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Responsiveness and robustness in the David Lewis signaling game

Brusse, Carl and Bruner, Justin (2017) Responsiveness and robustness in the David Lewis signaling game. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signalling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we explore realistic asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signalling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this paper can also help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict of interest signalling games.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Brusse, Carlcarl.brusse@anu.edu.au0000-0001-5732-8750
Bruner, Justinjustin.bruner@anu.edu.au
Additional Information: Updated version for publication in Philosophy of Science 84(5), December 2017
Keywords: David Lewis signalling games, Evolution of communication, Simulation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Carl Brusse
Date Deposited: 26 Jan 2017 15:30
Last Modified: 26 Jan 2017 15:30
Item ID: 12769
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12769

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