López de Sa, Dan (2008) Defending “Restricted Particularism” from Jackson, Pettit & Smith. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 23 (2). pp. 133-143. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith (2000), “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s (1989).

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID López de Sa, Dan dlds@st-andrews.ac.uk
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	particularism, response-dependence, restricted particularism, values
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2014 00:28
Last Modified:	28 Feb 2014 00:28
Item ID:	10392
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.390
Date:	November 2008
Page Range:	pp. 133-143
Volume:	23
Number:	2
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10392

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