately true, therefore (3) those descriptions are at least approximately true. We think our argument from success is stronger than this familiar argument in several respects.

One common objection to this argument for scientific realism invokes the specter of underdetermination. One way to state the objection is that no matter the predictive success of $T$, one cannot rule out that $T$ is false and some alternative $T^*$ is true, where $T^*$ is inconsistent with $T$ but accounts for the same phenomena. How seriously one should take this objection in a given context depends, in part, on how plausible it is that there is any such theory $T^*$. Applied to our argument, the analogous issue is whether there is some alternative account, postulating very different worldly infrastructure, that accounts equally well for the “phenomena”: the success of our causal inference procedures. We are not aware of even a hint of a serious proposal in this direction.

A second disanalogy: our reasons for thinking that the worldly infrastructure features are present go well beyond the inference to the best explanation on which the scientific realist relies. Often we can directly establish that the infrastructure features are present – we observe that certain variables are statistically independent, etc. Direct observation that the infrastructure features are present, combined with arguments that if present, they would explain the success of our causal discovery procedures, and that no other po-
tential explanations of success seem to be available, all support the claim that the presence of the infrastructure features is crucial for the success of causal discovery. We have something more like an argument that the presence of the infrastructure features would be the only empirically viable explanation, bolstered by independent evidence that the explanatory infrastructure is, in fact, present.

We conclude by commenting on a distinct issue that might invite a similar skeptical challenge: the status of the causal claims that our inference procedures deliver. Suppose those procedures seem to tell us that (1) $C$ causes $E$. How do we know that some alternative account – perhaps a more “fundamental”, fine-grained account – won’t one day be accepted, according to which (1) is not true, but rather some alternative (2) is true: $C^*$ causes $E$? If so, our causal inference procedures will not be successful in the sense we have claimed.

One way this might happen is if there was some unrecognized source of confounding in the procedures that we took to establish (1): we thought we were intervening on $C$ and observing changes in $E$, but some other factor $Z$ was associated with our attempted interventions and in fact $Z$ causes $E$. This is always possible in principle, but is extremely far-fetched in many realistic cases and often not a possibility to be taken seriously in inquiry.

Suppose instead that we succeed in performing genuine interventions on $C$ and that $E$ changes in accord with (M), or we provide evidence via other inference strategies we have discussed for the same conclusion about how $E$ would respond to interventions on $C$. Might we still subsequently discover
that (1) is false? This is harder to envision. This could be a genuine possibility if (M) was an inadequate account of causation. The correct account could be one that did not incorporate (M) but instead invoked some entirely distinct condition(s) S, or one according to which a relationship is causal only if it satisfies (M) and some additional condition R that (M) omits. Then it might be that even though E changes in response to interventions on C, the condition(s) S or R are not satisfied so the relation between C and E is not really causal.

Of course, if (M) or something sufficiently similar is the correct account of causation, that won’t be a genuine possibility. However, there is reason beyond optimism about (M) to believe that statements of the form “interventions on C are associated with changes in E” are unlikely to be overturned by future developments. Statements of that form, established on the basis of apparently well-designed experiments and reliable inference procedures but then invalided by subsequent developments, are difficult to come by. Subsequent discoveries may tell us more about why interventions on C are associated with changes in E, about which components of C are the genuine difference-making elements, about mediating variables, about the range of conditions under which the original claim holds, and so on. However, they rarely show that under the specified conditions the original claim is false. (And if they do, the mistake is usually discoverable via investigation at the level of the original causal claim, such as the presence of an unknown confounder or a failure of replicability, and not via some means that depend on future theorizing about causation.\textsuperscript{20} This is, in part, be-
cause interventionist causal claims are “thin”, i.e., relatively ontologically non-committal. In particular, interventionist causal claims describe a dependence relationship without making commitments about more “fundamental” or fine-grained characterizations of the variables involved, nor about the specific mechanism responsible for dependence relationship. For example, if we understand “aspirin causes headache relief” as a “thin” interventionist claim, it is wildly implausible that it would be falsified by subsequent theoretical developments. After all, it makes no commitments about how the causal influence is transmitted (e.g., via inhibiting prostaglandin production vs. via activating μ-opioid receptors) nor about the chemical composition of aspirin, the physiological realizers of headaches, etc. This results in interventionist relations typically being preserved under theory change, including the embedding of high-level causal relations into more “fundamental” or fine-grained theoretical descriptions.

