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Defending Conventions as Functionally A Priori Knowledge

Stump, David J. (2002) Defending Conventions as Functionally A Priori Knowledge. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correct-some elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a constitutive part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than the standard treatments of conventionalism, the picture of knowledge developed here is very different from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be differentiated.


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Item Type: Preprint
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Stump, David J.
Keywords: Conventionalism, History of Philosophy of Science
Depositing User: Program Committee
Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2003
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID: 1099
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1099

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