Sheredos, Benjamin (2009) Embodied Delusions and Intentionality. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorder, via their accounts of intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to extend Bolton’s claims, by exploring what an embodied/situated theory of mind might imply about mental disorder. I argue that, unlike the more traditional views Bolton considers, embodied/situated accounts can (in principle) provide an observer-independent criterion for distinguishing mental health from disorder in cases of Capgras and Cotard delusions.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Sheredos, Benjamin
Additional Information:	Corrected Section #'s from the earlier version.
Keywords:	phenomenology, intentionality, capgras delusions, cotard delusions, affective feelings, bodily feelings, feelings of familiarity
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Medicine > Psychiatry General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Benjamin Sheredos
Date Deposited:	23 Mar 2009
Last Modified:	09 Apr 2019 03:56
Item ID:	4530
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Medicine > Psychiatry General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	2009
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4530

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• Embodied Delusions and Intentionality. (deposited 18 Mar 2009)
  • Embodied Delusions and Intentionality. (deposited 23 Mar 2009) [Currently Displayed]

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