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Scientific discovery: that-what’s and what-that’s

Schindler, Samuel (2014) Scientific discovery: that-what’s and what-that’s. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper I defend Kuhn’s view of scientific discovery, which involves two central tenets, namely (i) that a scientific discovery always requires a discovery-that (i.e., the observation of X) and a discovery-what (i.e., the correct conceptualisation of X), and (ii) that there are two kinds of scientific discovery, resulting from the temporal order of the discovery-that and the discovery-what. I identify two problems with Kuhn’s account and offer solutions to them from a realist stance. Alternatives to Kuhn’s account are also discussed.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Schindler, Samuelsamuel.schindler@css.au.dk
Keywords: discovery, Kuhn, essence, science, theory-ladenness
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Samuel Schindler
Date Deposited: 27 Oct 2014 15:21
Last Modified: 27 Oct 2014 15:21
Item ID: 11090
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 2014
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11090

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