Vicente, Agustín (2004) The role of dispositions in explanations. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 19 (3). pp. 301-310. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

According to a model defended by some authors, dispositional predicates, or concepts, can be legitimately used in causal explanations, but such a use is not necessary. For every explanation couched in dispositional terms, there is always a better, and complete, explanation that makes use of a different vocabulary, that of categorial bases. In what follows, I will develop this view, and then argue that there is a kind of use of dispositions in explanations that does not fall within this model. That is, I will argue that we would miss some explanations if we were to forsake dispositional concepts and dispositional explanations.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Vicente, Agustín agusvic@fyl.uva.es
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	dispositions, explanation, teleology, exclusion problems
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	11 Mar 2014 18:00
Last Modified:	11 Mar 2014 18:00
Item ID:	10495
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.583
Date:	September 2004
Page Range:	pp. 301-310
Volume:	19
Number:	3
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10495

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