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On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth

Suárez, Mauricio and Solé, Albert (2006) On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21 (1). pp. 39-48. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Suárez, Mauriciomsuarez@filos.ucm.es
Solé, AlbertAlbert.Sole@uab.cat
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: representation, inferential conception, truth, minimalism
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 17:21
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 17:21
Item ID: 10463
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.552
Date: January 2006
Page Range: pp. 39-48
Volume: 21
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10463

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