PhilSci Archive

Ambiguity is Kinda Good, Sometimes

O'Connor, Cailin (2014) Ambiguity is Kinda Good, Sometimes. [Preprint]

[img] PDF (Published in Philosophy of Science, 2015)
AmbiguityPreprint.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (241kB)

Abstract

Santana (2014) shows that in common interest signaling games when signals are costly and when receivers can observe contextual environmental cues, ambiguous signaling strategies outperform precise ones and can, as a result, evolve. In this note, I show that if one assumes realistic structure on the state space of a common interest signaling game, ambiguous strategies can be explained without appeal to contextual cues. I conclude by arguing that there are multiple types of cases of payoff beneficial ambiguity, some of which are better explained by Santana's models and some of which are better explained by the models presented here.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
O'Connor, Cailincailino@uci.edu
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, decision theory, sim-max game, signaling, ambiguity, language, evolution, evolution of language
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Depositing User: Dr. Cailin O'Connor
Date Deposited: 12 Apr 2016 22:48
Last Modified: 12 Apr 2016 22:48
Item ID: 12037
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Date: 2014
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12037

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item