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Defending Conventions as Functionally A Priori Knowledge

Stump, David J. (2002) Defending Conventions as Functionally A Priori Knowledge. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correct-some elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a constitutive part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than the standard treatments of conventionalism, the picture of knowledge developed here is very different from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be differentiated.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Conventionalism, History of Philosophy of Science
    Conferences and Volumes: [2002] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 18th Biennial Mtg - PSA 2002: Contributed Papers (Milwaukee, WI; 2002) > PSA 2002 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Program Committee
    Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:11
    Item ID: 1099
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1099

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