# **Sellars and Peirce on Truth and the End of Inquiry**

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**1. Introduction**

In recent years, some productive connections have grown up between Pittsburgh School philosophy, which derives from the rich philosophical investigations of Wilfrid Sellars and his students, and certain realist-inclined corners of the pragmatist philosophical tradition, particularly those focussed on Charles Peirce. These two research communities arguably are in many ways fellow travellers who increasingly find themselves sharing common themes.[[1]](#footnote-1) These themes include critiques of metaphysical realism and representationalist semantics in favour of an appreciation of the sociality of meaning and truth, a determined antireductionism about normativity in the face of ongoing positivist currents in mainstream philosophy, and thoughtful and original discussions of how the natural sciences might be used to ground naturalistic philosophy methodologically rather than ontologically. It is also interesting to observe how both philosophical perspectives were founded on strong critiques of modern philosophy’s Cartesian legacy, including its methodological individualism and its supposed ‘foundation’ of radical doubt.

 It is somewhat puzzling, then, that during his lifetime Sellars often seemed to dodge invitations to identify himself as a pragmatist, and in his mature work he appeared to explicitly distance himself from Peirce’s account of truth and realism, describing it as lacking “an intelligible foundation” (Sellars 1968: vii). In this paper, I will explore Sellars’ mature account of truth and realism with a view to better understanding why he critiqued Peirce’s position on these matters, and to what degree this critique was justified, or rather was based on misunderstanding. As such a comparison remains almost entirely unexplored,[[2]](#footnote-2) I hope to untangle some crucial knots in reconciling the insights of these twophilosophers, who were not only impressively far-sighted in diagnosing the ills and dead ends of modern philosophy, but also highly productive in systematically scoping out new ways forward.[[3]](#footnote-3)

 I will begin with a quick summary of Peirce’s pragmatist understanding of truth as the indefinitely deferred ‘limit’ of the process of inquiry (section 2), then explore how strikingly similar the two philosophers’ views are in some respects (section 3). Then, in section 4, I will present Sellars’ account of what he felt was missing from Peirce’s ostensibly scientific philosophy – a rigorous account of world-sourced ‘cognitive friction’ that can ground and vindicate Peircean inquirers’ epistemic journey. In section 5, I will explore Sellars’ proposed remedy to Peirce’s purported lack, in his complex and enigmatic account of ‘picturing’ – a causal, non-discursive ‘mapping’ of the world which is understood to complement discursive signification. Sellars notes how, unlike discursive signification, picturing posits a real-world relation between map and ‘terrain’ which may be inspected, and even represented in ‘projection tables’. This, Sellars suggests, forms the basis for an account of *veridicality* which goes beyond Peirce’s apparent blind faith in our journey towards truth.

 In section 6, I offer a Peircean philosophical response to these Sellarsian themes. I argue that much of what Sellars charges Peirce’s philosophy with missing is actually present there, specifically focusing on the causal, non-discursive role that Peirce assigns in his theory of perception to what he calls the ‘percept’. I go further, however, to argue that Peirce’s account supplies more resources to resolve certain philosophical tensions. In particular, I explore the apparent bifurcation between Sellars’ radically naturalistic notion of picturing in the ‘real order’ and his much more rationalistic treatment of discursive signification in the ‘order of signification’. I argue that although he works to connect the two orders via ‘analogy’, this account is relatively enigmatic and extenuated, with discursive signification serving as metalanguage to picturing’s object language. By contrast, I show how Peirce’s semiotic philosophy of language effectively coordinates the two orders within the very structure of the proposition as he understands it. I also argue that in between Sellars’ ambitious scientific realism, which appears to anticipate a form of scientific self-mensuration, and Rorty’s dismissive ‘anti-truth’ quietism, Peirce’s “contrite fallibilism”[[4]](#footnote-4) regarding truth charts a wise middle path.

**2. Peirce’s Pragmatist Account of Truth as the ‘End’ of Inquiry**

It appears that the key aspect of Peirce’s account of truth and realism which put it on Sellars’ radar as a strong rival with which to engage, is its distinctive future-directed anti-representationalism. As I have previously explored Peirce’s account of truth in detail (Legg 2014, 2018b), here I will merely summarise key points. Peirce chose not to define truth in terms of some kind of reified correspondence relation between words and world.[[5]](#footnote-5) In such accounts – speaking broadly – an assertion such as **“The cat is on the mat”** is understood to be true because of the existence of a ‘truth-maker’, namely the state of affairs of certain *objects* (the said cat and mat) exemplifying the appropriate *relation* (*x* is on *y*). Such understandings of truth naturally generate a broadly Fregean representationalist account of meaning or intentionality[[6]](#footnote-6), whereby singular terms and predicates are understood to denote discrete objects and concepts respectively. Such an account provides a handy analysis of (contingent) falsehood as consisting merely in rearrangement of these same discrete components into a combination which is not presently the case. Thus semantics could in principle be explicated in a giant list of formulae of the form: **“The term ‘X’ refers to x / Xs”**,[[7]](#footnote-7) and our grammar is thought to limn our ontology, as early Wittgenstein dreamily postulated. Although such analyses are a frequent reflex of realists of a metaphysical bent, they generate numerous philosophical problems once we turn to subject matters which are not as reducible to discrete sets of ordinary middle-sized objects as feline room location, yet which we still want to treat as truth-apt in some genuine sense.[[8]](#footnote-8)

 As well as circumventing a correspondence theory of truth, Peirce avoided today’s ‘usual suspects’ of coherence, identity or deflationary accounts. Instead, he offers a form of what Putnam usefully taxonomized as *internal realism*,[[9]](#footnote-9) based around the key concept of a ‘community of inquiry’[[10]](#footnote-10) that seeks to increase its knowledge indefinitely into the future, and he aligns our concept of truth with the outcome of such a process – the so-called *end of inquiry*. Thus in an early formulation, he states, “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth” (Peirce CP: 5.407).[[11]](#footnote-11) In short, Peirce defines truth as a kind of outer limit of the inquiry process. The notion of limit was being newly defined mathematically in the second half of the 19th century, and Peirce consciously explored this dimension of his definition:

