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Epistemological Pluralism

Davies, E Brian (2006) Epistemological Pluralism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

A number of those actively involved in the physical sciences anticipate the creation of a unified approach to all human knowledge based on reductionism in physics and Platonism in mathematics. We argue that it is implausible that this goal will ever be achieved, and argue instead for a pluralistic approach to human understanding, in which mathematically expressed laws of nature are merely one way among several of describing a world that is too complex for our minds to be able to grasp in its entirety.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
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Davies, E Brian
Additional Information: This is a substantially rewritten and expanded version of a paper called "Scientific Understanding"
Keywords: pluralism, epistemology, reductionism, Platonism
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User: E Brian Davies
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2006
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID: 3083
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Specific Sciences > Physics
Date: December 2006
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3083

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