

SECOND-LEVEL EVIDENCE FOR FUTURE-PROOF SCIENCE?

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1. Can we identify securely true hypotheses in current science?

According to the “pessimistic meta-induction” none of our current scientific theories, hypotheses or assumptions are true and will be preserved in the future. For some hyper-optimistic outlooks (e.g., Doppelt 2007, 2011), unlike past science practically all current science is true and (save minor adjustments) it will stay forever. The latter view runs against fallibilism, and the former against the hope that through science we can reach at least some truths. However, the current debates on scientific realism abundantly show that both extremes are wrong: most realists are nowadays selective realists, but also many antirealists are only *selectively* so. This means that we now possess at least some truths. Moreover, if science is progressive, or at least not badly regressive, it follows that many, or at least some, of our true scientific claims are future-proof, i.e., they will never be refuted.

The question, is, however: which ones? Can we identify them? Clearly, they are not all of those we hold now, for that would mean that now we are infallible. Moreover, it would seem that to distinguish which of our claims are true and enduring, and which ones are false, we should be able to anticipate future scientific progress, which is impossible. Yet, this question is becoming crucial today, not only for philosophers or historians of science, but also for policymakers and the general public: the Covid-19 pandemic has shown how important it is for our very safety that even individual laypersons become able to distinguish between mere scientific **opinions** and established scientific *facts*.

Some, like Alberto Cordero (2017a, 2017b), maintain that for certain claims we have now overwhelming evidence, so that it would be nonsensical to imagine that they can be rejected in the future. For instance, despite wide disagreements on the interpretations of quantum mechanics, physicists of all leanings and allegiances agree on certain basic tenets (Cordero 2001, S307). But who is to say when evidence is enough to warrant that we are in front of an indisputable *fact*? Earlier on, Rescher (1987, Ch. 5) had distinguished between “forefront science”, which is precise but mostly false, and “schoolbook science”, which though vague and imprecise includes the true core of the forefront science. But this distinction is vague; moreover, it doesn’t seem to capture the distinction between reversible and perduring claims, because some of today’s forefront science will remain in the future, while much science that was in the schoolbooks of the past has subsequently been rejected.

Deployment realists (notably, Psillos 1999) have convincingly used the “no miracle” argument from novel predictions (henceforth ‘NMA’) to argue that when a hypothesis was essentially deployed in a novel and risky prediction, we can be practically certain of its truth; but from this it is a short step to conclude that (save unfortunate but unlikely scientific regresses) it is future-proof. There is a problem, however: to begin with, we must distinguish between claims that are *completely* true (i.e., true *tout court*) and others that are only *partly* true (i.e., false but with some true content, i.e. consequences). For instance,

(SW) All swans are white

is false, for some Australian swans are black. However, it entails the true statements that all European swans are white, all American swans are white, all Asian swans are white, and all African swans are white. These latter four claims are completely true, while (SW) is only partly true. This is what we mean by saying that (SW) is *approximately* true, and it explains the remarkable empirical and practical success which (SW) provides to its holders (Musgrave 2006-7). If we trust in the progressive nature of science, we can expect a completely true claim to be future-proof, while a partly true claim in the long run will (hopefully) be rejected and substituted by its completely true parts (i.e., consequences).

Now, when a hypothesis H is used to derive a novel risky prediction, there are two possible cases: either it has been deployed *essentially*, hence most probably it is completely true, or it was deployed *inessentially*, hence it is only partially true (Alai 2014a §7; 2021). H is deployed inessentially in a prediction when the latter was actually deduced from it, but it might equally well have been deduced just from a part of it. In that case, only the essential part of H is certainly true. For instance, (SW) may be employed inessentially in deriving the prediction

(PR) Any swan I'll see in Urbino will be white,

for the same prediction may also be derived from some of its parts, like 'All European swans are white', or 'all Italian swans are white', etc. Still even the latter statements would be inessential to that prediction, while *in practice* only something like

(UrSW) All swans in Urbino are white

might count as essential.¹ For instance, as argued by Psillos (1999, 121), we need not be committed to the caloric hypothesis, although it was actually deployed in Laplace's prediction of the speed of sound in air, because it was not deployed essentially, hence that prediction "did not depend on this hypothesis". The same goes for the existence of ether and other false assumptions which were deployed in successful novel predictions, but inessentially (Alai 2014a §7, 2021, §§ 9.4, 9.5). Therefore, only the assumptions which have played an *essential* role in novel scientific predictions can be trusted to be *completely* (not just *partially*) true, hence destined to preservation in the long run.