Truth is a character which attaches to an abstract proposition...It essentially depends upon that proposition’s not professing to be exactly true. But we hope that in the progress of science its error will indefinitely diminish, just as the error of 3.14159…will indefinitely diminish as the calculation is carried to more and more places of decimals. What we call π is an ideal limit to which no numerical expression can be perfectly true. (Peirce CP: 5.565)

 Now as Peirce’s internal realism makes no explicit reference to an ‘external world’, it has been treated as insufficiently realist by many philosophers. Shouldn’t our account of truth be kept free of ‘epistemic’ notions such as agreement within a community of inquiry?[[12]](#footnote-12) Surely an entire community can agree on something false? Peirce does acknowledge that inquiry can err for generations:

Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should last. Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far. (Peirce CP: 5.408)

Yet, he claims, pragmatism teaches that inquiry is inherently self-correcting insofar as we constantly act in the world, which means that our every concept C is in essence a set of hypothetical conditionals: **“If [this thing] is C, then I should expect experiences E1, E2, E3…”**. As such conditionals are continually tested and adjusted through lived experience, it is rational to expect all errors to be redeemed in the sufficiently long run:

…if, after the extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be the one which they would ultimately come to. (Peirce CP: 5.408)

 In this way Peirce offers a supremely strong and confident scientific realism, which is arguably superior to traditional correspondence accounts in the way it side-steps the inevitable sceptical questionsprompted by their Janus-faced word-world correspondence relation (such as, what is this relation exactly, and how can it be known?) All of this clearly impressed Sellars as a fellow scientific realist. Yet it must be admitted that Peirce’s notion of the ‘end of inquiry’ has been criticized for making its own unwarranted metaphysical claims. Is Peirce assuming that inquirers will find an answer to every question – and, moreover, just one? How could he possibly know that?[[13]](#footnote-13) Here we must first observe that ‘end of inquiry’ should not be understood to invoke a specific future time where all questions are settled (Legg 2014a: 206). Rather, it should be understood as an idealised continuation of inquirers’ current activities.

 Secondly, there appears to have been a shift in Peirce’s thinking through his career on the exact modal status of the promised ‘end’. Early on, as we have just seen, he tended to describe truth as ‘fated’ to emerge, but later he described it more as a *regulative hope*. Thus Peirce wrote in a 1908 letter, “I do not say that it is infallibly true that there is any belief to which a person would come if he were to carry his inquiries far enough. I only say that that alone is what I call Truth”.[[14]](#footnote-14) This quote highlights an implicit transcendental argument in Peirce’s account of truth. Without the hopeful hypothesis that inquiry *could* provide a single answer to our questions, what does it even *mean* to be inquiring, as opposed to merely ‘conversing’, in Rorty’s famous provocation? (Rorty 1995; 1989; 1979). Not much, Peirce suggests, which means that the idea that an answer is ‘out there’ is a necessary condition for us to inquire. But as inquiring is not something we can avoid while living a human life, given that even opening the refrigerator to look for orange juice qualifies, Peircean monism about truth is arguably implicit in our everyday practices, should we care to look.

 There is more to be said about Rorty’s famous provocation, however, and here Peirce’s fellow pragmatists have pushed back against his views ‘from the left’, as it were.[[15]](#footnote-15) Rorty argues that Peirce’s account of truth as indefinitely deferred means that truth cannot be a goal of inquiry, as we can never know that the goal has been reached. As such, the notion of truth has no *use* beyond the notion of ongoing conversations and justifications, because “[p]ragmatists think that if something makes no difference to practice, it should make no difference to philosophy” (Rorty 1995: 281). Although our desire for further justification for our beliefs serves as a “motive” for enquiry (Rorty 1995: 298), it is not sufficient to ground a meaningful definition of truth:

The difference between justification and truth makes no difference, except for the reminder that justification to one audience is not justification to another. (Rorty 1995: 300)

But Rorty’s argument here fails to recognise that the indefinite deferral itself might serve an important function in our epistemology. This was Peirce’s view, as we shall see.

**3. Epistemological Commonalities between Sellars and Peirce**

In this section I explore some significant consonances between Sellars’ and Peirce’s epistemologies. Firstly, and most importantly, Sellars also rejected metaphysical realist understandings of truth in terms of a reified correspondence relation between words and world, and relatedly, rejected representationalist understandings of intentionality. He embraced a broadly inferentialist understanding of intentionality whereby our terms gain their meaning from logical relations with other terms within a broader ‘space of reasons’. Within such a framework, the meaning of **“This animal is a kitten”** consists in its facilitating a network of inferences to conclusions such as, **“This animal is not a rabbit”** and **“This animal was birthed by a female cat”**. If someone is unable to perform such inferences, we conclude that their understanding of the meaning of ‘kitten’ is defective. These inferential relations may be further analysed as public linguistic rules scaffolded by pragmatic norms maintained across a culture which enforces social penalties for breaching them.[[16]](#footnote-16)

 It must be admitted that the traditional Fregean representationalist approach to intentionality has much intuitive plausibility, insofar as we imagine that a great deal of our language ‘is about’ objects in the world. When I state **“The cat is on the mat”**, am I not talking *about* that cat, and that mat?[[17]](#footnote-17) So one might wonder why Sellars is entirely opposed to the approach. One answer lies in his famous critique of the *Myth of the Given*. Speaking generally, representationalism invites naïve and philosophically confounding assumptions concerning concept-formation as somehow magically (that is to say, instantaneously and completely) ‘given’ by non-linguistic reality. For instance, it is assumed that in learning the concept ‘kitten’, I performed the following mental acts:

i) noticing an ‘inner episode’ of observing the property of kittenhood in the world

ii) abstracting a concept pertaining to the new property I have just noticed[[18]](#footnote-18)

iii) learning to label my concept with a name that my fellow humans also use to denote it.

