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Is identity really so fundamental?

Krause, Décio and Arenhart, Jonas R. B. (2015) Is identity really so fundamental? [Preprint]

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Abstract

We critically examine the claim by Otávio Bueno (Bueno O. 2014. “Why identity is fundamental”. American Philosophical Quarterly 51, 325-332) that identity is a fundamental concept. Bueno advances four related theses in order to ground such a claim: 1) identity is presupposed in every conceptual system; 2) identity is required to characterize an individual; 3) identity cannot be defined; 4) the intelligibility of quantification requires identity. We address each of these points and argue that there are no compelling reasons to hold that identity is fundamental in these cases. So, in the end, identity may not be a fundamental concept after all.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Krause, Déciodeciokrause@gmail.com
Arenhart, Jonas R. B.jonas.becker2@gmail.cpm
Keywords: identity, definition of identity, quantification without identity, quantum objects
Subjects: General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Décio Krause
Date Deposited: 01 Feb 2015 00:46
Last Modified: 01 Feb 2015 00:46
Item ID: 11295
Subjects: General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 30 January 2015
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11295

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