Eagle, Antony (2003) Russell, Causation, Determinism. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Two arguments due to Russell are examined, and found to show that the notion of causation as full determination doesn’t mesh easily with deterministic global physics and the distinction between effective and ineffective strategies. But a concept of local causation as involving a certain kind of counterfactual dependence is, I argue, compatible with Russell’s conclusions. I defend it from a resurgent form of Russell’s microphysical determinism argument by using some slightly contentious claims about the autonomy of the events posited by the special sciences.

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Item Type:	Other
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Eagle, Antony
Keywords:	Bertrand Russell
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User:	Antony Eagle
Date Deposited:	31 Jul 2003
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID:	1261
Public Domain:	No
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date:	2003
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1261

Available Versions of this Item

• Russell, Causation, Determinism. (deposited 31 Jul 2003) [Currently Displayed]
  • Pragmatic Causation. (deposited 13 Nov 2003)

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