Suárez, Mauricio (2014) A Critique of Empiricist Propensity Theories. [Preprint]
![[img]](https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
|
PDF
A_Critique_of_Empiricist_Propensity_Theories_EJPS.pdf - Accepted Version Download (411kB) |
Abstract
I analyse critically what I regard as the most accomplished empiricist account of propensities, namely the long run propensity theory developed by Donald Gillies (2000). Empiricist accounts are distinguished by their commitment to the ‘identity thesis’: the identification of propensities and objective probabilities. These theories are intended, in the tradition of Karl Popper’s influential proposal, to provide an interpretation of probability (under a suitable version of Kolmogorov’s axioms) that renders probability statements directly testable by experiment. I argue that the commitment to the identity thesis leaves empiricist theories, including Gillies’ version, vulnerable to a variant of what is known as Humphreys’ paradox. I suggest that the tension may be resolved only by abandoning the identity thesis, and by adopting instead an understanding of propensities as explanatory properties of chancy objects.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creators: |
|
||||||
| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in the European Journal for Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Keywords: | Propensity, Probability, Empiricism, Humphreys' Paradox | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory/Observation |
||||||
| Depositing User: | Prof Mauricio Suárez | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 03 Feb 2014 15:00 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Feb 2014 15:00 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 10307 | ||||||
| Official URL: | http://link.springer.com/journal/13194 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory/Observation |
||||||
| Date: | 2014 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10307 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}