Sellars claims that this purported process is explanatorily entirely backwards:

…we now recognize that instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and cannot account for it. (Sellars 1956b §45: 176)

There are high epistemological stakes here, as certain logical empiricist contemporaries of Sellars theorised that i)’s posited ‘inner episodes’ served as foundational premises for all knowledge. Sellars argues that such a ‘foundation’ is both confused and illusory. A better philosophical story concerning kitten-concept-formation is that I learn to deploy its many salient rational connections piecemeal, through extensive training by – and ongoing deference to – my linguistic community. Thus Macbeth elegantly summarises Sellars’ view of the Myth of the Given as an impossible dream of *rational constraint by what is.*[[19]](#footnote-19)As I have previously noted, Sellars is seeking to train us out of such foundationalism into what, in his paper “Phenomenalism”, he terms an “adequately critical direct realism” (Sellars 1963a: 90). This position holds that “rather than building our epistemology around the search for ideal prior conditions for knowledge-formation in the individual, we should understand knowledge-formation as a group endeavour in which critical scrutiny can be applied by anyone, anywhere, at any time” (Legg 2018: 124). It is worth observing how much this sounds like Peirce’s community of inquiry.

 We have seen how representationalism holds that semantics might be explicated in a list of formulae of the form: **“The term ‘X’ refers to x / Xs”**. By contrast, Sellars held such ‘cross-categorial’ theorising to be deeply confused. Instead, his *inferentialism* holds that rational relations, of which meaning-relations are one example, can only hold *between* items in the ‘order of signification’. Therefore, semantics should more properly be explicated through formulae such as: **“In German ‘Mensch’ signifies *man*”**, which states that two terms in different languages have the same *use* (Sellars 1963b §47: 55). In this sense, then,importantly,for Sellars *intentionality is* *not world-related*. Does this mean that for him, *truth also is not a relation*? On one level, the answer seems to be yes, insofar as Sellars aligns truth in a language with what he calls “*S-assertibility*” (i.e. semantic assertibility), which means a “performance” which is authorised by the rules of our language (Sellars 1968 §27: 101). In this light, our previous example of **“The cat is on the mat”** is understood to be true simply insofar as we understand that the terms ‘cat’, ‘mat’ and ‘on’ are appropriately applied to the charming scene on the kitchen floor, as per our long socialisation in the English language. However on the deeper level of the functioning of our language in its lived context, much more can be said, and this will be explored through the rest of the paper.

 Before moving on, it is worth noting a further commonality between Sellars’ and Peirce’s scientific epistemologies. Both are also strongly *future-directed*. This can be seen in Sellars’ famous discussion of the *manifest image*, which consists in our world of everyday experience and commonsense understanding, and the *scientific image*, which consists in the world as described theoretically by scientific researchers. Given that the two images are very different, equally complex, and both purport to present “a complete picture of man-in-the-world” (Sellars 1963b: 4), the question of the proper relation between them is a troubling source of philosophical problems for our age. Controversially, Sellars claims that the ultimate truth about reality lies with the scientific image, a claim often referred to as ‘*scientia mensura*’:

…in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. (Sellars 1956b §41: 173)

As Sellars is clear that his scientific image refers to our best future science,[[20]](#footnote-20) this seems remarkably consonant with Peirce’s faith in the final opinion. We have now established that the two great American philosophers have much in common.But as noted above, Sellars offered a systematic critique of Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology, to which I now turn.

**4. “Acceptance without Intelligible Foundation”: Sellars’ Criticism of Peirce**

The history of Sellars’ reception of pragmatism is an intriguing story, involving his own relation to his philosopher father (Roy Wood Sellars), a critical realist who strongly criticised the pragmatisms of John Dewey and C.I. Lewis in the 1920s.[[21]](#footnote-21) In various places, Sellars makes rather harsh assessments of pragmatism. For instance, in the autobiographical introduction to his 1973-4 Dewey Lectures, he describes having initially found pragmatism to be “wishy-washy and ambiguous”, and “all method and no results”, although he then claims that when he finally read Peirce seriously, he was astonished by what he had missed (Sellars 1980a: 1-2). In “Some Reflections on Language Games”, he suggests that the influence of agency on meaning that is pragmatism’s philosophical signature has been applied far too crudely:

…Pragmatism, with its stress on language (or the conceptual) as an instrument, has had hold of a most important insight – an insight which, however, the pragmatist has tended to misconceive as an analysis of ‘means’ and ‘is true.’ On the other hand, if the pragmatist’s claim is reformulated as the thesis that the language we use has a much more intimate connection with conduct than we have yet suggested, and that this connection is intrinsic to its structure as language, rather than a ‘use’ to which it ‘happens’ to be put, then Pragmatism assumes its proper stature as a revolutionary step in Western philosophy. (Sellars 1954: 213-4)

But the key to Sellars’ critique of Peirce in particular is his suggestion that Peirce’s future-directed anti-representationalism risks falling into a kind of nineteenth century absolute idealism.[[22]](#footnote-22) In the preface to *Science and Metaphysics*, Sellars promises to redeem the aforementioned lack in Peirce’s account of truth and reality of an “intelligible foundation”:

…the argument of [chapter 5] provides that missing ingredient, the absence of which from Peirce’s account of truth leaves the ‘would-be’ of the acceptance ‘in the long run’ of propositions by the scientific community without an intelligible foundation; a fact which has obscured the extent to which this gifted composer of variations on Kantian themes succeeded in giving metaphysics a truly scientific turn. (Sellars 1968: vi)

In the relevant chapter, he reiterates his critique as follows:

Peirce…fell into difficulty because, by not taking into account the dimension of ‘picturing’, he had no Archimedean point outside the series of actual and possible beliefs in terms of which to define the ideal or limit to which members of this series might approximate. (Sellars 1968 §75: 135)

Here Sellars seems to suggest that a truly scientific metaphysics should include some conception of what it is to be *closer or further from the truth*. Some philosophers have summarised this concern as that without such a conception, future-directed internal realism accords our epistemology no *cognitive friction*, which Sachs usefully defines as “an actual relation – an empirical relation between two relational systems in the natural world – to account for how the intellect relates to the world” (Sachs 2019: 675). Lacking an account of such a relation, it seems that we can possess only an ‘internal’ assessment of the truth of our beliefs – as true insofar as we currently believe them – a seemingly slender reed for a realist. Thus, Sellars calls for scientific metaphysicians to define a robust notion of *verisimilitude* – the idea that one language can enable a more adequate *picturing* of objects than another. His detailed and original exposition of ‘picturing’ is the subject of our next section.

