Viger, Christopher and Hoefer, Carl and Viger, Daniel (2019) The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34 (3). pp. 407-421. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Viger, Christopher cviger@uwo.ca Hoefer, Carl carl.hoefer@ub.edu Viger, Daniel dviger2@uwo.ca
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	Newcomb problem; rationality; causal decision theory; evidential decision theory; causation; counterfactuals
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Evidence
Depositing User:	Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited:	12 Dec 2019 00:28
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2019 00:28
Item ID:	16711
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	https://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.20040
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Evidence
Date:	September 2019
Page Range:	pp. 407-421
Volume:	34
Number:	3
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16711

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