Spencer, Quayshawn (2016) In Defense of the Actual Metaphysics of Race. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

In a recent paper, David Ludwig (2015, 244) argues that “the new metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of metaphysical and normative classificatory issues.” Ludwig defends his thesis by arguing that the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-substantive metaphysics from contemporary metametaphysics. However, I show that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of actual metaphysics of race. One interesting result is that actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the metaphysics done in philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Spencer, Quayshawn qspencer@upenn.edu 0000-0001-6896-164X
Keywords:	race, metaphysics, pluralism, racial realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Science and Society
Depositing User:	Dr. Quayshawn Spencer
Date Deposited:	28 Oct 2016 13:48
Last Modified:	28 Oct 2016 13:48
Item ID:	12527
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Science and Society
Date:	27 October 2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12527

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