However, whenever a novel prediction np has been derived from a hypothesis H , in general it is *practically* impossible to tell whether H was employed essentially or not, and if not, which part of H was essential. One reason is that which is the minimal assumption a scientist needs to predict np depends on her background knowledge. Only in hindsight, if H is found to be false by subsequent research, this shows that H had not been essential (Alai 2021, § 9.5). There follows that we cannot exactly circumscribe future-proof claims: the most we can learn from the NMA is that a hypothesis is at least partly true, and this doesn't guarantee that it will be preserved in the long run. Of course, this is to say that we do have some completely true (hence future-proof) beliefs (those that were actually essential in deriving the relevant predictions), but we don't know which ones.

Moreover, in his book *Identifying Future-Proof Science* (2022), Peter Vickers maintains that the question whether a claim is actually new and risky seldom, if ever, allows for a clear-cut answer, and it can be decided only through interdisciplinary competences. In the past, I too argued that novelty, riskiness and inessentiality are gradual properties (2014b §§ 3.4, 4). Summing up, in many cases the NMA can be of little help in identifying future-proof claims.

More generally, Vickers points out that the first-level empirical evidence one would need to assess in order to decide whether a claim is future-proof is so vast and requires such a specialized competence in different disciplines that not only no philosopher or layperson, but even no individual scientist could master all of it. Even if a scientist could, over many years, study all that material, still he would see it from his individual and potentially biased perspective.

2. Vickers' criterion for future-proof scientific claims

Although neither the NMA nor the direct assessment of any other first-level empirical evidence allow to decide whether a claim is future-proof, Vickers argues that this can be decided by a second-level criterion:

¹ It may be remarked that, from a purely logical point of view, only (PR) itself is essential to deriving (PR). However, by hypothesis the fact described by a prediction (PR) is unknown to us, and we must derive it from some assumption (H) we know. Moreover, if (PR) is to be deduced from (H), (H) must be stronger than (PR). Yet, there are problems in isolating essential assumptions: see the next paragraph.

(C) If the community of scientists competent on a claim C is sufficiently large and representative of different perspectives and sociological groups, and at least 95% of its members believe that C describes an established scientific fact (i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, save philosophical skepticism), then C is future-proof.

Since checking whether a given claim complies with (C) is in principle possible even for philosophers or laypersons, (C) may allow us to recognize future-proof claims even for the needs of philosophy and practical life.² Moreover, (C) is only a sufficient condition of truth and permanence, not a necessary one: unbeknown to us, even claims which don't command a 95% consensus, or not yet, may be future-proof.

Granted, (C) runs against the current wisdom of both laypersons and philosophers: as famously argued by Kuhn (1962), scientific consensus may be achieved even for sociological (non-epistemic) reasons, and many theories or hypotheses that in the past were accepted as matter of course have subsequently been rejected by the "scientific revolutions" and are now considered straightforwardly false. Yet, Vickers holds this criterion is borne out by the history of science: no claim fulfilling the requirements of (C) has ever been rejected: all the once largely accepted claims that have subsequently been rejected were still debated by at least some 6% of the specialist scientists. Moreover, Vickers lists 30 statements or whole bodies of knowledge which met criterion (C) already long time ago, (pp. 12-18, 220).

However, one might grant that (C) has been confirmed so far, but ask whether this is only a contingent fact, or we can be assured that also present and future claims fulfilling the conditions of (C)'s antecedent will be future-proof. In other words, one may ask whether (C) is predictively reliable, and an affirmative answer may be provided only by *justifying* (C): *why* can we trust that claims fulfilling (C)'s antecedent are future-proof?

To begin with, Vickers remarks that in some cases almost unanimous consensus is reached when, thanks to technical progress, entities, structures, or behaviors which were originally unobservable become directly observable by means of appropriate instruments, as it happened with continental drift and SARS-CoV-2 virus. But, he adds, scientific debates on the reliability of instruments, like the question whether we see through optical microscopes, were closed many years ago (pp. 198-200, 221): therefore, claims that are unanimously accepted on such bases are certainly true and destined to be preserved in the future.

