Barrett, Jeffrey A. (2001) Toward a Pragmatic Account of Scientific Knowledge. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Abstract: C. S. Peirce's psychological analysis of belief, doubt, and inquiry provides insights into the nature of scientific knowledge. These in turn can be used to construct an account of scientific knowledge where the notions of belief, truth, rational justification, and inquiry are determined by the relationships that must hold between these notions. I will describe this account of scientific knowledge and some of the problems it faces. I will also describe the close relationship between pragmatic and naturalized accounts of scientific knowledge.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Barrett, Jeffrey A.
Keywords:	peirce, knowledge, pragmatism
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Depositing User:	Jeffrey Barrett
Date Deposited:	27 Nov 2001
Last Modified:	01 Jun 2016 20:36
Item ID:	498
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Date:	November 2001
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/498

Available Versions of this Item

• Toward a Pragmatic Account of Scientific Knowledge. (deposited 07 Nov 2001)
  • Toward a Pragmatic Account of Scientific Knowledge. (deposited 27 Nov 2001) [Currently Displayed]

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