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A Material Theory of Induction

Norton, John D. (2003) A Material Theory of Induction. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that <I>all inductive inference is local</I>. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, we extend our inductive reach by supplying more localized inductive inference schemes. Since a material theory no longer separates the factual and schematic parts of an induction, it proves not to be vulnerable to Hume's problem of the justification of induction.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
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Norton, John D.
Additional Information: Submitted to <I>Philosophy of Science</I>
Keywords: induction confirmation
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: John Norton
Date Deposited: 04 Jun 2003
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID: 1207
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1207

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