**5. ‘Mapping Factual Truth’: Sellars’ Notion of Picturing.**

Sellars seeks to complement his non-world-related account of intentionality, which he calls *signifying*, with a world-related, non-discursive account of *picturing*. Sellars’ notion of picturing has been controversial. It was initially largely viewed as confused and best overlooked,[[23]](#footnote-23) but lately there has been growing appreciation of its merits.[[24]](#footnote-24) Our Peircean comparison will reinforce that Sellars was correct to pursue this idea.

 In *Science and Metaphysics* (henceforth: SM), the notion is introduced through an appreciation of early Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘logical pictures’ which, Sellars claims, contains the neglected insight that ground level ‘atomic’ statements function quite differently from their ‘molecular’ logical combinations. An interesting characteristic of atomic pictorial complexity is that its predicate expressions are “ancillary” and “dispensable” (Sellars 1968 §47: 106). For instance, one may assert **“Fido is big”** simply by writing ‘Fido’ in large font. The same applies in principle to all other predicates, should one possess a suitable arsenal of notational techniques. This nominalist insight, Sellars suggests, “provides the keystone which can keep philosophical semantics from collapsing ever anew into a rubble of fruitless discussion” (Sellars 1968 §51: 107).

 The point may be generalized to a general appreciation of how we may isomorphically map reality as well as discursively describe it. For instance, I might ‘picture’ the animals in the Melbourne Zoo by creating a list of their species names, printed in fonts of the relative sizes of the animals themselves. Such examples show how – unlike discursivity as understood by Sellars – picturing can be theorised as a relation that exists in the real (causal and spatiotemporal) order*.* Simply put, I can consider the animals themselves and my map of them side by side, and Sellars notes that it is even appropriate to describe the relation as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, for instance, if I note that my map is missing tigers:

Truth, we have seen, is not a relation. Picturing, on the other hand, is…a relation between two relational structures. And pictures, like maps, can be more or less adequate. (Sellars 1968 §56: 128-9)

 In “Being and Being Known” (henceforth: BBK), Sellars explicates picturing initially in more sensory terms. He imagines a robot moving about a world, scanning and recording its features in order to steer itself better in future. Such a robot has no inherent intentionality, as it does not speak a language and cannot infer logically. Yet, Sellars suggests, the robot’s recordings represent a non-linguistically structured mapof its surroundings, through an isomorphism between the structures in the robot’s recordings and its environment (Sellars 1963b §39-40: 53). Once again, both relata of the picturing relation are open to view. But now we can see important similarities between the robot and ourselves, as we engage in analogous mapping of our lived environment through *sensory perception*. So picturing must also be an important aspect of our cognition, such that there are real isomorphisms between our sensory inputs and our environment, which can be studied by neuroscientists.[[25]](#footnote-25)

 Sellars notes that it is appropriate to state that the annotating robot (and thus the sensing human) are non-discursively *learning facts* about their surroundings, through adjusting to those surroundings ever more adequately:

[The robot] achieves an ever more adequate adjustment to its environment, and if we permitted ourselves to talk about it in human terms…we would say that it *finds out* more and more about the world, that it *knows* more and more *facts* about what took place… (Sellars 1963b §39: 53).

But how is such ‘adequacy’ to be determined? Sellars acknowledges that it must be defined *qua* some specific *projection relation*:

A picture (candidate) subject to the rules of a given method of projection (conceptual framework), which is a correct picture (successful candidate), is S-assertible with respect to that method of projection. (Sellars 1968 §56: 129).

So for instance, my map of Melbourne Zoo animals is adequate if regarded as projecting a ‘picture’ of their relative sizes, and quite inadequate if regarded as projecting a ‘picture’ of their relative popularity.

 In a bold and philosophically ambitious twist, Sellars then claims that we can (and often do) *assert* *facts about picturing* *in the order of signification*.[[26]](#footnote-26) For example, by virtue of the relevant isomorphism, we can identify elements of the robot’s annotations as ‘signifying’ corresponding elements of its environment, and make statements in the order of signification such as, **“In Robotese ’::’ signifies lightning”** (Sellars 1963b §45: 55). In this way, he suggests, we may consider the sentences of our language as *natural-linguistic objects* (NLOs), which have a kind of double reality in belonging to both the real and significatory orders. From the picturing viewpoint, we can view NLOs as part of an object language in which their projection relations to other features of the world function just like any scientific mapping between, say, tracks on a bubble chamber diagram and atomic particles. But at the same time, we can view certain NLOs as part of an order of signification *entirely by virtue of the isomorphism seen from the picturing viewpoint*:

…our willingness to treat the pattern ‘::’ as a symbol which *translates* into our word ‘lightning’ rests on the fact that we recognize that there is an isomorphism in the real order between the place of the pattern ‘::’ in the functioning of the robot and the place of lightning in its environment. In this sense we can say that isomorphism *in the real order* between the robot’s electronic system and its environment is a presupposition of isomorphism *in the order of signification* between robotese and the language we speak. (Sellars1963b §53: 57)

Similarly, in my animal map example, I might pull the relation between font magnitudes and animal magnitudes which my map depicts into the order of signification by creating the concept ‘*different sizes’* as being ‘what my map is about’. This reveals the possibility of, as it were, *transferring truth from picturing to signifying*, which obviously lodges a giant caveat on our earlier account of Sellarsian truth as fully explicated through S-assertibility. A way of understanding such transfer which has an important role to play in Sellars’ wider philosophy is that certain claims of isomorphism in the order of signification may be viewed as true *by* *analogy* with isomorphisms in the real order, by virtue of having the same structure in some relevant respect.