As to the claims that are not even instrumentally observable, it must be considered that science is essentially a critical activity, with strong epistemic and sociological premiums on criticism and nonconformism; therefore, if any doubts on a given claim were still possible, at least a substantial minority of scientists (well over 5%) would have raised them. "Any solid international scientific consensus is so hard-won that the evidence base has to be truly enormous to achieve it" (p. 112). As remarked by Kuhn himself, "History suggests that the road to a firm research consensus is extraordinarily arduous" (1962, p. 15). This is why if at least 95% of scientists has no doubts on a claim, it must be future-proof.

Still, it may be objected that various sociological and epistemic forces in scientific practice drive to conformity, and Vickers is ready to grant that these forces may be even stronger today than in Kuhn's times. Therefore, when a claim gains acceptance, the "bandwagon" effect is a possible threat (p. 220). Thus, in the end, Vickers gives up providing a full principled explanation of *how* scientists may reach such a 95% consensus, and *why* it should be such a reliable indicator of truth and

² In practice this may be more difficult: as Vickers remarked in discussion, some scientists are not convinced that global warming is anthropogenic, but they are very few. More or less than 5%? Of course, there aren't exact figures, moreover, it depends on which scientists we count as competent on this matter. Therefore, some have objected that in practice checking whether a claim satisfies (C) can be so hard, that it isn't actually helpful. Yet, while in some cases it may be difficult, in other cases is certainly easier. Besides, even if it may be difficult to give an *exact* answer, in many cases it will be possible to give a more or less approximate one, and for practical purposes that may certainly be enough.

stability; instead, he settles for just maintaining *that* it is, by induction from its confirmation in the history of science so far.

3. Why is Vickers' criterion reliable?

However, if a 95% consensus could be reached for merely sociological reasons (or for any epistemically irrelevant reason), the fact that claims passing the (C) standard have been preserved *so far* wouldn't be a sufficient reason to assume that they are true and that they will always be accepted in the future, i.e., the inductive support for (C) would become weaker, or even irrelevant. A reason to suspect that even claims that now command a 95% consensus might not be really future-proof is Stanford's (2006) idea that at any time, hence even now, there are alternatives to accepted theories which escape us, but which might be the true answer to our questions. Another such reason is the abovementioned fact that hypotheses which now seem to have been essential in deriving certain novel predictions (hence completely true) may actually have been inessential. Therefore, the questions of how the 95% consensus is reached and why it is reliable remain compelling.

Thus, in order to establish the reliability of criterion (C) one should show

(A) which *epistemically* relevant reasons (i.e., relevant to truth of a claim) may produce a 95% consensus,

and

(B) why epistemically irrelevant reasons could not produce such a consensus.

As mentioned earlier, a clear and satisfactory answer to question (A) is provided by Vickers for the claims about facts which have become observable thanks to new sophisticated instruments. Here I shall try to explore some further steps toward answering this question in the general case, including the case of non-observable facts.

It is usually assumed that the probability conferred by some empirical evidence *e* to a hypothesis *H* is given by Bayes' theorem:

$$(i) p(H|e) = \frac{p(e|H) \cdot p(H)}{p(e)}$$

or, in its extended formulation,

$$(ii) p(H|e) = \frac{p(e|H) \cdot p(H)}{[p(e|H) \cdot p(H)] + [p(e|\neg H) \cdot p(\neg H)]}$$

However, according to the NMA the success of novel predictions provides also some second-level evidence for *H*, and this is why: all true hypotheses have only true consequences, while not all the consequences of false hypotheses are true: in fact, most false hypotheses have mostly false consequences. For instance, if it is true that

H Tomorrow is Tuesday,

all the consequences of **H** are also true:

C₁ Today is Monday

C₂ Yesterday was Sunday

C₃ The day after tomorrow is Wednesday

C_{*n*} Etc.

C_{*n*+1} Today is a weekday

C_{*n*+2} Tomorrow's name's initial is T

C_{*n*+3} Etc.

Instead, consider the six false hypotheses on which day is tomorrow: none have the true consequences C_1 - C_n ; besides, only five of them have C_{n+1} , only one has C_{n+2} , etc.

