Friederich, Simon (2016) Choosing Beauty. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently plausible ways sometimes yields the startling conclusion that rational credences are such as if agents had bizarre causal powers. The present paper introduces a novel version of the Sleeping Beauty problem—Choosing
Beauty—for which the response to the problem advocated by David Lewis unappealingly yields this conclusion. Furthermore, it suggests as a general desideratum for approaches to problems of self-locating belief that they
should not recommend credences that are as if anyone had anomalous causal powers. Adopting this desideratum, as the paper shows, yields uniformly plausible verdicts on the most-discussed problems of self-locating belief.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Friederich, Simon email@simonfriederich.eu
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in "Logique et Analyse"
Keywords:	Doomsday Argument · Sleeping Beauty · self-locating belief · anomalous causal powers
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Dr. Simon Friederich
Date Deposited:	06 May 2016 13:29
Last Modified:	06 May 2016 13:29
Item ID:	12078
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12078

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