Majszak, Mason and Sartori, Lorenzo (2026) AI, Experts, and Epistemic Authority. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

In a recent contribution, Boisseau (2026) argues against a popular analogy between artificial intelligence (AI) and human experts. We start by clarifying that the analogy does not aim to establish that AI is an expert, but rather that AI can be a potential source of epistemic authority and trust. Once this is clarified, we examine Boisseau’s objections against the AI-expert analogy and demonstrate that they are unsuccessful. Finally, we contend that AI should be seen as an interestingly novel case where the categories “scientific instrument” and “expert” are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Majszak, Mason mason.majszak@nyu.edu 0000-0003-0775-9418 Sartori, Lorenzo l.sartori@sheffield.ac.uk 0000-0002-8457-7100
Keywords:	Expertise; Artificial Intelligence (AI); Epistemic Authority; Trust; Peer-Disagreement
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence > Machine Learning General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Technology
Depositing User:	Dr. Mason Majszak
Date Deposited:	08 Jun 2026 18:45
Last Modified:	08 Jun 2026 18:45
Item ID:	29998
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence > Machine Learning General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Technology
Date:	27 May 2026
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29998

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