Gilmore, Cody (2002) Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence, and Temporal Parts. [Preprint]

Preview

PDF BSRRev.pdf Download (116kB)

Abstract

Yuri Balashov has argued that endurantism (the view that material objects persist by being wholly present at each moment of their careers) is untenable in the context of Minkowski spacetime. Balashov’s argument runs through two main theses concerning the relation of coexistence, or temporal co-location. (1) Coexistence must turn out to be an absolute or objective matter; and in Minkowski spacetime coexistence must be grounded in the relation of spacelike separation. (2) If endurantism is true, then (1) leads to absurd conclusions; but if perdurantism is true, then (1) is harmless. I object to both theses. Against (1), I argue that coexistence is better construed as being relative to a hyperplane of simultaneity. Against (2), I argue that the consequences of (1) given endurantism are no worse than the consequences of (1) given perdurantism.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Gilmore, Cody
Additional Information:	This paper was published in Philosophical Studies 109: 241-263 (June 2002).
Keywords:	Balashov, persistence, endurance, perdurance, endurantism, perdurantism, three-dimensionalism, four-dimensionalism, temporal parts, wholly present, special relativity, Minkowski, coexistence
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User:	Cody Gilmore
Date Deposited:	15 Oct 2006
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID:	2983
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory Specific Sciences > Physics
Date:	June 2002
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2983

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item