Eva, Benjamin (2022) Chancy Covariance and the Mind Body Problem. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, 2. pp. 177-216.
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Abstract
Most agree that mental properties depend in some way on physical properties. While physicalists describe this dependence in terms of deterministic synchronic relations like identity or supervenience, some dualists prefer to think of it in terms of indeterministic dynamic relations,like causation. I’m going to develop a third conception of the dependence of the mental on the physical that falls somewhere between the deterministic synchronic dependence relations of the physicalist and the indeterministic diachronic dependence relations advocated by some dualists. I’ll then use this new conception of metaphysical dependence to formulate a novel approach to the mind body problem that (i) posits a necessary, metaphysically robust synchronic dependence of the mental on the physical, (ii) satisfies several of the key motivations of both non-reductive physicalism and naturalistic dualism, (iii) is consistent with both the causal efficacy of the mental
and the causal closure of the physical, and (iv) is capable of reconciling determinism about the physical world with indeterminism about the mental world.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Supervenience, Dualism, Mental Causation | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Reductionism/Holism |
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| Depositing User: | Dr Benjamin Eva | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 21 Aug 2024 10:35 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 21 Aug 2024 10:35 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 23795 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://academic.oup.com/book/38959/chapter/338183... | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Reductionism/Holism |
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| Date: | 2022 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 177-216 | ||||||
| Volume: | 2 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23795 |
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