This illustrates another important disanalogy with the familiar argument for scientific realism. There are many examples of theories that are highly predictively successful but have mistaken ontological commitments – nineteenth-century theories that held light and electromagnetism were transmitted by a mechanical ether, Dirac’s “hole theory” that was used to predict the existence of antimatter, and so on. By contrast, statements of the form “interventions on $C$ are associated with changes in $E$” describe a dependence

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$C$ might be discovered to be “ambiguous”: different interventions that set $C$ to the same value might be associated with different outcomes depending on how $C$ is “realized” at some lower level (Spirtes and Scheines[2004]). This mistake is something that can typically be discovered by doing experiments at the level of $C$ – no discovery of a deeper or more fine-grained theory is required.
relationship without making such ontological commitments. This makes it possible for interventionist causal claims to survive subsequent scientific developments and attendant changes in ontology. This is just as true for claims that more than 40 CAG repeats in the HTT gene causes Huntington’s chorea, that the motion of a conducting material in a magnetic field causes induction of a current, etc. as it was for the claim that aspirin causes headache relief.

Our invocation of “well-designed” experiments and inference procedures may seem question-begging. We disagree. One can always be mistaken in thinking that an experiment is well-designed, but whether this is the case is usually something that can be determined by subsequent scrutiny of the experiment itself. Consider the replication crisis affecting portions of psychology. That the experiments claiming to show that certain manipulations cause various effects (e.g., priming effects on behavior) were badly designed can be revealed from inspection of the experiments themselves and the techniques employed to analyze them (e.g., inappropriate statistical procedures), along with the information provided by their failure to replicate. Again, we can discover this via investigations at the same level as the original causal claim; new scientific theories are not required. Our point is not that this is never the case – nineteenth-century experimenters working with cathode ray equipment could not possibly have recognized that their experiments were poorly designed and that certain causal claims rested on shaky ground (because they failed to control for X-rays) until X-rays were discovered by Roentgen in 1895. Our point is that such cases are the exception, not the rule, and do not justify anything like a general expectation that interventionist claims are endangered by future scientific development.
Physicists make widespread use of the notion of an “effective theory”. This is a theory $T_E$ that accurately captures dependence relations over a restricted range of scales or within a specified domain, but will not be predictively accurate outside that domain. The use of effective theories is licensed by the fact that their structure is relatively independent of the structure that might be revealed by more fine-grained levels of analysis. Put otherwise, the dependence relationships described by $T_E$ depend only weakly on which fine-grained theory turns out to be correct: as long as that fine-grained theory lies in a class of theories that satisfy specified conditions, the relationships in $T_E$ will be retained by that theory (Williams, 2019).\footnote{The formal specification of these conditions varies between theories, but they are in general fairly weak.} (In physics, this can often be demonstrated by the methods for exploiting realization independence mentioned in section 3.6 or similar techniques.) The use of effective theories in particle physics has received philosophical attention, but the concept can be profitably applied more generally; for example, the use of Navier-Stokes or Navier-Cauchy equations to model the continuum-scale properties of fluids and solids (respectively) can be illuminatingly understood as making use of effective theories (Batterman, 2021). We suggest that causal claims, in an interventionist framework like (M), exhibit important similarities to dependence relations found within effective theories throughout physics: they are typically independent of many details of their lower-level realizers while remaining non-committal about any detailed ontological account of those realizers. As discussed above, these properties justify the expectation that interventionist claims will remain stable across future theoretical developments.
6 Disanalogies with Traditional Metaphysics

We presume it is clear that the “worldly infrastructure” project differs from those typically engaged in under the heading of the metaphysics of causation. It requires no special metaphysical concepts or entities, like powers or relations between universals. It neither relies upon nor attempts to systematize intuitive judgments about cases. It maintains tight connections with the epistemology and methodology of causal inference, since the infrastructure features it aims to identify are precisely those on which successful causal reasoning relies. Here we spell out some differences that may be less obvious, with the aim of further elucidating our approach.

