Karliuk, Maksim (2025) What is the value free ideal and should scientists strive to uphold it? UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

There seems to be a near consensus among philosophers of science rejecting the value-free ideal - that non-epistemic values ought not to influence scientific reasoning. This essays shows that arguments put forward against the ideal do not necessitate the rejection of its desirability. It also argues that rejecting the ideal can lead to detrimental consequences and instead the ideal should be retained by reframing it as a constraint in resorting to non-epistemic values and choosing among values.

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Item Type:	Other
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Karliuk, Maksim maksim@karliuk.com 0000-0001-8246-7947
Keywords:	value-free ideal, science, proportionality, value-neutrality thesis, non-epistemic values, epistemic values, inductive risk
Subjects:	General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Maksim Karliuk
Date Deposited:	25 Mar 2025 13:38
Last Modified:	25 Mar 2025 13:38
Item ID:	24942
Subjects:	General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	17 January 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24942

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