 Unsurprisingly, perceptual statements which report directly on the world’s structures are a key locus of such ‘picturing to signifying truth-transfer’, and in this way Sellars intends his account to resolve long-standing philosophical problems concerning the truth of sensory reports. Such reports are not true because they denote special ‘immaterial’ objects (‘sense data’). They are true by analogy with reports of seeing actual things, as Macbeth explains:

…as used in the phrase “impression of a red triangle” the expressions “red” and “triangle” can function analogically…[T]hey are…concepts that share certain second-order attributes with the ordinary concepts *red* and *triangle* (Macbeth 2000: 125-6).

Sellars claims that such analogical assertions are no more recondite than many of our successful scientific theories, such as those which describe a subatomic particle as ‘like a very small object’.[[27]](#footnote-27)

 Sellars concludes his discussion of picturing in SM by venturing to define *degrees of adequacy*.[[28]](#footnote-28) To this end, he defines a “*conceptual structure*” (Sellars 1968 §49: 126) from which we can assess the relative adequacies of various projection relations. As Seibt explains:

…using here for convenience Sellars’ generalization over languages, from within one “conceptual structure” we must be able to compare the…projection functions of several conceptual structures. Such language- or conceptual structure-internal comparisons of the functional set-ups of other languages or conceptual structures or orientation systems are possible due to our capacity of performing functional abstractions. (Seibt 2009: 266)

To illustrate this, let us return to my animal map example. As my map only depicts the animals’ sizes, I could render it more adequate by adding further notational conventions, which may be transferred through functional abstraction into further concepts in the order of signification (such as *colour* or *sex*). We can now say more things about the animals, and we can also say that we can say more things. (**“We used to only be able to show the animals’ *sizes*, but now we can also show their *colours* and *sexes*.”**) But is such monotonic additivity the only way Sellars imagines that languages become more adequate? This is surely an easy case – more challenging ones will concern *conceptual change*. (E.g. **“Our Linnean biological classification has shifted from two to five kingdoms, and fungi are no longer plants.”**) Seibt claims that ultimately language amendments are judged by how well they improve our world-navigational capacities (Seibt 2009: 267), but I will return to this issue below.

 Finally, Sellars seeks to define the notion of *complete adequacy*, or *ideal truth*. Here Sellars postulates an ideal language for stating empirical facts, which he playfully dubs “*Peirceish*”:

Let us now go one step further and conceive of a language which enables its users to form ideally adequate pictures of objects, and let’s call this language Peirceish. Indeed, let us conceive of the conceptual structure which would be common to English Peirceish, French Peirceish, and even Mentalese or inner episode Peirceish (Sellars 1968 §§68-9: 140).

Sellars claims that although Peirceish may be very far removed from *our current* *conceptual structure* (CSO), we can make sense of the idea that it is nonetheless a successor of CSO which describes the same reality much better than we do. To this end, he defines the notion of a *family of propositions* (PROPFAM), through which we can trace some sufficient continuity of ‘describing the same facts’, and he claims that such continuities can support our currently inadequate attempts to describe the world being nonetheless true insofar as they have successors in Peirceish. As Stovall helpfully explains, with an example which well shows the challenges in tracing such continuities:

When…two utterances fall into a common ‘propositional family,’ as determined by the later community’s assessment of the ways the utterances picture the world, and when the later utterance is recognized as a truth in the later language, then the earlier utterance will be recognized as true by the speakers of that later language as well…With this account we are supposed to see that an ancient Egyptian utterance (in their language) of “the sun rises in the east” was true by our lights when uttered by them, even though the ancient Egyptians had a very different view of the sun and its activities. (Stovall 2019: 219).

This, then, is how Sellars proposes to use the notion of picturing to grant Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology a new “intelligible foundation”.

**6. The Limits of Discursivity Lie Inside the Proposition: A Peircean Response to Sellars**

Sellars’ position is not without problems and further questions. Perhaps most glaringly, we now appear to have a bifurcated view of getting things right. As Macbeth explains:

Sellars’ inferentialism…funds a two-perspective view according to which our judgments can be treated either as episodes in…the conceptual order, which, as justified or not according to the semantic rules of the game, are S-assertible or not, or as episodes in the realm of nature, in the real order, which either do or do not correctly picture other states of affairs in the real order... (Macbeth 2010: 208.[[29]](#footnote-29))

This adds considerable complexity to Sellars’ epistemology and – all talk of analogy and ‘truth-transfer’ (my term) aside – it is not entirely clear how these ‘two correctnesses’ may be systematically coordinated into an overall account of meaning and truth. Sellars’ account of projection relations also deserves scrutiny. In his examples, such as the robot’s annotation of **“::”** ‘meaning’ lightning, Sellars appears to treat projection relations as open to view and immediately observable. But is it not more accurate to describe them as *interpreted*? We earlier noted that in practice empirical scientists must assess relative adequacy across theoretical conceptual change, in examples such as **“Our Linnean biological classification has shifted from two to five kingdoms, and fungi are no longer plants.”** We can imagine two biologists seeing a comprehensive map of the Earth’s creatures as projecting onto *four* and *five* biological kingdoms respectively – this issue was in fact hashed out by biologists in the late 1950s. Could Sellars specify how such disputes might be adjudicated in non-question-begging terms? Finally, in seeking to define veridicality so formally, Sellars seems to sail dangerously close to endeavouring to erect some kind of framework for ‘scientific self-mensuration’, whereby science could serve not only as the ‘measure’ of the features of the world under study, but also of its own sufficiency in mapping that world. Let us pause and marvel at the intoxicating philosophical ambition.Could such an epistemic goal be achievable? Is it coherent?[[30]](#footnote-30) With all these concerns in mind, I will now consider a Peircean response to Sellars’ arguments.

 Firstly and most importantly, Peirce also gave a crucial role in his epistemology to causal, non-discursive signification. Like Sellars, he theorized it in perception, and this is where I will explicate it for our purposes.[[31]](#footnote-31) Peirce initially analyses perception into two elements, which he calls the *percept* and the *perceptual judgment*. Whereas the realm of perceptual judgment corresponds to Sellars’ order of signification, Peirce notes that the percept strictly cannot be described. It “is a single event happening *hic et nunc*”, which “cannot be generalized without losing its essential character” (Peirce CP 2.146). Yet it forces us to acknowledge it; it has insistency (Peirce CP 7.620). In my view, it is helpful to consider the percept as consisting in the perceived object itself, or more precisely, the object *as it directly impacts on us*.[[32]](#footnote-32) Thus although there is a ‘sensational’ element to the percept, this should be considered in a direct realist sense which Peirce called ‘the outward clash’, rather than as representationalist ‘sense-data’.[[33]](#footnote-33) Peirce at one point likens the perceptual judgment to “the printed letters in a book, where a Madonna of Murillo is described”, and the percept to the exquisite picture itself (Peirce CP 5.54). This evocative observation strikingly echoes Sellars’ claim that intentionality must be non-world-related as language and world are too unlike one another.