Modal Ambitions: Metaphysicians of causation often understand their task

22A reviewer encouraged us to situate our project with respect to those of Andersen (2017) and Papineau (2022) in particular. Andersen aims to provide a metaphysical account of causation that (i) allows a unification of causal process and counterfactual theories of causation and (ii) will support an information-theoretic characterization of causation. She proposes that a theory of causation be grounded on a pattern ontology: causal relata are patterns in microphysical degrees of freedom (“the causal nexus”) which are characterized by a qualitative “counterfactual robustness” based on the stability of the pattern under variations in the state of the causal nexus. Her “core metaphysical view”, then, is that “causation is a set of information-theoretic relations between patterns instantiated in the rich causal nexus” (Andersen, 2017, p. 612). We do not offer a metaphysical account of what causation, or causal relata, “are” nor attempt to provide a semantic basis for interventionist counterfactuals in some “causal nexus”; we do not aim at a unification of causal process and counterfactual theories of causation; we do not aim at an information-theoretic account of causation.

The primary points of departure between our project and Papineau’s are (i) he seeks a reductive account of causal relations to statistical (in)dependence properties, while we do not pursue (and indeed are skeptical of) any such reduction and (ii) he is focused exclusively on statistical (in)dependence among exogenous variables and does not consider the other infrastructure features we identify, nor does he suggest that there may be underlying physical bases for this statistical independence (which would be akin to our “stage two” of the worldly infrastructure project). There are myriad smaller differences between our projects and those of Andersen and Papineau, but these strike us as the biggest.
as characterizing features of causation that are “conceptually necessary” – perhaps features that causation must possess in all “metaphysically possible” worlds. The infrastructure project has more restrained modal ambitions. It does not claim that the generic features that characterize the worldly infrastructure obtain as a matter of conceptual necessity, nor does it claim that there is a conceptually necessary connection between causation and the presence of those features. It does not attempt to identify causation with the infrastructure features and it does not take the infrastructure features to be “grounds” or “truth makers” for causal claims, in the metaphysician’s sense of those terms (which imports assumptions about metaphysically necessary relations). Instead, the infrastructure project is solely concerned with properties of the actual world and how they support causal reasoning.

In line with its restricted modal ambitions, the infrastructure project declines to take a stand on how to think about causal relations in “alien worlds” – proposed worlds very different from our own in which the worldly infrastructure is not present or not connected with causation in anything like the way it is in the actual world. The alien worlds typically considered are worlds in which some or all of the worldly infrastructure that supports successful causal reasoning in the actual world is missing. It is no surprise, then, that we do not consider the judgments one may be tempted to make about such worlds – using causal concepts and reasoning strategies developed in the actual world to exploit precisely that worldly infrastructure – to provide useful information or insight into causation or causal reasoning in the actual world. Indeed, our functionalism inclines us toward skepticism about whether there is a determinate fact about how causal concepts developed to exploit a spe-
cific worldly infrastructure can be applied to worlds that do not exhibit the infrastructure presupposed by those concepts and strategies.

**Domain-specificity.** Although the infrastructure features obtain generically, it is entirely possible that there are actual systems that, at least at some natural levels of analysis, fail to instantiate the infrastructure features to such an extent that they resist causal analysis. For example, there has been recent discussion about whether structural features of general relativity leave it unable to provide causal explanations of various phenomena. Several of those structural features apparently imply that certain interventions (and the associated counterfactuals) that are crucial for causal interpretation are ill-defined, which would mean a crucial element of the worldly infrastructure is missing.

If this is correct, and if sufficiently many other infrastructure features are absent for certain systems modeled in GR, we think it warranted to conclude that the behavior of such systems simply will not admit a straightforward causal interpretation, at least on anything like how we presently think about causation. This possibility illustrates our general point that some systems – at least when modeled at certain levels of analysis – may simply be “un-

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23 For additional discussion, see Williams (2022b); Woodward (2022b).
24 For discussion, see e.g., Curiel (2015); Jaramillo and Lam (2021). Problems with the relevant counterfactuals arise in several ways. The stress-energy tensor is partly dependent on metric structure for its characterization, so an intervention on the former with respect to the latter is arguably not well-defined. This creates difficulties for the claim that any chosen matter distribution “causes” metric structure. In addition, the absence of unique vacuum solutions creates problems for counterfactuals concerning what would happen if matter were removed from a region of spacetime (since there won’t be unique situations associated with the antecedents of such counterfactuals). There are also global constraints that follow from the field equations that create problems for the possibility of local interventions.
friendly” to causal analysis because important worldly infrastructure is not present. Accepting this contingency of the worldly infrastructure stands in contrast to the common philosophical expectation that causal notions should be applicable everywhere that certain minimal constraints (e.g., the presence of regularities) are satisfied.

