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Conceptions of the mind... that do not loose sight of logic

Acero, Juan José (2003) Conceptions of the mind... that do not loose sight of logic. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 18 (1). pp. 17-25. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Which is the relation between logic and philosophy of mind? This work tries to answer that question by shortly examining, first, the place that is assigned to logic in three current views of the mind: Computationalism, Interpretativism and Naïve Naturalism. Secondly, the classical debate between psychologism and antipsychologism is reviewed –the question about whether logic is or not a part of psychology- and it is indicated in which place of such debate the three mentioned conceptions of mind are located.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Acero, Juan Joséacero@ugr.es
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Logic, philosophy of mind, computationalism, interpretativism, naive naturalism, psychology
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 04 Mar 2014 19:50
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 21:00
Item ID: 10536
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.407
Date: 2003
Page Range: pp. 17-25
Volume: 18
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10536

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