Brading, Katherine (2012) Presentism as an empirical hypothesis. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this paper, I identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe, and then offer an alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. I fear that labelling it “presentism” dooms the view, but I don’t know what else to call it.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
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| Keywords: | presentism special relativity law-constitutive | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory |
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| Depositing User: | Katherine A. Brading | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 09 Nov 2012 14:06 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 09 Nov 2012 14:06 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 9428 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory |
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| Date: | 8 November 2012 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9428 |
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