**Laws:** Many philosophers advocate a tight connection between causal relations and laws of nature. A simple, especially strong form of this connection asserts that \( C \) causes \( E \) if and only if \( C \) and \( E \) are “related by” a “law of nature”. We do not necessarily dispute the “only if” direction, depending on how the quoted terms are made precise. However, we do deny the “if” direction. The infrastructure features include the presence of statistical independencies, the possibility of interventions, and so on. If these features do not obtain then it may not be true that \( C \) causes \( E \), even if \( C \) and \( E \) are “related by” a “law of nature”. The presence of the infrastructure features in some domain does not follow merely from the fact the domain is law-governed, but depends on detailed, contingent features of those laws as well as contingent (if generic) facts about initial and boundary conditions (e.g., that the world is not superdeterministic). Our discussion of obstacles to defining interventions and their associated counterfactuals in general relativity provide one example; anti-entropic systems also appear to defy causal description, despite obeying the same laws of nature as entropic systems [Williams (2022b)]. These examples illustrate the general point that more is required for causal notions to be applicable to a given system or relationship than merely that it be lawlike.
Relevance of Physics: The causal modeling techniques that inform our analysis are widely used in the social and behavioral sciences and increasingly in portions of biology, including neurobiology and genetics. However, readers may wonder whether these techniques can be usefully applied within physics and, relatedly, whether the infrastructure features we describe are important for causal reasoning in physics. We have several replies. First, there is now a rapidly growing literature applying causal discovery methods to classical and quantum physics, e.g., (Costa and Shrapnel 2016; Janzing et al. 2016; Allen et al. 2017; Barrett et al. 2020). Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that the infrastructure features on which we have focused do often figure in physical reasoning. For instance, assumptions that causally unrelated variables will be statistically independent are very common; for example, this is why, in the absence of delicately arranged contrivances, the possibility of coherent electromagnetic radiation converging on a source it is not considered a serious physical possibility in the actual world, despite being consistent with Maxwell’s equations. The need for theoretical structure to license interventions also plays an important (albeit rarely explicit) role in physical theorizing, from thermodynamics to quantum field theory. The principle of independent mechanisms is also universally assumed to hold in physics and has been exploited in classical and quantum physics for multiple purposes (e.g., Maudlin 2007 pp. 130-35; Janzing et al. 2016; Williams 2022a).

25 Treating thermodynamics as a “control theory” is a familiar idea (Wallace 2014), especially in engineering, but the invocation of quantum field theory may be surprising. The cluster decomposition principle, mentioned above, is one of multiple principles that plays this role: its satisfaction ensures that particles separated by sufficiently large spatial or temporal intervals can be treated as dynamically independent. This allows one to define a notion of an “essentially” localized state in quantum field theory, which in turn allows for a well-defined notion of an intervention; again, see (Williams et al. 2024).
Second, to the extent that these infrastructure features are not satisfied by some physical systems and we cannot usefully apply causal inference techniques, we think this may simply mark limits on the applicability of causal thinking in physics. However, we do not conclude from these limits (should they exist) that the features we discuss are somehow thereby unimportant to causal reasoning in circumstances in which they are present. The legitimacy of causal reasoning in genetics does not hinge on whether the Standard Model of particle physics provides causal explanations of phenomena; whether and when causal reasoning can be applied to any domain of natural phenomena, including physics itself, depends on whether the worldly infrastructure that supports causal reasoning is present.

7 Conclusion

This paper engages in a novel project – the elucidation of the worldly infrastructure that supports the application of causal analysis. This is distinct from most projects pursued within mainstream metaphysics of causation, but it also does not concern only the epistemology or methodology of causal reasoning. Instead, it aims to identify the features that are “out there” in nature that underlie our ability to learn about causal relationships and successfully apply them. The project is is motivated by an idea that is relatively uncontroversial elsewhere in the philosophy of science: when a theory or methodology delivers reliable knowledge about its subject, it is worthwhile to investigate the worldly features that help to explain that success.
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