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Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism

Bhakthavatsalam, Sindhuja (2016) Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Stump (2007) argued for a virtue epistemological reading of Duhem's good sense: according to him Duhem advanced good sense as a source of justified beliefs about theory choice and as a mark of the cognitive character of the physicist. Ivanova (2010) argues that Duhem proposed good sense as a post hoc explanation of theory choice rather than as a justification of it. I contend that Ivanova’s reading of Duhem is inaccurate and that good sense can indeed be accommodated within virtue epistemology. However Stump’s account is incomplete: I propose that within virtue epistemology, agent reliabilism best accommodates Duhemian good sense.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Bhakthavatsalam, Sindhujasbhakthav@csun.edu
Keywords: Duhem, Underdetermination, Good Sense, Virtue Epistemology, Theory Choice
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam
Date Deposited: 28 Oct 2016 14:01
Last Modified: 28 Oct 2016 14:01
Item ID: 12535
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: 3 November 2016
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12535

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