LE NEPVOU, Alexandre (2026) Residual Empiricism and the Bearer of Scientific Acceptance From Empirical Adequacy to Objectivating Adequacy. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Constructive empiricism restricts the belief involved in scientific acceptance: to accept
a theory is not to believe that it is true, but only that it is empirically adequate. I argue that this
restriction is correct but incomplete. It restricts the doxastic force of acceptance, while leaving its
bearer at the level of whole theories. Drawing on van Fraassen’s semantic conception of theories,
his later account of scientific representation, measurement, and perspective, and his conception
of empiricism as a stance rather than a factual thesis, I argue that acceptance should instead
be directed at classes of objectivating content: contents stable across admissible formulations,
models, mediations, measurements, and uses. Such a view yields a residual empiricism that is
stronger than mere empirical adequacy, because it requires public objectivation, but weaker than
scientific realism, because objectivating adequacy does not entail ontological commitment. The
argument is situated against debates on scientific realism, selective realism, structural realism,
robustness, and scientific representation.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID LE NEPVOU, Alexandre idealismescientifique@gmail.com 0009-0003-7233-5029
Keywords:	constructive empiricism; scientific realism; van Fraassen; empirical adequacy; empirical stance; scientific acceptance; scientific representation; measurement; robustness; perspective; objectivation.
Subjects:	General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Mr Alexandre LE NEPVOU
Date Deposited:	20 May 2026 12:34
Last Modified:	20 May 2026 12:34
Item ID:	29713
Subjects:	General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	May 2026
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29713

Available Versions of this Item

• Residual Empiricism and the Bearer of Scientific Acceptance From Empirical Adequacy to Objectivating Adequacy. (deposited 16 May 2026 12:10)
  • Residual Empiricism and the Bearer of Scientific Acceptance From Empirical Adequacy to Objectivating Adequacy. (deposited 20 May 2026 12:34) [Currently Displayed]

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