PhilSci Archive

Conditional Degree of Belief

Sprenger, Jan (2015) Conditional Degree of Belief. [Preprint]

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
Text
ConditionalProbability_v3.pdf

Download (183kB) | Preview

Abstract

It is a commonplace in epistemology that credences should equal known chances. It is less clear, however, that conditional credences should do so, too. Following Ramsey, this paper proposes a counterfactual interpretation of conditional probability which provides a justification for this equality without relying on the Principal Principle. As a result, we obtain a refined view of Bayesian inference where both learning and supposing have a place.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sprenger, Janj.sprenger@uvt.nl
Keywords: conditional probability, degree of belief, statistical inference, Principal Principle, Ramsey
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Jan Sprenger
Date Deposited: 25 Jul 2016 17:06
Last Modified: 25 Jul 2016 17:06
Item ID: 12304
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 7 December 2015
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12304

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item