Now, theoreticians look for true hypotheses, and they try to build them in order to entail certain known evidence e , e' , e'' , etc. Hence their hypotheses will entail e , e' , e'' even if false. However, it is only by chance if they build a false hypothesis with a true *novel* and unlikely consequence ne . Therefore, we may ask which is the probability that by chance one picks a false hypothesis H with a true consequence ne . Clearly, this is equal to the ratio of false hypotheses which entail ne to all the false hypotheses on that subject.

In turn, that ratio is inversely proportional to the logical content of ne : if ne is tautological all hypotheses entail it, while if it is contradictory none does; in between, the greater the logical content of ne , the fewer the hypotheses which entail it. We may measure the logical content of ne as the ratio of the number of equiprobable cases it excludes to the number of all equiprobable cases (where equiprobable are the cases which we have no reason to believe are differently probable).

Conversely, we may call “logical probability” of ne the ratio of the number of equiprobable cases it allows to the number of equiprobable cases: if ne is tautological (allowing all the cases) its logical probability is 1, if it is contradictory (excluding all the cases) it is 0. Hence, the probability that by chance one picks a false hypothesis H entailing ne is equal to the logical probability of ne .

Determining what are the equiprobable cases is not always possible, and it involves a principle of indifference which depends on our background assumptions. However, in several actual scientifically relevant cases one can figure out in a substantially clear way what the possible alternative cases are, hence which is logical probability of ne .

For instance, when Adams and Leverrier predicted the mass and position of a new planet (later called Neptune), the equiprobable cases where the other positions and masses a new planet might possibly have had. As concerns the mass, it is rather vague which the possible equiprobable alternatives were (e.g., those not obviously too large or too small). However, their prediction of the position missed the mark by just 1° over 360° , so their true prediction was $n^\circ \pm 1^\circ$, hence its logical probability was $2/360$, or $1/180$. This is to say that only one in 180 logically possible (groups of) hypotheses entailing predictions on a new planet entailed the right one. Therefore, also the probability that *by chance* a theoretician picked a hypothesis entailing the right prediction was $1/180$.

Now, on the one hand, all false hypotheses are picked by chance, since theoreticians look for true hypotheses. On the other hand, there are countless false hypotheses for any true one, hence, even if by chance one might have picked also the *true* hypothesis entailing this prediction, that chance is negligible. Therefore, in practice, all the (groups of) hypotheses entailing a true consequence are false if and only if they are picked by chance.

Hence, the probability that Adams and Leverrier predicted Neptune’s position using false hypotheses (i.e. that the hypotheses of Newton’s gravitation theory essentially used by them were false) is $1/180$. Conversely, the probability that they made this prediction using true hypotheses (i.e., that the hypotheses of Newton’s gravitation theory essentially used by them were true) was $1-1/180$.

In general, the probability that one makes a true prediction ne using a false hypothesis H equals ne ’s logical probability $lp(ne)$. Hence, the probability that one has used a true hypothesis, i.e., that H is true, is the complement of $lp(ne)$:

$$(iii) p(H/ne) = 1-lp(ne).$$

Therefore, when ne is very risky, i.e., $lp(ne)$ is very low, $p(H)$ gets close to 1: it would be a “miracle” if H were not true.

Besides, many contemporary novel predictions are much riskier and much more approximated than the prediction of Neptune’s position, hence the probability that the hypotheses used to derived them is proportionally much larger: for instance, quantum electrodynamics predicted the magnetic moment of the electron to be $1159652359 \times 10^{-12}$, while experiments found $1159652410 \times 10^{-12}$: hence John Wright (2002, 143-144) figured that the probability to get such an accuracy *by chance*, i.e., through a false theory, is as low as 5×10^{-8} .

Thus, in the ideal case of NMA (when the logical probability of ne can be assessed with sufficient confidence) we might recognize that H is (at least partly) true just by one piece of evidence (the confirmation of ne). Something similar, perhaps, happened with Eddington's confirmation of Einstein's prediction of the bending of light in the 1921 solar eclipse. Hence, this is a kind of epistemically relevant considerations which may underly, explain and warrant a 95% consensus.