 As with Sellars’ picturing, the Myth of the Given is avoided insofar as Peirce’s percept does not stand in a *justificatory* relation to the perceptual judgment, but a *purely causal* one. Peirce states, “there is no relation between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and the sensational element of the percept, except forceful connections” (Peirce CP 7.634). In other words, the percept makes the perceptual judgment happen whilst not providing any of its content. One might justly ask, how then are the two related? And from where does the content of the perceptual judgment derive? Peirce presents a diachronic account of these matters which is very congenial to Sellars’ complaint that much of the problem with the Myth of the Given is how it neglects to treat concept-formation as an ongoing process of learning and forming associations (Sellars 1956b §6: 131).

 Peirce theorises that certain germinal (likely innate) causal triggers from percepts to perceptual judgments are noted, encouraged and trained by our native language community, as we gradually assume our linguistic birthright, our ‘second nature’. Through such entrainment, we gradually build an ever more smooth, predictable, and socially appropriate network of habits of association between certain percepts and certain perceptual judgments, whereby the judgments are understood to *interpret* the percepts in ways that are intelligible to our language-using community. Thus, in order to explain how a child learns to correctly perceive **“This animal is a kitten”**, we do not need to plumb the depths of his subjective experience – as with later Wittgenstein’s insightful comment on his ‘beetle in the box’ analogy, this may be ‘divided through’ as irrelevant. We need merely note that the child is receiving some kind of sensation that is sufficiently memorable and malleable that in the presence of actual (socially recognised) kittens, the child’s language teachers can publically correct his ‘kittening assertions’ until they reliably reproduce community norms.

 In this way, for Peirce *habit* serves as a crucial mediator between the orders of reality and signification. This can be explicated in the broader framework of Peirce’s pragmatist theory of meaning, in which (as noted above) concepts consist in nothing but habits of expecting certain experiences in certain circumstances. Crucially, the repeated enfolding of noninferential causal triggers into useful habits of inferential association is how concepts are built in Peirce’s philosophy. There is no other (dualist) ‘mind-stuff’ from which concepts are ‘made’. This is the great elegance of Peirce’s view, and its prospects for underpinning a thoroughly naturalistic philosophy of mind.[[34]](#footnote-34) This is another significant consonance with Sellars, insofar as abolishing dualist ‘mind-stuff’ is also Sellars’ stated goal in the discussion in which he enframes his extended treatment of picturing in BBK, seeking to construct a ‘Thomism without immaterialism’.

 However the two views arguably part ways on a number of fronts. Firstly, for Peirce, the relationship between the two orders is no mere analogy. Rather, he manages to interweave them in his distinctive semiotic account of the structure of the proposition, which I shall now explain. Peirce theorised propositional structure as consisting in *an icon which is fused to an index, in order that something may be said about something*. Icons and indices may be broadly understood as ‘pictures’ and ‘pointers’, respectively:

[I]t has been found that there are three kinds of signs which are all indispensable in all reasoning; the first is the diagrammatic sign or icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the subject of discourse; the second is the index, which…forces the attention to the particular object intended without describing it (Peirce CP 1.369).

Thus, **“The cat is on the mat”** is understood to simultaneously indicate a particular state of affairs, and to describe the logical picture which it instantiates (‘cattishness-on-mattishness’, as it were). Perceptual judgments follow this structure, with the percept itself constituting an index to some real-world object, and the perceptual judgment created by the ‘intentional enfolding’ of the percept by a predicate conceived iconically (essentially, as a Kantian schema). But there is a further twist to this, insofar as the proposition gains its true reality diachronically. As relevantly similar icons are assigned to relevantly similar indices across different times and places, a generalized judging process becomes habitual, and thus cemented as ‘truth’. This introduces the third in Peirce’s famous triad of sign-types – the *symbol* – which Peirce defines as nothing but habits of forming relevantly similar associations. In this way, the initially affixed icon, which when viewed synchronically counts as merely *pictorial*, transmutes through an ever-widening variety of applications into the abstract generality of a *concept*. Thus, for instance, my first successful assertions of **“This animal is a kitten”**, based on memories of interactions with particular animals I knew, gradually generalize into a broader concept of ‘kittenhood’ that can generate the full range of inferences that my community requires. This process represents Peirce’s Law of Mind, which states that all mental activity consists in increasingly generalized habit-taking (Peirce CP 7.515). Thus, rather than Sellars’ two orders, we now have a triadic process:

 real *object* à interpreted as instantiating *picture* à generalizes into *concept*

 The way in which Peirce manages to weave together these three elements (reality, picturing, and intentionality) in individual judgements has some crucial epistemological implications which are arguably unavailable to Sellars. Peirce’s account enables *the pictorial to correct the conceptual, and, somewhat surprisingly, vice versa*. I will now explain this. We saw earlier how Peirce’s account of propositional structure holds that index and icon ‘fuse’. This term is no mere poetry – the perceived object becomes a literal amalgam of index, picture and concept in the perceiver’s mind. (**“That animal *is* a kitten”**). Within such a framework, it is easy enough to understand how the pictorial may correct the conceptual. For instance, the animal turns around, I see its floppy ears, which are materially inconsistent with the concept *kitten*, and I realise that it is not a kitten but a rabbit. But how may the conceptual correct the pictorial? Here Peirce references the well-known scenario where, sitting in a train looking out the window at another train that begins moving, we feel *our* train moving, although we know that it is stationary. Peirce notes how, although our perception of our train’s apparent motion might seem entirely ‘sensational’, gaining new conceptual information can lead us to literally feel (‘picture’) our own train’s motion entirely differently, as our mind rationally re-interprets the whole scene:

…that moving train that appears stationary will not move however one may try to force it to do so. Yet if one only looks down and watches the wheels turn, in a very few seconds it will seem to start up (Peirce CP 7.647).

