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What Becomes of a Causal Set

Wuthrich, Christian and Callender, Craig (2015) What Becomes of a Causal Set. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Unlike the relativity theory it seeks to replace, causal set theory has been interpreted to leave space for a substantive, though perhaps ‘localized’, form of ‘becoming’. The possibility of fundamental becoming is nourished by the fact that the analogue of Stein’s theorem from special relativity does not hold in causal set theory. Despite this, we find that in many ways, the debate concerning becoming parallels the well-rehearsed lines it follows in the domain of relativity. We present, however, some new twists and challenges. In particular, we show that a novel and exotic notion of becoming is compatible with causal sets. In contrast to the ‘localized’ becoming considered compatible with the dynamics of causal set theory by its advocates, our novel kind of becoming, while not answering to the typical A-theoretic demands, is ‘global’ and objective.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Wuthrich, Christianwuthrich@ucsd.edu
Callender, Craigccallender@ucsd.edu
Keywords: causal set theory; quantum gravity; time; becoming; relativity; present; dynamics
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Gravity
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Depositing User: Craig Callender
Date Deposited: 04 Feb 2015 15:34
Last Modified: 04 Feb 2015 15:34
Item ID: 11298
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Gravity
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Date: 30 January 2015
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11298

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