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Idealization, Confirmation, and Scientific Realism

Liu, Chuang (2007) Idealization, Confirmation, and Scientific Realism. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

The paper first raises the problem concerning the confirmation of idealized theories in science and its relationship to scientific realism. Then a solution by Laymon is discussed. It is then argued that two different types of idealization need to be distinguished and that only one of them produces false theories. But then, such “theories” are really theory-maps, which point to theories at the end of improvements. Finally, Laymon’s account is modified in accordance with the above insight.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Liu, Chuang
Keywords: induction, confirmation, idealization, approximation, realism, antirealism,
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Chuang Liu
Date Deposited: 05 Oct 2014 21:32
Last Modified: 05 Oct 2014 21:32
Item ID: 11059
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2007
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11059

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