It might be objected that, just because there are infinitely many false hypotheses for any true one, the probability of finding a true hypothesis entailing ne is still lower than that of finding a false one entailing ne . Indeed, this would be the case if all hypotheses were picked by chance. But in that case even the probability of picking a false hypothesis entailing a true risky prediction would be minimal, definitely too low to explain the many extraordinary successful predictions of our scientific theories. Therefore, we must conclude that scientists do not pick hypotheses randomly, but seek *true* hypotheses (which necessarily entail true consequences) and sometimes find them, and this happens because they employ reliable heuristics. This is why hypotheses which licensed novel risky predictions are most probably true (White 2003, Alai 2014c § 6).

Bayes' theorem establishes the conditional probability of H on the basis of the antecedent probability of H , the antecedent probability of e , and the logical relationship of H to e . In general, the antecedent probabilities of H and e are different from their logical probabilities, for they are based on certain prior empirical or theoretical evidence we have for them. Only when we have no prior information about them, their antecedent probabilities reduce to their logical probabilities, but this is seldom or practically never the case. Thus, Bayes' theorem assesses the conditional probability of H by first-level evidence.

Instead, the NMA assesses the probability that H is true only by considering that it has licensed a novel risky prediction ne , irrespectively of what H and ne say and of the first-level (empirical or theoretical) evidence we have for them. Thus, it provides second-level evidence for H . In fact, ' $p(H)$ ' and ' $p(ne)$ ' do not appear on the right-hand side of equation (iii). Therefore, the NMA does not face the thorny problem of the prior probabilities of H and ne (although it faces the problem of assessing the at least approximate logical probability of ne , by figuring what cases are equiprobable).

Of course, in the overall assessment of H 's probability one should take into consideration also the first-level evidence for it, i.e., H 's probability conditional not just on ne , but on all pieces of evidence e, e', e'' , etc., which are relevant to it. However, as pointed out by Vickers, it is practically impossible to establish that a claim is future-proof just by assessing first-level evidence. In fact, especially because of the empirical underdetermination of theories H 's probability based on first-level evidence cannot become sufficiently high. Instead, in ideal cases the NMA by itself may produce a reliable 95% consensus that a hypothesis describes a scientific fact.

There are problems, however, and not all cases are ideal. First, as explained above, in this way we cannot establish whether H was used essentially, hence whether it is completely true or not, so whether it is actually future-proof. Alternatively, we might say that we can establish that it is future-proof *in the weaker sense* that *a part of it* is completely true, hence properly speaking future-proof.

Second, the novel prediction ne may be not very risky, and the probability of H decreases as the logical probability of ne increases. Third, a NMA may be less than ideal also because it is unclear whether the prediction or predictions involved are actually novel, and even more because (as suggested by the literature on novel predictions), we should probably consider novelty as coming in degrees (alai 2014b, p. 312).

Often, however, a hypothesis H is employed in more than one (more or less risky) novel predictions $ne_1 \dots ne_j$. For instance, Adams and Leverrier predicted both the position and the mass of Neptune; Mendeleev predicted various properties of different new elements; etc. Thus, we get a new measure

$$(iv) p(H/NE) = 1 - lp(NE),$$

where $lp(NE)$ is the logical probability of the conjunction $ne_1 \& \dots \& ne_j$. Of course, $lp(NE)$ (the conjunctive probability of many predictions) is smaller than $lp(ne)$ (the probability of just one

prediction) and it gets smaller and smaller as the number j of predictions raises. Therefore, it can be very low, hence the probability of the hypothesis $p(H/NE)$ can approach 1, even if each of those predictions is not *very* risky.

Instead, if it is unclear whether the predictions are actually novel, or if they are only partially novel, the probability of H will be lower by a factor k (where the less novel the prediction is, or the less clear that it is novel, the greater is k): if $n?e$ is a *possibly* novel prediction, we have

$$(v) P(H/n?e) = 1 - \frac{1}{k} P(n?e) - n,$$

or in case of joint predictions

$$(vi) P(H/N?E) = 1 - \frac{1}{k} P(N?E) - n.$$

Even this smaller probability, however, may raise the degree of confirmation conferred to H by first-level evidence.