Such reciprocal corrigibility would seem warranted by an “adequately critical direct realism” (Sellars 1963b: 90).

**7. Conclusion**

Although Sellars opined that picturing was the one important philosophical move that Peirce missed in constructing his scientific metaphysics, both great American philosophers show rare insight into the importance of integrating non-discursive causal representations into the heart of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. However, Sellars’ separation of the real order from the order of signification as object to meta-language creates a tricky dilemma in his account of picturing, concerning where to place the projection relation which creates and grounds the picture. If he places it in the order of signification, then it becomes yet another discursive activity, so it can no longer play the role of supplying cognitive friction. So he sees that he must place it in the real order, but now he cannot help himself to any interpretive resources in specifying the relation, but must resort to Tractarian fantasy that it is perspicuously ‘seen’, at some sufficiently ‘atomic’ level (arguably creating yet another incarnation of the Myth of the Given).

 Whereas Sellars’ bifurcation between orders of reality and signification arguably represents the faintest and most final holdover of Cartesian dualism between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, which descended into Kantian dualism between natural necessity and rational freedom, Peirce integrates the two into a semiotic account of meaning which is simultaneously iconic, indexical and symbolic. This means that pictures can be causally triggered by percepts, and then rationally corrected by our habits of judgment and inference into useful assertions, in a lived context of continual interaction with both experience and a language-using community. We may now observe that *rational constraint by what is* (Macbeth’s elegant characterization of Sellars’ understanding of the Myth of the Given) is not after all an impossible dream. The impossible dream is treating rational constraint by what is as a *foundation* to knowledge, rather than as a hard-working participant in a reciprocally correcting *critical direct realism*. I submit that this presents a more thoroughly naturalistic answer to the great problem in modern philosophy – of which Sellars was also in hot pursuit – how is synthetic judgment possible?

 Meanwhile, a proper understanding of the lived context of both experience and a language-using community within which our habits of judgment and inference develop enables a response to Rorty’s ‘left-wing’ criticism that Peirce’s concept of truth is unjustifiably robust because “[t]he difference between justification and truth makes no difference…” (Rorty 1995: 300). The response is that continued sincere attempts at justification *in context* receive ongoing rational constraint by what is, which shapes and improves them. This account shows why the ‘end of inquiry’ *must* be indefinitely deferred, on pain of our ceasing to inquire – that is, to think intelligently at all. The key question of this paper, though, is whether it is correct to say that Sellars errs ‘on the right’, by labelling Peirce’s concept of truth overly weak. His famous quote on this (already cited above) has received much attention:

Peirce…fell into difficulty because, by not taking into account the dimension of ‘picturing’, he had no Archimedean point outside the series of actual and possible beliefs in terms of which to define the ideal or limit to which members of this series might approximate. (Sellars 1968 §75: 135)

What is meant by this ‘Archimedean point’? I suggested above that Sellars seems to be advocating a kind of scientific self-mensuration, whereby science could serve not only as the ‘measure’ of the world, but also of its own sufficiency in mapping it.[[35]](#footnote-35) It is as if Sellars is saying that we cannot say true things unless we are also able to talk about (and, should our formal analyses reach sufficient sophistication, possibly even quantify) *how* true they are. But why should this be? Although Peirce, like Sellars, and unlike Rorty, understands that any inquiry that deserves the name requires cognitive friction, his account of that friction does not require an analogous cantilevered epistemological superstructure. Rather, for Peirce cognitive friction lies inside the process of inquiry – behind the concepts, behind the pictures – in the index and its distinctive role of drawing our attention to what is. This is to say that Peircean pragmatism does not resile from the view that language is not merely “intimately involved with conduct” (Sellars 1954: 213-4, cited above), but rather, language’s role as an instrument for grappling with the world provides a *bona fide* *analysis of ‘means and is true’*. As such, Peircean pragmatism understands that real objects lie inside[[36]](#footnote-36) our real-world judgments about them, where they always have been.[[37]](#footnote-37)

