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Abstract versus Causal Explanations?

Reutlinger, Alexander and Andersen, Holly (2016) Abstract versus Causal Explanations? [Preprint]

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Abstract

In the recent literature on causal and non-causal scientific explanations, there is an intuitive assumption (which we call the ‘abstractness assumption’) according to which an explanation is non-causal by virtue of being abstract. In this context, to be “abstract” means that the explanans in question leaves out many or almost all causal microphysical details of the target system. After motivating this assumption, we argue that the abstractness assumption, in placing the abstract and the causal character of an explanation in tension, is misguided in ways that are independent of which view of causation or causal explanation one takes to be most accurate. On major accounts of causation, as well as on major accounts of causal explanation, the abstractness of an explanation is not sufficient for it being non-causal. That is, explanations are not non-causal by dint of being abstract.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Reutlinger, AlexanderAlexander.Reutlinger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Andersen, Hollyholly_andersen@sfu.ca
Additional Information: forthcoming in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Keywords: explanation; abstraction; non-causal explanation; causal explanation; causation
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Alexander Reutlinger
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2016 12:01
Last Modified: 21 Sep 2016 12:01
Item ID: 12452
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: September 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12452

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