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Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions

Votsis, Ioannis (2014) Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 45 (1). pp. 70-78.

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to put in place some cornerstones in the foundations for an objective theory of confirmation by considering lessons from the failures of predictivism. Discussion begins with a widely accepted challenge, to find out what is needed in addition to the right kind of inferential–semantical relations between hypothesis and evidence to have a complete account of confirmation, one that gives
a definitive answer to the question whether hypotheses branded as ‘‘post hoc monsters’’ can be confirmed. The predictivist view is then presented as a way to meet this challenge. Particular attention
is paid to Worrall’s version of predictivism, as it appears to be the most sophisticated of the lot. It is argued that, despite its faults, his view turns our heads in the right direction by attempting to remove contingent considerations from confirmational matters. The demand to remove such considerations becomes the first of four cornerstones. Each cornerstone is put in place with the aim to steer clear of
the sort of failures that plague various kinds of predictivism. In the process, it becomes obvious that the original challenge is wrongheaded and in need of revision. The paper ends with just such a revision.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Votsis, Ioannis
Keywords: objective confirmation, predictivism, accomodationism, novel prediction, double counting, post hoc, ad hoc
Subjects: General Issues > Data
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Dr Ioannis Votsis
Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2017 14:53
Last Modified: 22 Mar 2017 14:53
Item ID: 12928
Journal or Publication Title: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
Subjects: General Issues > Data
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 2014
Page Range: pp. 70-78
Volume: 45
Number: 1
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12928

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