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An argument for psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements

Gao, Shan (2015) An argument for psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The ontological model framework provides a rigorous approach to address the question of whether the quantum state is ontic or epistemic. When considering only conventional projective measurements, auxiliary assumptions are always needed to prove the reality of the quantum state in the framework. For example, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem is based on an additional preparation independence assumption. In this paper, we give a new proof of psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements in the ontological model framework. The proof does not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and also applies to deterministic theories such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In addition, we give a simpler argument for psi-ontology beyond the framework, which is based on protective measurements and a weaker criterion of reality. The argument may be also appealing for those people who favor an anti-realist view of quantum mechanics.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gao, Shansgao7319@uni.sydney.edu.au
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
Keywords: ontological model framework;quantum state; auxiliary assumptions; Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem; psi-ontology; protective measurements; deterministic theories; de Broglie-Bohm theory; criterion of reality; anti-realist view of quantum mechanics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Mr. Shan Gao
Date Deposited: 12 Aug 2015 16:19
Last Modified: 12 Aug 2015 16:19
Item ID: 11608
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 24 June 2015
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11608

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