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On the Justification of Deduction and Induction

Huber, Franz (2017) On the Justification of Deduction and Induction. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end. I will begin by presenting a contemporary variant of Hume (1739; 1748)'s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap (1963; 1968) and Goodman (1954), as well as praise Reichenbach (1938; 1940)'s approach.

Some of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack (1976) compares deduction to induction, and I will critically discuss her argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principles of deduction next. In concluding I will defend the thesis that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end, and that we can do so in a non-circular way. Along the way I will show how we can understand deductive and inductive logic as normative theories, and I will briefly sketch an argument to the effect that there are only hypothetical, but no categorical imperatives.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Huber, Franzfranz.huber@utoronto.ca
Keywords: justification of induction; Carnap, Goodman, Reichenbach; justification of deduction, Haack
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email franz.huber@utoronto.ca
Date Deposited: 25 Apr 2017 20:46
Last Modified: 25 Apr 2017 20:46
Item ID: 13004
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13004

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