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Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science

Ivanova, Milena (2015) Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science. Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science, 52. pp. 114-122.

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Abstract

Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the
relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincaré’s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincaré’s conventionalism and its position in Poincaré’s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincaré defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which departs him from metaphysical realism.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ivanova, Milenamail@milenaivanova.co.uk
Keywords: Conventionalism, Henri Poincaré, Neo-Kantianism, Structural Realism, Synthetic A Priori
Depositing User: Dr Milena Ivanova
Date Deposited: 15 Dec 2015 13:47
Last Modified: 15 Dec 2015 13:47
Item ID: 11813
Journal or Publication Title: Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science
Publisher: Elsevier
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
Date: 2015
Page Range: pp. 114-122
Volume: 52
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11813

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