Pagès, Joan
(2005)
Truthmaking and Supervenience.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 20 (2).
pp. 191-197.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
In his criticism of Armstrong’s argument against nominalism, Parsons (1999) makes a crucial use of a notion of truthmaking in terms of weak supervenience which assumedly: (i) does not entail truthmaker essentialism, (ii) is neutral as to the issue of nominalism, and (iii) is useful in Armstrong’s argument against Ryle. I will try to show that Parsons’ notion is defective because it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers. Besides, I argue that the natural reformulation of the notion in terms of strong supervenience fails in two respects: (i) it is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism and (ii) it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers if it succeeds in avoiding truthmaker essentialism. As a corollary, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument against nominalism is vindicated.
| Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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| Creators: |
|
| Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
| Keywords: |
Metaphysics, truth, truthmakers, supervenience |
| Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
| Date Deposited: |
11 Mar 2014 17:47 |
| Last Modified: |
11 Mar 2014 17:47 |
| Item ID: |
10485 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
| Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
| Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
| DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.572 |
| Date: |
May 2005 |
| Page Range: |
pp. 191-197 |
| Volume: |
20 |
| Number: |
2 |
| ISSN: |
2171-679X |
| URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10485 |
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