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Does weak discernibility determine metaphysics?

Arenhart, Jonas R. B. (2017) Does weak discernibility determine metaphysics? THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (1). pp. 109-125. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Two entities are weakly discernible when an irreflexive and symmetric relation holds between them. That weak discernibility holds in quantum mechanics is fairly uncontroversial nowadays. The ontological consequences of weak discernibility, however, are far from clear. Part of the literature seems to imply that weak discernibility points to a definite metaphysics to quantum mechanics. In this paper we shall discuss the metaphysical contribution of weak discernibility to quantum mechanics and argue that, contrary to part of current literature, it does not provide for a fully naturalistic determination of metaphysics. Underdetermination of the metaphysics still plagues the way of the naturalist.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Arenhart, Jonas R. B.jonas.becker2@gmail.com
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: weak discernibility; ontic structural realism; naturalistic metaphysics; metaphysical underdetermination.
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 06 Mar 2017 15:35
Last Modified: 06 Mar 2017 15:35
Item ID: 12880
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.15870
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: January 2017
Page Range: pp. 109-125
Volume: 32
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12880

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