Finally, also the fact that H accounts for *old* evidence may constitute additional second-level evidence for it. In fact, we may ask what the probability was to find a hypothesis which (no matter whether true or false) accommodated a known datum e . Apparently, the answer is that if the theoretician was minimally skillful, the probability was 1, for this was just a puzzle-solving exercise. But since there are infinite false hypotheses for each true one, the probability that H is false is practically 1. However, things are seldom so simple. To begin with, usually H must account for *many* data $e_1...e_m$, and the more they are, the harder the task becomes. Moreover, the data are practically never entailed *just* by H , but by H in conjunction with several collateral assumptions $A_1...A_n$, which in turn must be derived from, or at least be consistent with, a number of independently accepted theories $T_1...T_n$. So, one must also find the right $A_1...A_n$, and H must not only entail $e_1...e_m$, but be compatible with $T_1...T_n$.

Therefore, finding a hypothesis entailing $e_1...e_m$ (no matter whether true or false) may become impossible for a minimally skilled theoretician, and very difficult also for a truly gifted one: the probability that H is false becomes $1-n$, where n increases with the number of the accommodated data and of the collateral assumptions needed. In fact, if n becomes quite high, it is no longer plausible that H has been found just by pure puzzle-solving skill, and another hypothesis becomes more plausible: that the theoretician was not just trying to accommodate $e_1...e_m$, but, more importantly, looking for a true hypothesis by a reliable heuristic, so that she actually found one.

This is why once I suggested that certain confirming instances apparently different from the confirmation provided by novel predictions are actually of a similar nature: for instance, the convergence of independent theories, the convergence of measurements by different experimental procedures based on independent theories, Keynes' distinction of confirming instances, and non-*ad hoc* explanations (Alai 2014b § 4). In other words, this argument from the complexity of the theoretician's task can be turned into an argument from the improbability that just by chance independent theories converge in accounting for a large number of disparate data. Even this argument, however, may show at most that H is partly true, for even a partly false hypothesis may entail $e_1...e_m$, and so be employed (inessentially) to account for them.

4. Conclusion

According to Vickers a certain kind of second-level evidence (i.e., a 95% consensus) may show *that* certain claims are future-proof. Here I have suggested that some different kinds of second-level evidence (provided by NMA-like considerations) may *justify* the achievement of such a consensus. That is, they can explain *why* and *how* it was reached for sound epistemological reasons, rather than just for non-epistemic sociological drives, hence why it can be a reliable indicator of future-proof claims. In other words, when at least 95% of specialists in the field take a claim to describe a scientific *fact*, they are probably right on this, at least in the *weak* sense that at least certain (possibly

unidentified) parts of those claims are future-proof. This happens especially when those claims yield various novel and risky predictions, but possibly also when they display great systematicity and unifying power (by accounting for a very large number of known data $e_1...e_m$) and great plausibility and coherence with accepted theories and assumptions (by accounting for $e_1...e_m$ in full consistence with assumptions $A_1...A_n$ and theories $T_1...T_n$).

Vickers grants that a claim fulfilling criterion (C) may be only *approximately* true, hence it may be future-proof *modulo-minor adjustments*. This however is a potential threat for his enterprise, for approximation is a vague concept, thus there is a continuum ranging from being true, to being approximately true, or half-way between true and false, or approximately false, or finally purely false. So, if a 95% consensus can be achieved by claims that are only approximately true, why couldn't it be achieved by claims which approximate the truth less and less, or even remain very distant from it? He notices that in practice we can clearly distinguish when a claim is substantially true and when it is not. Perhaps we can, but only retrospectively: *ideally*, and very roughly, we might suppose that 100% consensus shows that H is 100% true, 95% consensus shows that it is 95% true, and so on:

the further a claim is from 100% true, the less likely it is that a truly solid consensus will be reachable. So, a claim only half-way true would probably never reach 95% consensus. Other things being equal, there will be barriers to a half-way-true claim reaching 95% solid scientific consensus that are not present for a claim that is true. E.g., it will likely be less thoroughly tested, and the scientific community will know that.³

However, things may be far from ideal, I am afraid there might be a very wide consensus on claims which are far from *completely* true (various examples are provided by the history of science). Again, therefore, it might be safer to assume simply that Vickers' criterion warrants that a claim is at least *partly* true, hence *weakly* future-proof.

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