Tosh, Nick (2014) Finite frequentism in a big world. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The view that chances are relative frequencies of occurrence within actual, finite reference classes has long been written off. I argue that it ought to be reconsidered. Focussing on non-deterministic chance, I defend a version of finite frequentism in which reference classmates are required to have qualitatively identical pasts. While my analysis can evade or resist several standard objections, it has a counterintuitive consequence: non-trivial chances entail the existence of light cones that are perfect intrinsic duplicates. In mitigation, I argue that our scientific knowledge is consistent with the hypothesis that there are many such duplicates in the actual world. Moreover, my analysis has some striking advantages: it is simple, it is metaphysically undemanding, and it makes possible a satisfying explanation of the chance–credence connection.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Tosh, Nick nick.tosh@nuigalway.ie
Additional Information:	Penultimate draft. Please cite published version, forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Keywords:	Chance; probability; frequentism; indeterminism; indifference principles
Subjects:	General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Nick Tosh
Date Deposited:	14 Feb 2014 14:45
Last Modified:	14 Feb 2014 14:45
Item ID:	10343
Subjects:	General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	January 2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10343

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