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No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of Meta-Induction

Schurz, Gerhard (2016) No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of Meta-Induction. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

The no free lunch theorem (Wolpert 1996) is a radicalized version of Hume's induction skepticism. It asserts that relative to a uniform probability distribution over all possible worlds, all computable prediction algorithms - whether 'clever' inductive or 'stupid' guessing methods (etc.) - have the same expected predictive success. This theorem seems to be in conflict with results about meta-induction (Schurz 2008). According to these results, certain meta-inductive prediction strategies may dominate other (non-meta-inductive) methods in their predictive success (in the long run). In this paper this conflict is analyzed and dissolved, by means of probabilistic analysis and computer simulation.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Schurz, Gerhard
Keywords: No free lunch theorem, inductive skepticism, optimality of meta-induction
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Depositing User: Gerhard Schurz
Date Deposited: 29 Oct 2016 16:40
Last Modified: 29 Oct 2016 16:40
Item ID: 12540
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Date: 28 October 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12540

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