Aliseda, Atocha
(2007)
Abductive Reasoning: Challenges Ahead.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 22 (3).
pp. 261-270.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
The motivation behind the collection of papers presented in this THEORIA forum on Abductive reasoning is my book Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations into the Processes of Discovery and Explanation. These contributions raise fundamental questions. One of them concerns the conjectural character of abduction. The choice of a logical framework for abduction is also discussed in detail, both its inferential aspect and search strategies. Abduction is also analyzed as inference to the best explanation, as well as a process of epistemic change, both of which chal-lenge the argument-like format of abduction. Finally, the psychological question of whether humans reason abduc-tively according to the models proposed is also addressed. I offer a brief summary of my book and then comment on and respond to several challenges that were posed to my work by the contributors to this issue.
| Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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| Creators: |
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| Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
| Keywords: |
abduction, abductive inference, discovery, heuristics |
| Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
| Date Deposited: |
27 Feb 2014 16:54 |
| Last Modified: |
11 Mar 2014 21:40 |
| Item ID: |
10412 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
| Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
| Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
| DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.446 |
| Date: |
2007 |
| Page Range: |
pp. 261-270 |
| Volume: |
22 |
| Number: |
3 |
| ISSN: |
2171-679X |
| URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10412 |
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