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Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt

Machery, Edouard (2012) Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 27 (2). pp. 223-227. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

In this article, I argue that philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.

En este artículo defiendo que las intuicio
nes de los filósofos sobre la referencia no son más
fiables que las de los legos y que las intuciones sobre la referencia de los nombres propios y los usos de los nombres propios ofrecen evidencia de igual valor para las teorías de la referencia.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Machery, Edouardmachery@pitt.edu
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: epistemology; semantic intuitions; expertise; reference; epistemología semántica; intuiciones semánticas; expertos; referencia
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 04 Feb 2014 23:14
Last Modified: 04 Feb 2014 23:14
Item ID: 10253
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.6223
Date: May 2012
Page Range: pp. 223-227
Volume: 27
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10253

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