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1. Of course, one may also observe the heterogeneity and nuanced dissension typical of landscapes of academic debate. James O’Shea has presented a discerning mapping of current coalitions and lingering concerns on both sides. On the pragmatist side, he notes that a number of scholars “have found regrettable the dominance of formal-linguistic paradigms of inquiry characteristic of much analytic philosophy in general, and also the downplaying of ‘experience’ by Sellars-inspired neo-pragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom” (O’Shea 2019: 111). On the Pittsburgh School side, he notes a recent claim by Robert Brandom that “Sellars never explicitly identified himself with pragmatism” (Brandom 2015: 5-6, cited in O’Shea 2019: 111). With regard to Brandom’s work it is also worth noting that his summational *Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary* (Brandom 2011) refers very little to Peirce’s philosophy. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. One notable recent exception is (Stovall 2021), which seeks to synthesise Sellarsian and Peircean insights in a new theory of philosophy of mind and rationality. But in effect, this project represents a Sellars scholar reaching out to embrace insights from Peirce – I hope to provide the reverse service here. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Willem deVries (2005: 1) also nicely observes what a rare figure Sellars presents in twentieth century philosophy as “both analytic and systematic”. The same can be said for Peirce, who produced some of his most impressive philosophical output in the early 1900s, before his death in 1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. This term is adumbrated in (Peirce CP 1.14). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Strictly speaking, Peirce does not claim that the correspondence theory of truth is *false*, merely that (in a characteristically pragmatist critique) it is *not very* *useful*. He claims that his definition of truth is preferable as it generates *future* *expectations* from the hypothesis that a claim is true, for instance that the claim will survive further criticism – *albeit* we cannot predict the time-period across which these effects will appear. For further discussion of this point, see (Misak 2007: 68-9; 2004; Legg 2014: 205). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. I shall use the term ‘intentionality’ through the rest of this paper, as it is more widely used by Sellars and his interlocutors. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. (*pace* some extra ‘bells and whistles’ for the logical constants) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Examples famously include modal, moral and mathematical talk. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. For an extended account and defence of the high-level distinction underlying this term, see (Putnam 1981). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Maughn Gregory credits philosophers of education Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp with coining this specific and now widely-used term in the late 1970s, as they developed the ‘philosophy for children’ movement (Gregory 2022, see also Cam 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. He defines a coordinate concept of reality as follows, “…the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of COMMUNITY, without defined limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge.” (Peirce CP: 5.311) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The early pages of (Misak 2008) gather a useful history of such responses since the birth of pragmatism. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Russell was an early castigator on this point, writing that since “the last man on earth…will presumably be entirely occupied in keeping warm and getting nourishment, it is doubtful whether his opinions will be any wiser than ours” (Russell 1939: 145). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. This letter is cited in (Haack 1976: 246). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. This ‘political analogy’ is intended to be continuous with standard usage in Sellars scholarship. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Discussion of these themes spanned Sellars’ career, but see in particular (Sellars 1953b). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. C.f. (deVries 2005: 36) “…does this approach have the crushing disadvantage that it cuts language off from the world altogether? Surely language and the world are related to each other.” [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. At (1968 §11: 12), Sellars calls this supposed mental event “classical Aristotelian abstractionism”. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. For example (Macbeth 2010: 202, 215). See also (Macbeth 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See for instance (Sellars 1968 §61: 161). For a useful discussion of these issues, see (O’Shea 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Valuable overviews are provided by (O’Shea 2019), (Sachs 2018) and (Olen 2015). O’Shea describes Sellars’ relationship to pragmatism as “itself a dynamic field of forces of attraction and repulsion” (O’Shea 2019: 110), going on to argue that Sellars was deeply influenced by pragmatism, perhaps despite himself. Sachs explores, and rejects, neopragmatist Rorty’s repudiation of Sellars as a pragmatist because Sellars pursued “the project of finding connections between inquiry and the world” – a project which, in Rorty’s view, “needs elimination rather than naturalization” (Rorty 1979: 91, cited in Sachs 2018: 157n). Olen argues that “recent attempts to place W. Sellars within the pragmatist tradition” are overstated by comparison to the influence exercised on his philosophy by his father’s critical realism (Olen 2015: §2). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Here it’s worth noting that Sellars was familiar with a version of 19th century idealism that was directly influenced and inspired by Peirce – that of Josiah Royce – and he knew that C.I. Lewis had introduced his notion of ‘the given’ precisely in order to try to add some cognitive friction to Royce’s idealist pragmatism. I am grateful to Carl Sachs for these observations. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See for instance (Williams 2016), (Brandom 2015), (McDowell 2009; 1994), (Rosenberg 2007), (Rorty 1979). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See for instance (Sachs 2019), (Seibt 2009), (O’Shea 2007), (deVries 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. (Sachs 2019) draws out interesting implications from this discussion for cognitive science, noting that Sellars goes so far as to identify the intellect’s presence in the ‘real order’ with the central nervous system (Sellars 1963b §59: 59). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. In contrasting the real order with the ‘order of signification’, I follow Sellars’ own usage. Some commentators replace the latter term with ‘intentional order’, but this begs the crucial question of whether picturing might instantiate its own form of intentionality. I am grateful to Preston Stovall for pressing me on this point. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. “…we explain the behaviour of perceptible things in terms of imperceptible objects…but this is compatible with the fact that we conceive of the imperceptible by analogy with the perceptible” (Sellars 1963b §55: 58). See also, “…to take a realistic stance towards scientific theories is to take seriously this role of theoretical languages as providing a method of picturing the world” (Sellars 1968 §57: 17). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Here there has been important debate concerning whether Sellars can define adequacy *tout court* and not (seemingly more in the spirit of pragmatism) for particular purposes. See for example (Seibt 2009), (Rosenberg 2007), (deVries 2005: 54). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See also (Macbeth 2000: 114). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. It’s worth noting that in recent decades a quite extensive literature has sprung up on ‘*truthlikeness*’. These researchers define nearness to the truth as a special case of a general similarity metric, thereby proving a suite of formal results. See for instance the summative (Niiniluoto 1987). They do not look to Sellars for inspiration, though, but Quine and Popper. What Sellars might have made of this work, which began in the mid-1970s, towards the very end of his career, is interesting to ponder. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Peirce’s distinctive mature theory of perception is still relatively unknown, as it only appears in the still largely unpublished *Minute Logic*, and in a remarkable and idiosyncratic occasional piece which the *Collected Papers* entitles “Telepathy and Perception” (Peirce CP 7.597-7.688). I have seen no evidence that Sellars was familiar with the theory, which I have previously explored in (Legg 2022; 2018a; 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. I work out this point in more detail in (Legg 2022)**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. On this, see e.g. (deVries 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. For further discussion of this point, and others in this section, see (Legg 2018a; Legg & Black 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Two accomplished Sellars scholars have taken pains to argue that by his Archimedean point metaphor, Sellars is not advocating the kind of anti-pragmatist ‘view from nowhere’ that Rorty for instance assumed (see n21 above). Stovall writes that although, “[o]n the face of it this may look as though Sellars is suggesting that with picturing we reach an ‘Archimedean point outside the series of actual and possible beliefs’…on closer inspection Sellars should be understood as rejecting the need for an Archimedean point that arises, he claims, when we do not have a notion of picturing at our disposal...” (Stovall 2019: 218). Similarly, Seibt writes, “…I think Sellars meant to point out…Given that there is no Archimedean standpoint, we cannot make sense of the limit of science in terms of a series of possible beliefs; however there is another way to define that limit, namely, as the perfect map.” (Seibt 2009: 258). But, to me, both these interpretations seem strained in light of the way Sellars seems to explicitly deprecate Peirce’s lack of an Archimedean point in the quote at hand. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. (literally inside, not represented as inside – this is not idealism) [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. For discussions which significantly improved this paper, I am indebted to Carl Sachs, Preston Stovall, and Luz Seiberth. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)