Weinberger, Naftali (2025) The Red Herring of Probability Raising. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Theorists of probabilistic causality viewed causation as probability raising relative to particular contexts. In contrast, more recent graphical theories do not specify whether a cause raises or lowers the probability of its effect as part of the causal representation, but enable one to infer such quantitative facts from the joint probability distribution and additional causal assumptions. This difference between the accounts may seem minor, but here I argue that the emphasis among probabilistic theorists on probability raising reflected their not having an adequate theory of confounding and thus of the relationship between causal and probabilistic claims. The graphical account of confounding clarifies why causal relationships need not be identified with particular probabilistic relationships in particular populations, and thus why many of the earlier debates about probability raising in retrospect no longer appear to reflect substantive philosophical differences.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Causal Models, probabilistic causality, confounding, laws | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Depositing User: | Mr. Naftali Weinberger | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 10 Jan 2025 16:17 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 10 Jan 2025 16:17 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 24507 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Date: | 2025 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24507 |
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