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Bayesian humility

Elga, Adam (2014) Bayesian humility. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Say that an agent is "epistemically humble" if she is less than certain that her opinions will converge to the truth, given an appropriate stream of evidence. Is such humility rationally permissible? According to the orgulity argument (Belot 2013): the answer is "yes" but long-run convergence-to-the-truth theorems force Bayesians to answer "no." That argument has no force against Bayesians who reject countable additivity as a requirement of rationality. Such Bayesians are free to count even extreme humility as rationally permissible.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Bayesianism, orgulity, convergence to the truth, convergence theorem, washing out, finite additivity, finitely additive probability, countable additivity, problem of priors
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    Depositing User: Adam Elga
    Date Deposited: 18 Aug 2014 15:06
    Last Modified: 02 Sep 2014 10:49
    Item ID: 10963
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10963

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