Esfeld, Michael (2010) Causal overdetermination for Humeans? [Preprint]

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Abstract

The paper argues against systematic overdetermination being an acceptable solution to the problem of mental causation within a Humean counterfactual theory of causation. The truth-makers of the counterfactuals in question include laws of nature, and there are laws that support physical to physical counterfactuals, but no laws in the same sense that support mental to physical counterfactuals.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Esfeld, Michael
Keywords:	counterfactuals, Humeanism, laws, mental causation, overdetermination
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation
Depositing User:	Michael Esfeld
Date Deposited:	13 May 2010
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:19
Item ID:	5349
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation
Date:	May 2010
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5349

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